A DEMOGRAPHIC TRAP

Azat Artsakh, Nagorno Karabakh Republic [NKR]
12 June 2006

It has become clear recently that the mediators in the settlement
of the Karabakh-Azerbaijani conflict tend to set out the Armenian
sides for the following model of resolution: first, the Armenian
party immediately concedes five of the regions of the former Soviet
Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan it controls, which were outside
the borders of the former Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh,
the Azerbaijani refugees return there, second, peacemaking forces
are stationed in the conflict area, third, the Azerbaijani refugees
return to the NKR territory, controlled by the NKR government (in
fact, the territory of the former ARNK because Shahumian and Getashen
occupied by Azerbaijanis are not mentioned anywhere). A referendum
must be held to decide and set down the future status of NKR. The
outcome of the referendum is suggested to be definitive. It should
be noted that accepting the proposal on holding a referendum means
rejecting that the outcome of the referendum held on December 10,
1991 was legal. Practically, neither the European organizations nor
Baku hides this circumstance. Certain European organizations pursue
their interests in the settlement of the conflict over Karabakh, which
in fact coincide with those of Azerbaijan for a number of reasons,
using such levers to influence the international public opinion as
“NGOs”, which are formally independent but are, in fact, controlled
by these organizations. One of these NGOs is the International Crisis
Group. In the September 14, 2005 report of the ICG entitled “Nagorno
Karabakh. Viewing the Conflict on the Ground” is an attempt to deny
not only the lawfulness but also the legal force of the December 10,
1991 referendum. The ICG reporters stressed the following argument
borrowed from the Azerbaijani propaganda: since the Azerbaijanis did
not vote to the December 10, 1991 referendum, it is illegal. Moreover,
they openly distorted facts to assure the international community that
their conclusions on the December 10, 1991 referendum are real. For
instance, in the draft of the report the demographic profile of the
Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh is not precise: by the USSR
census 1989 the number of Azerbaijanis in ARNK was 21.5 percent,
the report gives 25.3 percent. The report also gave facts about the
December 10, 1991 referendum: approximately 108 615 people voted
for the independence of Nagorno Karabakh. Very few of the 47 400
Azerbaijanis turned up. Hence, first another exaggerated number
of Azerbaijanis was set forward, second, the number of the Armenian
voters was compared with the number of the Azerbaijanis living in NKR,
including children (which is, by the way, exaggerated too), not the
number of Azerbaijani voters. In fact, according to the facts of the
NKR Central Election Committee, the number of the Azerbaijani voters
totaled 26.4 thousand, which is 20 percent of all voters. Whereas,
according to the false facts of the ICG, the Azerbaijani voters
totaled 30.4 percent. In the final draft of the September 14 report
of the ICG the most striking distortions were deleted. The tendency
remained, however. Let us suppose, for instance, that the referendum
is, nevertheless, held. What will be the conditions? What changes will
take place in NKR within the 10-15 years that must precede the new
referendum according to the plan of the mediators? The ICG carelessly
provides some details about the proposed referendum. Hence, the ICG
representatives particularly stated that the question of one community
or another outnumbering the others in Nagorno Karabakh will not be
posed categorically after the resolution, that only the inhabitants
of Karabakh who lived here before the conflict should participate in
the referendum. According to the ICG, they count about half of the
146 thousand Armenians living in NKR (by preliminary data of the
census taken in autumn 2005, about 137.7 thousand). Hence, it is
neglected that by the official data of the census in the USSR 165
thousand Armenians lived in NKR in 1991 (including Shahumian and
Getashen). That by official data, over 60 thousand were displaced
by the war, but after the war many returned home. People who have
recently moved from Armenia and Turkmenistan were born in Nagorno
Karabakh, or their children now have the right to return home,
independent from whether they were in Karabakh in 1988 or not. The ICG
report does not contain any mentioning of the return of Armenians of
Shahumian or Getashen, whereas the authors of the report use the term
“vast return” for the Azerbaijani refugees. It is certain that if
necessary conditions are created (international peacemakers, pullout,
and diminishing the role of the NK Defence Army to that of a national
guard) neither 40.5 thousand (by 1989) nor 47.5 thousand Azerbaijanis
(by the draft report) will “wish” to return to Karabakh. In case of a
“vast return” protected by international troops, groups of Azerbaijani
“refugees” with a total number of 70-80 thousand will head for NKR.

And every “native Karabakhi” family will have a “legal” passport with a
notice that they were born in Karabakh or the notice of the government
that these people are refugees from ARNK, whereas the real refugees
will most probably be living in Russia or Turkey. And every family
couple of “refugees from ARNK,” who had allegedly left the region at
a young, maybe teen age, will have 5-8 big and small children. Baku
does not even hide this. By recent information, the number of refugees
from ARNK has doubled, reaching 84 thousand. With such a demographic
pattern, in 10-15 years, till the next referendum, the number of
Armenians and Azerbaijanis will have become equal. Considering that the
mediators suggest that only the Karabakhis, who lived in the region in
1988, and their children born there must participate in the referendum,
and the same ICG decided that the Armenians count 70 thousand, it
is not difficult to predict the outcome of the referendum. Certain
international organizations are experienced in fooling their peoples
and the international community, and they can explain very logically
how and why it happened. The following conclusions can be drawn. The
will of the NKR people was clearly expressed in the December 10, 1991
referendum, which was held in compliance with the international law
and the USSR legislation in force then. The Azerbaijani minority of
NKR was given every possibility to express their will freely, however
under the pressure of official Baku the Azerbaijanis rejected their
right and neglected the referendum, displaying indifference towards
the future of the region.

Accepting a new, delayed referendum would mean for the Armenian
side denying the legality of the referendum in 1991 and its
outcome. Theoretically, the situation can change over the 10-15 years
preceding a new referendum to a degree that holding it may become
impossible for different reasons. Such as, for instance, the refusal of
Azerbaijan. The motivations may vary, including coercion on behalf of
Baku. Even if the referendum is held, the demographic picture in NKR
will change in favour of Azerbaijanis over the preceding period, and
the outcome will be for its “territorial integrity.” If the Armenian
side accepts the idea of a delayed referendum, after signing an
agreement neither Armenia, not NKR will be able to prevent Azerbaijan
from changing the demographic pattern, provoking ethnic skirmishes
to cause tensions and coercing the Armenian population of NKR under
the cover of “peacemakers” and after the return of refugees.