ARE EU-TURKISH NEGOTIATIONS A FOOL’S GAME?
by Alexandrine Bouilhet

Le Figaro (In English)
27 juin 2006

Negotiations between the EU and Turkey embarked on a crucial stage
in Luxembourg last week. The two contracting parties completed the
first chapter – devoted to science and research – of the accession
negotiations. Technically, it is an insignificant step. This field
includes very few "communitaire gains" – that is, European laws to
be transposed into Turkish national legislation.

Turkey already participates in joint scientific programmes such as
Euratom and Eureka; it can already use Brussels’ funds allocated to
these projects. So its importance in this regard is therefore small.

"It is like having a fully bilingual person sit an English-language
exam," according to Brussels. At the European Council meeting, [French
President] Jacques Chirac played down the event. "Yes, we have opened
a chapter, but the negotiations could still be called into question
if Turkey does not meet its obligations…" he commented. Despite
what the Turko-sceptics may think, Turkey has scored an important
point on the legal and political plane. The EU is above all a legal
community. After nine months in the waiting room, Turkey can boast
of having entered the heart of communitaire matters.

In Luxembourg it moved its pieces onto the first square of the huge
European board game, which has 35 squares or chapters, corresponding
to 80,000 pages of legislation. At the end of the game, once all
the squares have been filled, the candidate country in principle
becomes an EU member. For Turkey, which has never been regarded as
just another candidate, are these real negotiations or a fool’s game?

There are few people, either in Brussels or in Ankara, who are not
pondering this question, at least silently. This, particularly since
the last word on Turkey’s membership will, as we know, lie with the
French people, who are required to approve, by referendum, any future
EU enlargements, apart from those of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia.

The first test for Turkey, and for Europe, regarding the seriousness
of these negotiations will occur in the autumn, when the internal
market and transport chapters, requiring free circulation of goods
and citizens, are examined. If Ankara still refuses to open its ports
to Greek Cypriot ships, will the EU suddenly break off its talks with
Turkey? This is a risk that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems
willing to take, judging from his latest statements in Istanbul. When
they began membership negotiations with Ankara on 3 October 2005,
the Twenty-Five demanded a normalization of Turkish Cypriot relations
before the end of 2006. If the deadlock continues, the European
Council in December will tackle the issue. The Cyprus question, more
than the recognition of the Armenian genocide, is a major obstacle
to Turkey’s candidacy. In the likely event of Cyprus’ not being
recognized within the next six months, Brussels is preparing to break
off negotiations, at least on the chapters concerned – the internal
market, customs and transport. The examination of the other chapters
would continue, thus leaving the way open to Turkey. "Technically,
we will so arrange matters that the train can stay on track, but
politically, these negotiations will become increasingly difficult
to sell to the public," one expert in Brussels forecast. Cyprus,
with its veto rights, could derail everything. The Commission, which
is the arbiter in these negotiations, is Turkey’s most loyal ally.

"Sometimes it even goes too far!" one Italian diplomat quipped. The
Turkey desk in Brussels is headed by a pro-Turkish Swede, himself
flanked by a Briton, Michael Leah, who believes that enlargement
remains the best and most modern of the EU’s policies, a guarantee
of peace and prosperity on the continent. Among the Twenty-Five,
Turkey can rely on the support of several countries, and not the
least important – Britain, Sweden, Finland, Belgium, Italy, and all
the new member states. Though it must remain neutral, the Finnish
EU presidency, which begins on 1 July, is likely to do its utmost
to avert a rift over the Cyprus question. And Turkey, a leading
NATO member country, can always rely on Washington, as it did on 3
October 2005. Confronted by this solid bloc, the "anti-Turkey" camp
is weaker and more fluctuating. It comprises Austria, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Cyprus, and post-29 May [2005, date of European constitution
referendum] France. However, France’s line remains ambiguous,
divided between the Elysee [president’s office], which is in favour
of Turkey’s accession, for strategic reasons, and the Quai d’Orsay
[Foreign Ministry], which is often more sceptical. According to
[President] Jacques Chirac, Turkey must join Europe so that the
latter does not remain a "Christian club". According to numerous
French diplomats, however, Turkey’s accession could "denature" the
European blueprint. This twofold approach makes France’s position
often opaque to the public, except for experts on the matter, who
have learned to decipher Paris’s strategy. "In the background, French
diplomats are the most nit-picking, together with the Cypriots,"
one negotiator said. "They increase the pressure to the last moment,
but once a rift threatens, they side with Ankara. Suddenly Cyprus finds
itself isolated, alone versus everyone else, and has to yield." In the
European diplomatic interplay, France is less decisive than Germany,
which has always voted for Turkey. "In Germany, Turkey is a domestic
political issue more than a foreign policy one," one diplomat said,
in an allusion to the 2.7m Turks living in Germany, 550,000 of them
with voting rights. In France, Turkey will remain a foreign policy
issue, until it becomes the subject of a referendum, expected to take
place in 10 years’ time at least, that is, at the end of the European
board game.