EXPOSING THE MYTH OF LASTING IRANIAN-TURKISH AMITY
By Soner Cagaptay and Duden Yegenoglu
Daily Star (Lebanon)
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, DC
May 23 2006
With Iran’s nuclearization a hot button issue, analysts are asking
how Turkey, the only NATO country bordering Iran, would respond if
the United States imposed sanctions on Tehran or chose a military
option to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. There is one
answer that American policymakers will hear in Ankara: Turkey should
not confront Iran because Turkey and Iran have been good neighbors
since the 1639 Treaty of Kasri Sirin (also called the Treaty of
Zuhab). Turkish policymakers assert that the two countries have
neither fought nor changed their mutual border since that date.
The “Myth of Kasri Sirin” suggests four centuries of amicable ties
between Turkey and Iran. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Turkey and Iran have repeatedly fought since 1639, and since the 1979
Islamic Revolution Iran has supported terror groups inside Turkey to
undermine governments there.
First, some history: The Ottoman and Iranian empires have fought
many wars since Kasri Sirin. A full-scale war broke out in 1733 when
the Persians attempted to take Baghdad from the Turks. The Persian
siege of Baghdad and the accompanying battles ended in 1746 with the
Treaty of Kurdan, signed between the new Zand Dynasty of Persia and
the Ottoman Empire.
Soon after, in 1775, the Zand Dynasty attacked the Ottoman Empire
again and captured Basra. The invasion lasted until 1821, at which
time another war started between the Ottoman Empire and the new
Qajar Dynasty of Persia. The war ended in 1823, with the First Treaty
of Erzurum.
Rivalry over Muhammarah region (Iran’s modern-day Khorramshar) deepened
the conflict between the two empires by adding a new dimension to
the conflict. Persians and Ottoman Iraqi governors clashed over its
control, bringing the two empires to the brink of war in 1840. The
British intervened, establishing a boundary commission composed
of Iranian, Turkish, British, and Russian diplomats. As a result,
the Persian and Ottoman empires signed the Second Treaty of Erzurum,
reconfiguring the Iranian-Ottoman border.
Troubles between the two countries extended well beyond the Ottoman
era. Fighting also took place across the Turkish-Iranian border during
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s rule in Turkey. In 1930, when some Kurds
launched a rebellion around Mount Greater Agri (Ararat) in Turkey,
Kurdish bands armed by Armenian nationalists entered Turkey across
the Iranian border to support the rebellion.
This was no small skirmish. Turkey used airplanes in a counterattack
and mobilized 15,000 troops to suppress the incursion. In the end,
the Turkish Army was able to put down the border infiltration, though
with great difficulty, and only after losing several planes. In 1931,
Ankara asked Iran for a border rectification that put Mount Lesser
Agri, the base of the 1930 incursions, inside Turkey.
Volatility along the border became an issue again when the terrorist
Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) launched a campaign against Turkey in
1984. Iran’s theocratic regime, diametrically opposed to Turkey’s
secular, pro-Western society, saw the PKK as a useful tool to wreak
havoc in Turkey. Accordingly, Tehran allowed PKK bases such as Haj
Umran, Dar Khala, Benchul, Mandali, and Sirabad in its territory. Ali
Koknar, an expert on terrorism, writes that in 1995 the PKK “maintained
about 1,200 of its members at around 50 locations in Iran.” Throughout
the 1980s and the 1990s, the PKK crossed from these bases into Turkey,
attacking the Turkish military as well as killing civilians.
Iran has supported not only the PKK but also Islamist terrorist
cells. Since the 1979 revolution, Iranian-backed cells have killed a
number of secular Turkish intellectuals and journalists considered
offensive, including theologian Bahriye Ucok, a female Islamist
modernizer, and journalist Cetin Emec.
Interestingly, Iran’s policy of war by proxy, the use of the PKK and
Islamist terrorists to undermine Turkey’s secular system, has recently
come to a strategic halt. Since the beginning of the Iraq war, Tehran
has been feeling an increase in American-imposed isolation. To break
this policy, Iran has launched a policy of courting Ankara. Iran
now aims to win the Turks’ hearts. In this regard, Tehran is taking
advantage of American inaction against the PKK’s Qandil terror enclave
in northern Iraq — a fact that is planting seeds of resentment in
Turkey toward Washington — by launching attacks against Qandil and
the very PKK camps Iran allowed in the 1990s.
While these steps are helping Tehran build a positive image in Turkey,
the fact is that Tehran is far from the benevolent neighbor the “Myth
of Kasri Sirin” implies. Turkey and Iran have fought many times since
1639, repeatedly changing their mutual border, including as recently
as 1931. Lately, Tehran has fought war by proxy against Ankara. Yet,
like all other myths, the “Myth of Kasri Sirin” satisfies a real need:
So long as the U.S. ignores Turkey’s battle against the PKK in Iraq,
the future holds out the possibility that Ankara may be closer to
Tehran than to Washington.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy, an Ertegun professor at Princeton University,
and chair of the Turkey Program at the State Department’s Foreign
Service Institute. Duden Yegenoglu is a research assistant at
the Washington Institute. This commentary first appeared at
bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter presenting
contending views of Arab or Middle Eastern affairs.