Today, Azerbaijan
June 24 2006
Matthew Bryza: "We hope to see a similar democratic reforms in
Armenia we are starting to see in Azerbaijan"
24 June 2006 [15:00] – Today.Az
Matthew Bryza, the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for
European and Eurasian affairs, recently gained a second job title:
he has replaced Steven Mann as the U.S. cochair of the OSCE MG with
moderating negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno
Karabakh.
Bryza spoke on July 22 with RFE/RL Armenian Service head Harry
Tamrazian and RFE/RL Azerbaijani Service correspondent Kenan Aliyev
about the prospects for a resolution of the Karabakh conflict, Russia’s
role in the South Caucasus, and America’s strategic priorities in
the region.
RFE/RL: Your post — deputy assistant secretary — is more senior
than those occupied by previous U.S. cochairs of the Minsk Group.
Does that mean the United States is paying more attention to the
Karabakh question? Could that in turn mean that there is a sense the
sides are coming closer to resolving this conflict?
Matthew Bryza: I wouldn’t read too much in particular into the fact
that you now have a deputy assistant secretary, rather than someone
who wasn’t, doing this. A lot of this just depended on personalities
and my own background. I’ve been so deeply involved in the region for
a long time. It made sense that I would be the person to pick this up,
because it was time for Ambassador Mann, coincidentally, to move on
to his next assignment. So that’s all. I wouldn’t read anything more
into it. I’m just very happy that I’ll be able to play a more active
— and, in fact, daily — role on this conflict and make sure those
efforts are integrated with all the other broader things I’m trying
to do in the Caucasus.
RFE/RL: You have said in recent statements that there is a framework on
the table that makes an agreement on Karabakh possible. You have also
said that next year the political calendar will be more complicated
in Armenia, and therefore the presidents should do something this
year while there is still a window of opportunity.
First of all, what kind of framework is that? And do you still believe
there is room for a resolution this year? Some experts say the issue is
already very complicated today, even before we get into the elections
next year.
Bryza: It is complicated today. We see how complicated the situation
is based upon the fact that the presidents haven’t gotten to the
point where they’ve agreed to this framework that’s on the table.
That gets back to the first part of your question. What we have is
a framework agreement, as we described today here at the OSCE — as
Ambassador Mann did, and Ambassador [Yury] Merzlyakov [the Russian
cochair] and Bernard [Fassier, the French cochair] as well — we
have a framework agreement that would call for the removal, or the
withdrawal, of Armenian troops from those territories in Azerbaijan
where they currently are. That’s on the one side. On the other side
we have a normalization of Armenia’s ties — economic, diplomatic —
and other features having to do with peacekeepers and international
economic assistance to the Karabakh region, and economic development.
So there’s a package proposal on the table that, in the end,
would involve as well a vote at some point on the future status of
Karabakh. So that’s kind of the basic outline of the proposal on the
table, and we would very much encourage the presidents to accept this
framework. Which requires a lot of political courage, which I’ve said
publicly before.
RFE/RL: Have you noticed any sign that the two sides may be softening
their positions? Did they appear more willing to consider the framework
agreement you’re describing during their talks in early June at a
Black Sea summit in Bucharest than they were when they meant for
talks in February with the French president in Rambouillet?
Bryza: Put it this way: At Bucharest, they talked throughout the whole
meeting to each other, really went through the issues in detail, and
[they] haven’t issued any negative statements really since. So I’m
not sure how to interpret that. I know what I hope, what the cochairs
hope: The cochairs hope that this reflects political will on the part
of the presidents to really get serious about some tough compromises
each side will make. I’m not sure if that’s where they are, and the
cochairs talked today about taking a bit of a pause throughout the
summer to find out whether or not the presidents do in fact have that
sort of political will.
RFE/RL: What is the next step for the cochairs? Are you planning to
bring the presidents together again after the summer?
Bryza: At this point, as I was saying, the cochairs have decided to
take a pause throughout the summer. We will reconvene in September,
October, to report back here [to Vienna, the headquarters of the
OOSCE], I hope. But we’re taking some time off in terms of trying
to facilitate meetings between the presidents. It’s really up to
the presidents now to decide whether or not they want to take the
politically difficult and challenging decisions that are critical to
bringing the framework agreement home. So we’re giving them some space,
and we want them to demonstrate that they really do have the political
will to take these next difficult steps. That doesn’t mean we’re
quitting the process. That doesn’t mean we’re walking away from it. I
myself still have to make my first trips in this capacity to Yerevan
and Baku, and you can bet that I’ll be encouraging the presidents to
take these tough decisions. And there will be opportunities at major
international gatherings this summer to discuss this issue.
RFE/RL: At the turn of the year, there were a lot of optimistic
statements — from you as well as others — that the Karabakh conflict
could be resolved in 2006. We’re now halfway through the year. Are
you still optimistic about 2006?
Bryza: I don’t know. My optimism, if you look carefully at my
statements, was about the fact that there is a framework on the
table that provides a workable foundation for a just and lasting
settlement. I was optimistic that the Minsk Group negotiators had
gotten the two presidents as close as they could get to an agreement
without the presidents taking some very difficult decisions and
making some very difficult compromises. We are still in that same
place. I don’t know if that’s optimistic or pessimistic. But the
Minsk Group itself has decided that there’s no sense in us trying to
arrange another round of presidential meetings or trying to broker
an agreement, because we have taken the process as far as we can,
and all that’s left to do is for the presidents to make these tough
decision. Is that pessimistic? I don’t know if it is. It depends on
what the presidents themselves decide to do next. If they decide that
they simply don’t have the political will to keep going, well, that’s
a pessimistic outcome. But we just don’t know where the presidents
are right now. We’re encouraging them, we’re nudging them by taking
a step back. Nudging them to show that they have this political will.
RFE/RL: Russia does not always play what some would consider a
constructive role in the South Caucasus, particularly with regard to
the "frozen conflicts" in the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. But Russia has been very cooperative with the United
States on Nagorno Karabakh. Some Russian officials, like Sergei Ivanov,
have occasionally said there should be no Karabakh resolution imposed
from abroad. But otherwise the relationship has been constructive. How
would you evaluate relations between the United States and Russia
with respect to Karabakh in particular, and the Caucasus in general?
Bryza: First, let me say you made a statement of fact with which I
agree. We are working quite well with Russia on Karabakh. Our level
of cooperation has not been as significant when it comes to South
Ossetia and Abkhazia and Transdniester. I don’t work on Transdniester
[a separatist region of Moldova], but I was just in Abkhazia and I
think there is a lot of room for much better cooperation — and I
would argue that the Georgian side has shown a significant amount of
goodwill and a readiness to work on significant confidence-building
measures. I would also say the United States has worked hard to keep
the Georgians as constructive and moderate as possible, and I hope
our Russians colleagues and friends will do the same in terms of
encouraging the Abkhaz to be constructive and moderate. I saw today
that [Sergei] Bagapsh, the leader of the authorities of Abkhazia,
issued a rather incendiary statement, threatening to put mines along
the Line of Contact between Abkhazia and the rest of Georgia. That’s
the last thing that needs to be happening right now.
We don’t see that happening in the case of Karabakh. I leave that to
analysts like yourselves to figure out why that may be. Geographic
differences, perhaps? Where Karabakh is placed? I don’t know what the
reason is. Maybe it’s because the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
themselves have demonstrated a commitment to work in a constructive
way — although I would argue the Georgians have done so as well. But
we are working quite well with the Russians, and especially with
the Russian cochair, Ambassador Merzlyakov. He’s a creative and
constructive diplomat whom I’ve known for a long time, ever since we
worked together on Caspian energy issues.
RFE/RL: Your predecessor, Ambassador Mann, said repeatedly that
September 11th created pressure to resolve the Karabakh conflict in
order to put an end to one source of instability in the region. Even
so, high-level involvement on the part of the United States has
not materialized. How does Nagorno Karabakh fit into U.S. security
interests?
Bryza: I think Steve [Mann] is right to say that any time we have
an area that could become a gray area on the map, where nefarious
transactions or transit of goods and materials could transpire because
of legal grayness. That’s a potential threat. Where does Karabakh
fit into our broad national security calculus? Well, hopefully there
will be a discussion of it at the G8 [summit of the eight leading
industrialized nations, to be held in mid-July in St.
Petersburg]. The G8, one could argue, may be the world’s most elite
grouping of states and political leaders. So if we have a discussion
on Karabakh at the G8 — along with a discussion of Abkhazia,
South Ossetia, Transdniester — that would imply it figures pretty
prominently on our agenda. But we’re still working out the agenda of
the G8.
RFE/RL: So it’s not yet clear if Karabakh will be included? The
"Washington Post" has reported that the Georgian and Moldovan conflicts
would be discussed, but Karabakh will not be.
Bryza: I don’t believe that will be the case. We are working with our
secretary of state — we have already recommended to her that she
raise all of those conflicts at the ministerial [meeting in Moscow
on June 29]. Undersecretary [Nicholas] Burns has already made that
suggestion a couple of times. And so we would like to make sure all
of those conflicts are on the agenda.
RFE/RL: There is always the lingering possibility that the conflict
could resume. Both sides have made attempts to raise their military
budgets. That is particularly the case with Azerbaijan. How would the
international community react to either side attempting to shift the
balance of power away from the status quo?
Bryza: You’ve put me in that classic situation of having to answer a
hypothetical question. So I won’t answer that question directly. What
I will say is what I’ve been working on with my friends in the
government of Azerbaijan — because that’s the side where you most
often hear those sorts of threats; that’s a fact — and what I feel
the government of Azerbaijan doing as well is focusing on the positive
aspects of Azerbaijan’s burgeoning wealth that’s going to come from
the energy sector. It’s really quite unhelpful to make statements
that imply that this increased wealth is going to lead to purchases
of arms and military threats. It’s quite constructive, however, to
talk about how this wealth can open new channels of cooperation, how
such wealth would provide Azerbaijan an opportunity to invest in the
well-being of the region, [how it could] help develop Karabakh, all
the territories, create the opportunities for business, for commerce,
and for the ethnic Armenians and Azeris to come together and get to
know each other, and therefore, over time, to reduce the level of
tension and the level of animosity surrounding the status question of
Karabakh. So I guess what I’m saying is there’s really no reason to
expect that armed conflict will come out this. It’s really unwise even
to talk about it, and we urge the sides not even to think about it.
RFE/RL: The United States clearly has strategic interests in
Azerbaijan, not least Caspian oil. Does the United States look at
the Nagorno Karabakh conflict in the context of its energy interests?
Bryza: Throughout the Caucasus, we have three sets of strategic
interests. These are valid in all three countries. Yes, we have energy
interests, and we’re not embarrassed to say that energy is a strategic
interest. We have pure security interests, or traditional security
interests — meaning fighting terrorism, fighting proliferation,
avoiding military conflict, and restoring (or preserving, in some
cases) the territorial integrity of the states of the region. What
I really mean is, resolving the conflicts, in the case of Georgia,
within Georgia’s international boundaries; in the case of Karabakh, our
official line is we support Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity. And
then we have a third set of interests: in the internal reform of
each country — democratic and market economic reform, for all the
reasons the [U.S.] president has articulated, based on our belief
that stability only comes from legitimacy. And legitimacy requires
democracy on the political side and prosperity on the economic side,
and you only get both — democracy and prosperity — through serious
reform. So all three sets of interests are being pursued by us at
any one time.
In Armenia, obviously the significance of energy is not the same as in
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is a producer. Keep in mind that we Americans
will consume little if any of that energy produced in Azerbaijan. The
energy produced in Azerbaijan matters in terms of its contribution
to global energy diversity, especially for our European allies. So
it’s diversity we care about — diversity of supply, which leads to
energy independence. When it comes to Armenia, energy is similarly
important in terms of making sure that Armenia has independent or
multiple sources of energy supply so that it feels independent,
and therefore more stable, and more willing to negotiate in good faith.
So that’s a long answer to say that of course energy is part of
our strategic calculus. But that’s not what’s driving us. We’re
looking for balance. And we do recognize, however, that, God forbid,
if there was a resumption of conflict [over Karabakh], that that
would undermine the entire investment climate across the Caucasus,
all three countries. And we certainly don’t want that.
RFE/RL: The relationship between Turkey and Armenia, which is
also crucial to regional stability, is slowly showing signs of
improvement. Is the United States actively engaged in trying to help
make ties between Ankara and Yerevan warmer?
Bryza: We are working, consulting, talking, strategizing with our
friends in both Turkey and in Armenia. When it comes to Armenia, I
think it’s clear that the Armenian side is willing and ready to move
toward normalization. I think the same is true in Turkey. Besides just
encouraging the sides to get together and find a common language,
I can tell you that what we’ve tried to do over the last few years
is try to develop this particular framework for Karabakh that’s
on the table. Because if the sides are able to implement what the
framework indicates — meaning, again, the withdrawal from the
territories in Azerbaijan where Armenian troops are present, and
then the normalization of diplomatic and economic relations between
Azerbaijan and Armenia — then full normalization of Turkish and
Armenian relations follows naturally. Another way to put it is,
all of our diplomatic efforts with regards to Karabakh also aim at
normalizing Turkish and Armenian relations.
RFE/RL: A question on the issue of Russian military bases in Armenia:
Some military hardware was recently moved from Georgia to Armenia.
There are essentially no Russian troops in Georgia and Azerbaijan,
but there is a significant presence in Armenia. How does the United
States view that? Will you ask the Armenian government to ask the
Russians to withdraw?
Bryza: First of all, let’s be clear that there are Russian troops in
Georgia. They have not all withdrawn yet from [military bases at]
Akhalkalaki or Batumi. They are on the way, the heavy equipment is
moving. And there will be Russian troops in the context of the CIS
peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South Ossetia for some time, depending
on how the discussions go between Russia and Georgia. When it comes
to the movement of the heavy equipment from Akhalkalaki to Gyumri
[site of a Russian base in Armenia], no, we’re not asking Armenia
to press for the removal of those Russian bases. We didn’t ask the
Georgians to do that. We respect the sovereignty of our friends, be
they Georgia, Azerbaijan, or Armenia, and it’s up to those sovereign
governments to take their own decisions. We simply welcome the fact
that Russia and Georgia have agreed mutually that Russian bases will
close down. That was Georgia’s expressed ambition. Russia agreed.
That’s simply a good thing. But it’s not for us to try to encourage
the removal of the bases.
RFE/RL: Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia have had truly democratic
elections in the past 10 years. So can we say these governments have
the mandate, the popular support, to make the difficult decisions
outlined in the framework agreement?
Bryza: Certainly they have the mandate if they build popular support.
I think that’s the most important next step. I’ve been talking about
the fact that the presidents need to take tough decisions. And to
get to the tough decision, they need to prepare their populations for
a compromise. That’s another way of saying they either build, or do
have, that mandate. You raise a good question about the legitimacy of
a government depending on its elections. I would argue that the pace
of democracy in both of those countries isn’t a disaster. A lot more
work needs to be done. But in the case of Azerbaijan’s [parliamentary]
elections [in November 2005], there were some significant improvements
in this last round of elections. But they didn’t go as far as we
would like.
RFE/RL: How serious is the United States about promoting democracy in
Azerbaijan? We see your serious efforts in Georgia, and we see the
results. But in Azerbaijan, the international community seriously
criticized the elections, but the United States decided to invite
President Ilham Aliyev to Washington. What makes Aliyev different,
for example, from an autocratic leader like Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko?
Bryza: I categorically reject the statement that the United States
isn’t serious about democracy in Azerbaijan. As President Bush
said in his second inaugural address, long-term security requires
democracy. It’s the thirst for political and economic freedom that is
the most powerful motivating factor in international politics. That
really is the source of long-term stability. We fool ourselves if we
think that we can achieve our long-term interests in any country —
be they energy interests or security interests — and turn away from
democracy. You talked about September 11. Well, the great lesson we
learned from September 11 is that we were wrong, as the president
has said, for 50 years. We looked at the Middle East and said
‘these countries are too strategically important for us to focus
on democracy.’
So we understand that long-term security and therefore the ability
to achieve our energy interests requires democracy. In Azerbaijan,
we have pressed very hard on democracy. You said the international
community was critical of the Azeri elections — well, we’re part of
that community, and our statements were critical. However, we have to
make a judgment at some point whether or not we think the trend in
a country is positive or negative. And we don’t have unidimensional
relations with countries, either. I talked about three sets of
interests. Just because Azerbaijan hasn’t gone as far as we would
like on democracy doesn’t mean we’re going to ignore our energy
interests or our military interests. That’s not to say that our
energy interests or our military interests or our counterterrorism
interests are driving us to ignore democracy. I said before, we have
to pursue a balance. Why would we freeze out President Ilham Aliyev
from contact with our president forever because we think he needs to
do more on democracy? That doesn’t make sense. Our president made a
judgment. His judgment was that we could do more to elicit democratic
reform in Azerbaijan by embracing Ilham Aliyev right now rather than
freezing him out. That’s because we do feel the trend on democracy
is positive, even if Azerbaijan hasn’t gone as far as we wish.
So, finally, I’d say there is simply no similarity between Lukashenka
and Aliyev. We just don’t feel there is at all. Ilham Aliyev, we
believe, is working to modernize the political system of Azerbaijan,
to create democracy in the context of Azerbaijan’s culture and
traditions — which the president said is necessary, because democracy
looks different in every country. That said, they haven’t gone far
enough. And we will continue to press President Aliyev — and his
opposition as well — to behave constructively, to build and strengthen
democratic institutions as we pursue our full range of interests.
RFE/RL: Ilham Aliyev has been to Washington; Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili has been invited to the White House just ahead
of the G8. Are there any plans to invite Armenia’s President Robert
Kocharian as well?
Bryza: We obviously don’t look at balancing presidential meetings
like that, but there’s no reason not to want President Kocharian
to come to Washington. Let me just say I hope we can see a similar
series of positive steps on democratic reform in Armenia as we
hope we are starting to see in Azerbaijan. Maybe we’re wrong about
Azerbaijan. Maybe we’re overly hopeful. But we think things are
moving in a positive direction. And we hope to see more of that from
Armenia. We signaled our support for Armenia, quite dramatically,
with the Millennium Challenge Account [a development fund set by the
United States, whose recipients — including Armenia — are chosen
using competitive, reform-based criteria]. That is, in many ways,
one of our highest forms of stating that we seek a partnership with
a country, to help it move forward on democratic reform. So we began
that program this year. When we began it, we issued a letter saying
we really had problems with the way the constitutional referendum
was conducted in November [2005], and we’re waiting to see positive
changes implemented. So that’s kind of the key to the next steps in
our relationship.
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
