NOT A PRECEDENT, BUT AN OPPORTUNITY
By Oksana Antonenko
Special to Russia Profile
Russia Profile, Russia
June 15 2006
What Kosovo Can Do for the Former Soviet States
Over the course of this year, the international community aims to
complete negotiations over the final status of Kosovo, which has
remained in flux since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign. Since that time,
Kosovo has remained territorially a part of Serbia and Montenegro,
but has been governed by the United Nations Interim Administration for
Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo remains a politically dysfunctional and
economically devastated region, where unemployment runs at over 40
percent and relations between ethnic Albanians and Serbs are still
defined by hostility. This situation provides the most powerful
argument for granting Kosovo new internationally recognized status.
In its current form, Kosovo has no prospects for progressing
towards greater stability, democracy and prosperity. A new,
internationally recognized status will allow the people of Kosovo to
take responsibility for their own future, while introducing clear and
strict conditions that will guide future international engagement and
assistance. These conditions include the development of democratic
institutions, including respect for minority rights.
While the United States and the EU have pushed for international
recognition of Kosovo’s independence, Russia has traditionally
supported Serbia’s territorial integrity, with Kosovo as an integral
part. Recently, however, Moscow has indicated a change in its
policy, opening a path towards conditional recognition of Kosovo’s
independence. These conditions were advanced by President Vladimir
Putin in January, when he said that any future recognition of Kosovo’s
independence will create a precedent which could be universally
applied to other unrecognized de facto states, particularly those
that have emerged from the former Soviet Union.
Frozen conflicts
The dissolution of the Soviet Union ignited a number of violent
ethnic clashes across its territory, and in the South Caucasus in
particular. As a result of these conflicts, four self-declared
states emerged in the early 1990s – the republics of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transdnestr. Abkhazia and South
Ossetia seek independence from Georgia, Transdnestr from Moldova and
Nagorno-Karabakh is torn between Armenia and Azerbaijan. All of these
have now existed under such conditions for more than a decade, defying
international isolation and economic, political and humanitarian
constraints emanating from their unrecognized status.
All of them have developed some form of functioning economy and
security systems and have conducted referenda on independence and
held several rounds of elections, none of which were recognized or
properly observed by the international community. This situation has
created a generation of "citizens" who are committed to preserving
and defending their independence.
These republics see the Kosovo precedent as possible means to advance
their aims of gaining recognition. The president of Abkhazia, Sergei
Bagapsh, has said that the recognition of an independent Kosovo
could accelerate the recognition of an independent Abkhazia. Eduard
Kokoity, the president of South Ossetia, has described the change
in Russia’s position as a symbol of the end of a "double standard"
approach towards the plight of all unrecognized states.
However, Russia’s plea for universality, backed by heightened
expectations from the unrecognized states themselves, is unlikely to
be endorsed by the international community. The EU and the United
States have already responded with statements that any decision on
Kosovo’s status should be treated on its own merits, and not as
a precedent for other conflicts, which must be resolved based on
their unique characteristics and on existing international legal
strictures. This response takes into account a number of pragmatic,
strategic and geopolitical factors.
The pragmatists contend that there are major differences between the
Kosovo case and those of the unrecognized post-Soviet entities.
Indeed, while there are some clear similarities between Balkan
conflicts and those of the former Soviet states, there are also major
differences, mainly deriving from how the entities were formed.
Post-1999 Kosovo was shaped by a broad international consensus,
with major powers playing an active role in the development of its
political institutions, as well as in guaranteeing security and order
on the ground.
In contrast, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr developed
in isolation from the wider international community, with Russia
playing the role of key mediator and sole guarantor of security and
economic survival. Moreover, each of the entities differs in terms of
demographic characteristics, political aspirations, degree of "real"
independence, viability of government institutions and attitudes
towards refugees and ethnic minorities. Finally, unlike Kosovo,
where the international community seeks Serbia’s acquiescence to its
independence and offers the prospect of European integration as an
incentive, Europe and the United States both support the territorial
integrity of Georgia and Moldova.
Strategic arguments focus on the fact that any recognition of
Kosovo as a "precedent" could have strategic implications not only
for Eurasia, but also for other parts of the world where ethnic,
separatist conflicts have occurred and might be reignited. The
integration of a new state into the international community requires
significant political and financial resources – the case of East Timor
proves the point – and, in the cases of a number of such states,
the entire post-Cold war political landscape of a wider Europe has
to be revisited.
Geopolitically, Russia and the West are increasingly engaged in a new
rivalry in Eurasia that is particularly evident in the case of the
"frozen" conflicts. Both Russia and the West include the resolution
of these conflicts among their important foreign and security policy
priorities. The Western stance is based not only on the principle
of supporting the territorial integrity of Georgia and Moldova, but
also on the assumption that the restoration of territorial integrity
by peaceful means is possible.
Many Russian policy makers and experts neither support the practical
reintegration of unrecognized entities into states nor believe that
such an reintegration can be achieved at all, even by military force.
Europe and the United States have provided military assistance and
political backing to the governments of Georgia and Moldova. Both seek
to distance themselves from Russia and aspire to integrate themselves
into Euro-Atlantic structures. Russia, in turn, provides significant
economic assistance to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transdnestr and
maintains a military presence in these areas.
Additionally, Russia has granted citizenship to the majority of the
population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The more tension between Russia and the West, the less likely it
is that a Kosovo resolution could offer even a slim opportunity
to devise a more realistic and co-operative approach towards the
"frozen conflicts." Any new approach should address a few core issues.
First, it is no longer possible to ignore the fact that these
unrecognized entities exist. Kosovo helped to put them on the
international agenda, and a review is now required to develop a new
international policy towards each. This policy should combine new
efforts at conflict resolution with a renewed dialogue that could be
pursued until the issue of status is resolved through negotiations.
Another challenge could be finding a way to grant these entities some
voice within international organizations without legitimizing their
unilateral political aspirations.
Secondly, it is important to lower expectations and to develop
assurances that the "Kosovo precedent" does not rekindle prior
tensions, particularly in South Ossetia.
Thirdly, it is important to develop a set of principles that can
determine the degree of international engagement. These should
be derived from the Kosovo standards and relate to democratic
institutions, civil and minority rights and security.
Genuine international recognition cannot come without international
consensus. While the United States and the EU are likely to secure
such consensus with regard to Kosovo, Russia has little or no chance
of doing the same for Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transdnestr. Any
attempt by Russia to declare unilateral recognition for some or
all of these entities is bound to postpone their integration into
the international community further. However, it is precisely this
integration, rather than recognition, that the unrecognized entities
should hope to achieve.
Oksana Antonenko is a Senior Fellow at the London-based International
Institute for Strategic Studies, and has set up meetings between
high-level Georgian and South Ossetian officials with the aim of
promoting conflict resolution in South Ossetia.
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