EurasiaNet, NY
July 11 2006
BTC SECURITY QUESTIONS PERSIST
Alexandros Petersen 7/11/06
A EurasiaNet Commentary
Touted as the biggest official event in Turkey’s history, the July
13 launch of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline marks the
long-awaited completion of a project that is as much about geopolitics
as energy. But amid the celebrations, questions persist about pipeline
security.
The stakes are sizeable. Stretching 1,760 kilometers, with eight
pumping stations and 101 block valves, BTC is the second longest
pipeline in the world. The $4-billion project, completed a year later
than originally expected, is projected to have a daily capacity of
1 million barrels.
The BTC runs through difficult and dangerous territory. Not only
does the route pass through forbidding mountains and remote locales,
including over 14 seismic faults, but it runs dangerously close
to the region’s frozen conflicts and hotspots: Nagorno-Karabakh,
South Ossetia, the North Caucasus, Abkhazia, Armenian enclaves in
southern Georgia, and the restive Kurdish regions of southeastern
Turkey. The region has experienced an episode of sabotage as recently
as January, when suspicious explosions in North Ossetia cut off gas
and electricity supplies to Georgia. [For background see the Eurasia
Insight archives]. The pipeline also faces threats on the local
level. Despite reimbursement and reinstatement of the land from the
British Petroleum-led BTC consortium, locals staged frequent blockages
during construction, and illegal tapping attempts were found even
before oil began to flow in May 2005.
Faced with a host of potential threats, the BTC consortium has
implemented stringent security measures. While there is substantial,
tell-tale infrastructure above ground, such as block valves, devices
which change the oil’s flow direction, the pipeline itself is buried
at least a meter underground along virtually the entire route. Once
the land above is reinstated, the pipeline right-of-way should look
the way it did before construction, making it difficult for potential
saboteurs to find its exact location. Large, above-ground structures,
such as pump stations, have elaborate security measures, from concrete
blast walls to closed-circuit cameras and armed guards.
These measures may look impressive on paper, but their effectiveness
is questionable. A three-week research trip to Georgia and Azerbaijan
by this observer found that the rush to finish laying the pipeline
had often resulted in security systems that were either not well
thought out or badly implemented.
In one instance, a pump station had been surrounded by security
cameras, but the flood lights supposed to complement them had been
installed behind the cameras, negating their purpose. Blast walls,
although able to prevent truck bombs, are useless against much more
likely mortar or grenade attacks. Two layers of reinforced gates are
useful to protect the entrance to the facility, but only if they are
kept closed. In many cases, local staff flouts security procedures
for the sake of expediency. British Petroleum (BP) security personnel
have had to begin the re-installation of security measures after the
pipeline’s completion.
The pipeline route is also extensively monitored and patrolled.
Sensors along the entire length allow for any disruptions to be
immediately spotted on a constantly monitored digital map of the
pipeline. In addition, a joint agreement between the BTC consortium
and the Azerbaijani, Georgian and Turkish governments facilitates
patrolling arrangements. Georgia has gone a step further, signing
a bilateral agreement with BP to allow for complementary security
arrangements. BP field security teams regularly check above-ground
facilities and the company employs local Georgians to patrol the entire
right-of-way on horseback. The conglomerate additionally is operating
an extensive community relations program, aiming to maintain a strong
rapport with residents living along the route.
These residents could form a first line of defense for the pipeline
by potentially alerting officials to any suspicious activity. In
addition, the agreement provides for patrols by units of Georgia’s new
700-member Strategic Pipeline Protection Department (SPPD), outfitted,
trained and funded by BP.
To date, BP has been less involved in security measures for the
two other BTC host countries. Azerbaijan has not signed a similar
bilateral security agreement with BP, but talks are continuing.
Turkey has not indicated that it is interested in such an agreement,
preferring to let its armed forces handle pipeline security.
Long hailed for its geopolitical significance, the BTC pipeline is
likely to take on additional prominence in 2007 when Kazakhstan begins
transporting 3 million tons of oil this year via the conduit.
[For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. President Nursultan
Nazarbayev is expected to be among those leaders attending the July
13 ceremony in Ceyhan, according to reports.
While energy security will reportedly feature in talks among
leaders of the host countries, opportunities for fresh energy deals
will most likely not be missed, either. Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili, who left for Ceyhan on July 11, is expected to discuss
with Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan the prospect
of buying an additional 2 billion cubic meters of gas from the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline "at reduced prices," the Azerbaijani
news agency Trend reported.
In addition to Saakashvili, Nazarbayev and Azerbaijani President Ilham
Aliyev, the Ceyhan ceremony on July 13 is expected to attract four
foreign ministers, 16 energy ministers and two deputy prime ministers,
Trend reported. Deputy Energy Secretary Jeffrey Clay Sell will head
the US delegation, according to the White House.
Editor’s Note: Alexandros Petersen is a military and international
affairs analyst based in London and Washington, DC.