Montenegro Breaks Away: Will Abkhazia Follow?

MONTENEGRO BREAKS AWAY: WILL ABKHAZIA FOLLOW?
by Maksim Yusin
Translated by Pavel Pushkin

Source: Izvestia, May 25, 2006, pp. 1-2 EV
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
May 25, 2006 Thursday

Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Trans-Dniester are watching Montenegro;
Montenegro’s independence is sure to inspire all those who are striving
for a revision of internationally-recognized borders. This primarily
applies to the regions where interethnic bloodshed has flared already,
with conflicts being “frozen” at some stage. Frozen, but not resolved.

Will Montenegro’s separation from Serbia trigger a chain reaction?

That might well be the most pressing question in European politics
today. The continent has at least ten other territories striving for
separation from the states to which they “belong” at present.

All of Europe’s potential separatists have been paying close attention
to developments in Montenegro. It’s hardly surprising that the leaders
of Abkhazia and the Trans-Dniester region were among the first foreign
politicians to respond to the referendum results. They welcomed the
“free expression of the people’s will” in Montenegro, and stated that
they would also like to hold independence referendums. But who would
recognize the outcomes of those referendums?

The Europeans and Americans are prepared to recognize Montenegro’s
independence, but say it’s a special case and any analogies with
other separatist regions would be inappropriate. There’s a certain
amount of logic behind those words.

Three federative states broke up after the communist system collapsed:
the USSR, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. The international community
was faced with a tough decision: what kind of criteria it would use
for recognizing or not recognizing new countries.

Eventually, it was decided that recognition would be extended to
territories that possessed something akin to sovereignty within
their former states (in the case of the USSR, that meant the 15 union
republics). But autonomous formations within those republics could
not aspire to independence.

This criterion isn’t incontestable, but at least it’s clear and
definite. It has been used to redraw the map of the world. Fifteen
new state arose to replace the Soviet Union, and two states replaced
Czechoslovakia. Only the case of Yugoslavia produced a glitch:
Montenegro declined to separate from Serbia. This situation continued
for 15 years. But now the Montenegrins have changed their minds and
decided to make use of their “postponed” right to sovereignty.

This doesn’t seem to disrupt the logic of the process – but just try
explaining it to the residents of “autonomous formations” in Georgia,
Moldova, or Bosnia. They don’t care about the subtleties of diplomatic
formulations. They simply can’t understand why the Montenegrins are
allowed to do this, but they are not. Why the double standards?

So Montenegro’s independence is sure to inspire all those who are
striving for a revision of internationally-recognized borders. This
primarily applies to the regions where interethnic bloodshed has
flared already, with conflicts being “frozen” at some stage. Frozen,
but not resolved.

* * *

Abkhazia and South Ossetia (want to separate from Georgia)

1. Conflict History

After Georgia declared independence in 1991, Abkhazia (holding
autonomous republic status) and South Ossetia (an autonomous region)
declared their wish to secede from Georgia and become part of Russia.

Matters reached the point of war with Tbilisi in both cases. Russia
sided with the autonomies. The Georgians were defeated in both South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and at present they don’t control either of
the self-proclaimed republics.

2. Russia’s position

Officially, Moscow recognizes Georgia’s territorial integrity and
refuses repeated requests from Sukhumi and Tskhinvali for “admittance
into the Russian Federation.” All the same, Russia provides various
forms of aid to the governments of both unrecognized republics;
most of their residents have been granted Russian citizenship, and
the ruble is used as currency on their territories. Tbilisi accuses
Moscow of “creeping annexation.”

3. The West’s position

The United States and Europe are in full solidarity with Georgia,
recognizing its territorial integrity and calling for both conflicts
to be resolved via peaceful negotiations. Last year, when Georgian
President Mikhail Saakashvili seemed on the verge of launching a
military operation against South Ossetia, the Americans pressured
him to exercising restraint. A war was averted. However, the West
has been arming and training the Georgian military.

4. Prospects

In Tbilisi, many believe that the fate of both territories is sealed:
sooner or later, Russia will annex them. At the official level,
Moscow tries not to provide the slightest reason to suspect it of
harboring such intentions. Unofficially, Moscow makes it clear to
the Georgians that if Tbilisi attempts to use force to settle the
question of Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Russia is unlikely to stand
aside. So it’s better to negotiate, not fight. But the negotiations
have been deadlocked for years.

* * *

The Trans-Dniester region (wants to separate from Moldova)

1. Conflict History

In many respects, the Trans-Dniester scenario is reminiscent of
Abkhazia or South Ossetia. The residents of the Dniester River’s left
bank didn’t want to be part of independent Moldova, and declared that
they wanted to join Russia. The result was a brief but bloody war,
stopped only after Russia intervened, sending in troops commanded by
General Alexander Lebed. There hasn’t been any more fighting since
then, but negotiations haven’t made any progress either.

2. Russia’s position

The Russian authorities probably haven’t ever given any serious
consideration to annexing Trans-Dniester. The practical aspects would
be too difficult: Russia doesn’t share a border with the unrecognized
republic – they are separted by Ukraine. Moscow hoped to resolve the
conflict with the Kozak Plan, drawn up by Dmitri Kozak when he was
the senior deputy director of the presidential administration. But
Chisinau rejected the Kozak Plan, following unprecedented pressure
from EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana.

3. The West’s position

The Europeans and Americans were strongly opposed to the Kozak Plan.

They were particularly annoyed by the point specifying a continued
Russian military presence on Trans-Dniester territory. When Viktor
Yushchenko’s orange team came to power in Ukraine, the West decided
to use economic measures of influence on the “separatists” in
Tiraspol. The Ukrainian authorities blocked access to Trans-Dniester
for goods that didn’t go through Moldovan customs. Tiraspol called
it a blockade. Russia sent humanitarian aid to Trans-Dniester. The
West expressed full support for Kiev.

4. Prospects

The West won’t accept the Trans-Dniester region’s separation from
Moldova under any circumstances. The European Union’s activity with
regard to Trans-Dniester is likely to increase, especially after
Romania joins the EU, since it’s the major force lobbying for Moldova’s
interests. A military solution to the conflict is unlikely, especially
since Russian peacekeepers are still present in Trans-Dniester.

* * *

Nagorno-Karabakh (wants to separate from Azerbaijan)

1. Conflict History

The Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region, part of the Azerbaijan
Soviet Socialist Republic, had a mostly Armenian population. In the
late 1980s, they started making demands to join Armenia. The first
inter-ethnic clashes flared up even before the USSR collapsed, and
the bloodiest fighting happened in 1992-93. With Armenia’s support,
the Armenians of Karabakh won the war – capturing all the disputed
districts, as well as some adjacent regions of Azerbaijan. The conflict
has been frozen ever since.

2. Russia’s position

Moscow officially recognizes Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan,
and acts as a mediator. All the same, many Azeris suspect Russia of
siding with the Armenians and lobbying for their interests. The Azeris
claim that the Armenians wouldn’t have won the war for Nagorno-Karabakh
without help from Russian Armed Forces units stationed in the region.

3. The West’s position

The United States maintains close relations with Azerbaijan,
encouraging it to pursue “a foreign policy independent of Russia.”

Relations with Armenia are more complicated, since Washington considers
that the Armenian government looks to Moscow too much.

However, there are influential Armenian diasporas in the United
States and in Europe. They prevent the West from siding entirely with
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

4. Prospects

The Nagorno-Karabakh status negotiations are deadlocked. Armenia
insists that Nagorno-Karabakh should be independent, while Azerbaijan
refuses to consider the idea. Baku occasionally threatens to resolve
the problem by force, while pointing out that time is on Azerbaijan’s
side: it’s an oil-rich country that can spend far more on its military
needs than Armenia, which has essentially been existing in blockade
conditions for the past 15 years. All the same, the Azeri military
isn’t ready to challenge Armenia as yet.