RUSSIAN PEACEKEEPERS MIGHT BE SENT INTO NAGORNO-KARABAKH
by Sergei Bekirov
Translated by Pavel Pushkin
Source: Rossiiskie Vesti, No. 23, June 22, 2006, p. 6
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
June 26, 2006 Monday
BREAKING THE DEADLOCK;
Azerbaijan is a promising partner for Russia; It’s no secret that
relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia remain strained due to the
protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nagorno-Karabakh is called a
"frozen conflict." If that is the case, a question arises: what might
happen after it’s "unfrozen"? Another war?
The complexity of intra-CIS relations was vividly demonstrated at
the latest meeting of CIS defense ministers in Baku, Azerbaijan. The
Armenian defense minister stayed away because Azeri authorities
refused to guarantee his personal safety.
It’s no secret that relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia remain
strained due to the protracted Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This
problem isn’t being resolved, despite measures taken by various
international negotiation mechanisms. Nagorno-Karabakh is called a
"frozen conflict." If that is the case, a question arises: what
might happen after it’s "unfrozen"? Another war? But geopolitical
circumstances have changed since the last war, and if Nagorno-Karabakh
flares up again now, it might further destabilize the situation in
the Greater Middle East region, which the West defines as including
the former Soviet republics of the Trans-Caucasus. Therefore, no
expression of readiness to take part in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
resolution passes unnoticed.
This applies to a recent statement from Russian Deputy Prime Minister
and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, made at a news conference in Baku:
"I don’t rule out the possibility that in the foreseeable future, our
peacekeeping forces may be sent into the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
zone to carry out all the political agreements that will be reached
sooner or later."
"A ‘neither one thing nor the other’ situation cannot last forever,"
said Ivanov.
Clearly, the decision to send in peacekeepers would primarily depend on
the two sides involved in the conflict: namely, the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic and Azerbaijan. However, it is undeniably Russia that has
attempted to break the deadlock, with this proposal.
This "push" has been met with approval in Azerbaijan and alarm
in Armenia.
>>From Baku’s perspective, the deployment of peacekeeping contingents
would open up the prospect of liberating the Azeri districts which are
presently controlled by Armenia and the unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic (NKR). But the most important aspect here is that for the
first time in many years, Moscow is taking a constructive approach and
supplementing the efforts of other Minsk Group c-chairs. Presumably,
Russia and its Western partners have made some significant decisions
about the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. To all appearances, Russian
keepers might be deployed in the conflict zone beneath the OSCE flag
and under OSCE command; moreover, most of the contingent would be
made up of military personnel from NATO member states. These issues
were considered in the process of preparing a step-by-step conflict
resolution plan in the mid-1990s, and the principal points were
discussed at the OSCE’s Budapest summit. It isn’t very appropriate
to draw parallels with the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
or the Trans-Dniester region. The Nagorno-Karabakh proposal bears a
greater resemblance to Russian participation in the Bosnia and Kosovo
peacekeeping forces.
Thus, geopolitical processes in the South Caucasus are developing
some new directions. It’s worth noting that Nagorno-Karabakh marked
the start of the USSR’s disintegration process and the emergence of
hot-spots across the former Soviet Union. At the time, the influence
of external forces was clearly aimed at undermining the situation
in this region, and Russia subsequently had to to "lock" quarreling
entities together, while distancing itself from conflict zones.
Nowadays, much has changed. Russia and the West are establishing
a substantial dialogue with regard to conflict resolution in the
former Soviet Union. On the other hand, the South Caucasus is
being increasingly drawn into processes in the Middle East. For
example, political processes in Iran now have a direct impact on the
Armenian-Azeri conflict. As Azeri awareness grows and the ethnic Azeri
component of Iranian politics becomes stronger, this will certainly
make the regional geopolitical situation worse for Armenia.
Moreover, given that Russian troops are being withdrawn from Georgia,
the Armenian government’s position becomes even more vulnerable from
the geopolitical standpoint.
As for Azerbaijan, it seems to be a promising partner for Russia.
Baku maintains the most balanced and moderate position within GUAM.
At a press conference after GUAM’s Kiev summit, Azeri President
Ilkham Aliyev indicated directly that in his view, the GUAM project
is not aimed against any other country. That was a veiled reply to
those who are trying to intensify an anti-Russian tendency within
GUAM. Aliyev’s stance is understandable: unlike Ukraine, Moldova,
and Georgia, which are closer to Europe and have direct contacts with
it, Azerbaijan is surrounded by Russia, Iran, and Armenia. Geography
itself requires Azerbaijan to be cautious. All the same, it should
not be forgotten that Azerbaijan’s sole truly strategic ally – Turkey
– is an influential NATO member and European Union candidate. The
aim of ensuring security and development for Azerbaijan prompt an
analogous choice. Baku’s movement toward NATO and the EU could be
rapid or relatively slow, depending on the situation. Incidentally,
Turkey doesn’t even object, in principle, to the prospect of Armenia
joining NATO. How would Yerevan react to a new situation in the
conflict zone, with the West no longer prepared to give unconditional
support to Armenia’s Nagorno-Karabakh claims? So far, the reaction
has been cautiously hostile: while ignoring the Baku summit, Armenia
has been transferring a great quantity of arms and military hardware
to Nagorno-Karabakh.