NATO’S EVIL TWIN?
By Evgeny Morozov

TCS Daily, DC
June 8 2006

“I find it passing strange to bring a leading terrorist nation in the
world into an organization that says it’s against terror”, said Donald
Rumsfeld in Singapore last week, elevating the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) to the fore of media attention.

“OPEC with bombs”, as a commentator in one Canadian newspaper dubbed
SCO, is now the official bogeyman of the month. Ever since its
inception in 2001, SCO lingered in total media blackout, but Rumsfeld
gave its forthcoming summit in Shanghai the best PR it could hope
for. Bloggers — both liberal and conservative — have also recently
picked on the subject, mostly portraying SCO as a militaristic behemoth
aspiring to counterbalance American supremacy in Asia.

Becoming of a bogeyman, SCO is depicted in a rather bellicose manner
redolent of the Cold War era. Touted as Russia and China’s response
to NATO, SCO appears even more threatening, especially when plotted
against Pentagon’s fretting about China’s military expansion. And
now Iran — that perpetual bogeyman — aspires to join too. Global
security, if not the world order, seems to be at stake.

Are such fears justified?

The organization’s past and present do not seem to warrant all the
bad press. SCO launched to deal with security and confidence-building
issues (border conflicts, terrorism, and militant Islam), and since
then has expanded to the matters of economics, transportation,
culture, disaster relief, and law enforcement. So far, SCO sounds
short of NATO-type of tasks, doesn’t it?

A closer examination reveals that SCO aspires to be neither a new
NATO nor a new Warsaw Pact. At least, not yet and not officially. Its
charter has no reference to collective defense of its member by
others in the event of an outside attack (well, it does stipulate for
collective resistance to big armed gangs or international terrorists
if they cross the border of a member country — but NATO troops hardly
fall under that category). SCO has even developed a promising mechanism
for conflict resolution: i.e. last year when China suggested bringing
in Pakistan as an observer, Russia insisted that India be invited
too. As a result, both now cooperate within SCO’s framework.

In a move characteristic of the proposed cooperation under the SCO
auspices, China has extended loans worth of $900 million to other
SCO members so that they can buy Chinese exports. In another move,
Russia has recently agreed to help Tajikistan improve its border
security and fight drug-trafficking. SCO’s activities might not sound
extremely pacifist, but they do not sound belligerent either.

Set against the background of the rising violence in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the fact that Asian states cooperate in combating
terrorist threats is hard to reprimand. Even Rumsfeld agreed that
the increasing military cooperation between Asian countries bodes
well for the region’s stability. So, what’s all the fuss about?

Perhaps, the Pentagon hawks are fixating on the wrong organization —
they would be much wiser to look at the Collective Security Treaty
Organization, which comprises all of the SCO member states plus
Belarus and Armenia minus China. This is a true anti-NATO alliance in
the post-Soviet space, and it hardly concedes its real intentions
(which are obvious from the name). Yet how often have you seen
this organization in the press? (Perhaps, it is because Iran is not
joining it.)

Has SCO appeared threatening in the past? Partly. The only instance
when it flexed its muscles was at its Astana summit in 2005, when
members asked US troops to provide a deadline for their withdrawal
from Central Asia. However, it was an exercise in PR rather than
an exhibit of military strength. In the past, such statements would
have originated from some Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
institution — would anybody in their right minds ever accuse CIS of
presenting a threat to the international security?

Today as SCO’s clout in the region grows, Iran feels a strong urge
to become a member. The application to join was submitted by the
President Khatami, Ahmadinejad’s predecessor. Now the latter appears
firmly committed to cement Iran’s place in the SCO. Unlike most of
Ahmadinejad’s other desires, this one is hardly outlandish.

Sandwiched between Afghanistan and Iraq and facing grave problems
with its tumultuous minorities, Iran wants to step up its efforts
in preventing potential terrorist threats. The recent unrest of its
Azeri minority over a cartoon published in a local newspaper was an
alarming sign of how unruly things might soon become (four people
were killed and 70 injured, while the whole Azeri community in the
region was watching the evens with great uneasiness).

Acquiring membership in SCO would be a logical way to alleviate
Tehran’s concerns and ensure “collective resistance to big armed
gangs”. No matter whether it is Ahmadinejad or any other more
democratically elected leader ruling the country, reining in Iran’s
minorities is a top priority for the US, and Iraq is not the last
reason for that (Iran’s Kurds and Sunni Arabs might yet play their
own card in Baghdad). As an extra tool to prevent ethnic tensions in
the region, SCO might not be that bad.

So, why not capitalize on Iran’s vulnerability, and factor in
Ahmadinejad’s fears and SCO ambitious in all policy calculations?

Well, that’s easier said than done; Moscow and Beijing have tasted the
lucre of horse-trading and, depending on which official you talk to,
are sending mixed signals about their eagerness to embrace Iran in SCO.

Their stance is changing symmetrically in response to the US
position. The more vocally US oppose Iran’s membership in SCO, the
more strongly Russians and Chinese appear to want it. However, in the
rare moments that the White House skirts the issue, the Russians and
the Chinese oppose Iran’s membership themselves.

Thus, in early April Zhang Deguang, the Secretary General of SCO stated
that the organization would consider application for full membership
from observers. Just a few weeks later, Sergey Ivanov, Russia’s
minister of defense, expressed skepticism about any forthcoming
enlargements of the SCO. A few weeks later Gleb Pavlvosky, the
Kremlin’s spin doctor, said that “the consideration of this issue
was planned a year ago, and if Iran is still interested and if no
insurmountable obstacles are put by the SCO member-states or Iran
itself, this might well happen”.

Approximately at the same time, Russian foreign minister Sergey
Lavrov stated that the SCO is in the process of negotiating a possible
membership with Tehran.

To add to the controversy, on May 29 the Secretary General changed
his mind, saying that the organization’s charter does not provide
for the inclusion of new members (he obviously did not know when he
spoke in April). Nevertheless, an invitation to attend SCO’s 2006
summit was sent to Ahmadinejad; he agreed to come.

Seen through the prism of international relations, the opposition by
the two of SCO’s founding and dominating members to Iran’s membership
does not square well with their rhetoric of geopolitics. If Beijing
and Moscow believe in their own stories about the multipolar world,
they should jump at the opportunity to handle Iran’s crisis; having
it in the SCO will only strengthen the multipolarity they crave. Up
till now, however, their support for Iran’s bid to join SCO has been
rather “muted”.

To see why, suppose the US lifts its opposition to Iran’s membership
in SCO. Will it be the end of the unipolar world and the US military
supremacy? Or rather the end to Russia and China’s horse-trading with
the West? The second option is much more likely, so Iran’s ambition
to SCO should be used as an opportunity rather than a threat by the US.

The moment Iran joins SCO — if Russia and China ever allow that to
happen — both Moscow and Beijing will start panicking: none of them
wants to be responsible for Iran’s loony statements about Israel or
its nuclear program. They would also need to stop naysaying at the
UN Security Council and engage in direct diplomacy with Tehran,
something they’ve started forgetting how to do. They would also
become more involved in joint negotiations with the EU and the US,
since they would have their international credibility to lose should
Iran go nuclear while member of their warm club.

But since the US has already expressed its condemnation of Iran’s
membership in SCO both Russia and China stand to benefit more from the
current stand-off than from having Iran in SCO. Any further escalation
of the situation around Tehran’s nuclear plans only increases the price
that the US and EU would have to pay for Russia’s and China’s eventual
capitulation at the UN. And both of them have a lot to ask from the
West. Just ask Russia about the prospects of its membership in WTO.

What do the US and EU gain if they seize the initiative and green-light
Iran’s membership in SCO?

First of all, such would disarm SCO of whatever evil intentions —
if any — it has harbored. With Iran on board, the block would hardly
dare voicing any belligerent rhetoric. It would be a very awkward
conglomeration, which might actually focus on subjects like border
cooperation, in the absence of any other spicier topics. Neither
Russia nor China is silly enough to discuss alternatives to the US
domination in the region with Ahmadinejad present in the room; it
would be a total media disaster.

Secondly, Iran’s membership in SCO could finally put the burden of
global leadership on Russia and China who have largely shunned away
from their responsibilities as members of the Security Council. Iran
presents them with a good opportunity to prove that they are mature
actors on the international scene and deserve their global status
(this is especially relevant for Russia, which chair G8 this year).

Through SCO they will have to be extra cautious guarding Iran’s
nuclear ambitions, because, indirectly, they might be implicated in
the consequences too. It would be much easier to take both Beijing
and Moscow to task if they have some leverage and connection with
Iran in SCO. That either of them will instigate, not deter, Iran from
developing its nuclear potential is nonsense; both countries are too
dependent on the US and EU to engage in such dangerous schemes.

Therefore, the policy of the US and the EU regarding Iran’s membership
in SCO should focus not on blocking it, but rather on persuading China
and Russia to use SCO as a carrot to obtain certain concessions from
Iran. In order to incentivize them, the US and EU might, indeed,
require more and more carrots. But, perhaps, it is better to waste
a few carrots on China and Russia than waste all of the Middle East
with one stick.

0806A