MOSCOW PRESSING FOR CFE TREATY RATIFICATION DESPITE ITS OWN NON-COMPLIANCE
By Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
May 17 2006
Amid a deep secrecy that belies its democratic professions, the OSCE is
preparing to hold a Conference to Review the Operation of the Treaty
on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) in Vienna at the end of this
month. Some West European chancelleries are seeking ways to give in to
Moscow’s main goal at this conference: ratification of the 1999 treaty
at the expense of a few small countries in Europe’s East. Thus far,
Moscow has only managed to persuade Belarus, Ukraine (during Leonid
Kuchma’s presidency), and Kazakhstan to ratify that treaty.
Originally signed in 1990, the CFE Treaty underwent adaptation at the
1999 OSCE Istanbul summit, in one package with the Final Act that
includes what came to be known as Russia’s “Istanbul Commitments”;
namely, to withdraw its forces from Georgia and Moldova. While the
original 1990 treaty remains in force, the 1999-adapted treaty
never entered into force because Russia has not fulfilled those
commitments. Moreover, Armenian forces deploy Russian-supplied heavy
weaponry exceeding CFE treaty limits in areas seized from Azerbaijan,
out of bounds to international inspection.
Meanwhile, Russia seeks to extend the CFE Treaty’s area of
applicability so as to include the three Baltic states, which were
not parties to the 1990 treaty (they were still occupied by Moscow
at that time). Since the Baltic states joined NATO, Russia seeks
to bring them under the purview of the 1999-adapted CFE treaty and
start negotiations with them about limiting allied forces that might
hypothetically be deployed to the Baltic states’ territories, for
example in crisis contingencies. Legally, however, the Baltic states
cannot join an unratified treaty.
Thus, Russia is now pressing for the treaty’s speedy ratification
by all state-parties, so as to make possible the Baltic states’
accession to the ratified treaty, while still keeping Russian troops
on Georgia’s and Moldova’s territories in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and
Transnistria. Moscow calculates that Western consent to ratification
of the 1999 treaty in such circumstances would legitimize, prolong,
and even legalize the stationing of Russian troops in Georgia and
Moldova as “peacekeepers.”
To pave the way for such an outcome, Moscow has agreed with Georgia
to close Russian bases and military installations situated deep
inside the country by 2008 (nine years after its pledge to do so);
but it insists on maintaining its “peacekeeping” forces in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia while heavily arming its proxy forces there. Russia
had liquidated most of its treaty-limited weaponry in Transnistria
already in 2001; but retains a part of it to this day, has transferred
another part as well as personnel to Transnistria-flagged forces,
and openly repudiates the obligation to withdraw Russia’s own troops,
styled as “peacekeepers.”
The United States as well as NATO collectively take the position
that ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty is inseparably linked
to fulfillment of Russia’s commitments to withdraw its forces from
Georgia and Moldova; and that the Baltic states would accede to the
treaty, once it enters into force.
Russia has drafted its version of a decision for the CFE Treaty Review
conference and wants negotiations on its basis in the OSCE’s Joint
Consultative Group (JCG), the Vienna forum of the 30 state-parties to
the treaty. Moscow’s draft claims, “Most commitments and arrangements
mentioned in the [1999] Final Act are either already fulfilled or
are in the process of fulfillment, [while] the implementation of
the remaining ones has no direct relevance to the CFE Treaty and
depends on the progress of conflict settlement on the territories
of some State Parties.” It proposes that all state parties should
deem the 1999 treaty as valid from October 2006, start the national
ratification procedures, bring the treaty into force in 2007, and
“discuss the possibility of accession of new participants.”
The translation: Although Russia has far from completely honored
its force-withdrawal commitments, the state-parties (mostly NATO and
European Union member countries) should agree that is has. Thus, they
should: proceed with the Moscow-desired ratification of the treaty;
de-link ratification from the fulfillment of Russia’s withdrawal
commitments, using the conflicts for an excuse; lean on Georgia,
Moldova, and Azerbaijan to accept the situation and ratify the
treaty; and start the procedure of the Baltic states’ accession to
the force-limiting treaty.
Some German, French, Belgian, and other diplomats are now exploring
a solution that could allow Russia to claim that it has fulfilled
its troop-withdrawal commitments. Such a solution would:
1) exempt Russia’s “peacekeeping” troops from the obligation
to withdraw, recognizing their hitherto unrecognized role as
“peacekeepers” and allowing them to stay on;
2) silently tolerate the arsenals of CFE treaty-limited weaponry that
Russia has transferred to proxy forces in Transnistria, Abkhazia,
and South Ossetia, as well as the deployments inside Azerbaijan; and
3) elicit consent from Tbilisi, Chisinau, and Baku with such a
solution.
It would seem that the secrecy surrounding the JCG debates in Vienna
and the ironing out of common positions at the EU in Brussels is a
propitious atmosphere for a compromise with Moscow at the expense
of small countries. Lack of transparency in Vienna also tends to
facilitate undercutting or diluting the U.S. and collective NATO
position on these issues through initiatives from a few important
European capitals.
(JCG documents, May 2006)