"DURING ITS EU PRESIDENCY THE NEW GERMAN GOVERNMENT WILL DEFINITELY GO FOR
AN IMPROVED ENP"
(The exclusive interview of Dr. Joerg Himmelreich, Senior
Transatlantic Fellow, the German Marshall Fund of the United States,
to Mediamax news agency, June 2006)
In mid May 2006, German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke of the
need to bring the South Caucasus closer to Europe. Mediamax has
asked the Senior Transatlantic Fellow, Eastern Europe and Wider
Black Sea Region, the German Marshall Fund of the United States,
Dr. Joerg Himmelreich, to comment on the new policy of the German
government. The opinions in this interview reflect the personal
viewpoint of Dr. Joerg Himmelreich.
– On May 11, German Chancellor Angela Merkel delivered a speech in
Bundestag on "EU’s Eastern Policy" and spoke of the need
to bring South Caucasus closer to Europe. Did you expect to hear
something like this from Chancellor Merkel?
– Angela Merkel gave for the first time a broader outline of key
elements of the future German EU policy ahead of the German EU
Presidency in the first half of 2007 and the German G8 presidency in
2007. She underlined the importance of a common European Foreign
and Security Policy and of a common European Neighborhood Policy
for addressing the global challenges for the EU and for diminishing
a security gap between the EU and its neighbors. In his speech at
the Munich Security Conference this February, German Minister of
Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier had particularly underlined
the importance of the stabilization of the South Caucasus for the
stability of Europe.
– May we assume that Germany’s growing interest in the South
Caucasus region has been conditioned by the problems of energy
security which were brought to forefront early this year, or the
new policy was planned irrespective of it?
– The new German government seems to be deeply aware of various
problems of instability of the region – the unresolved frozen
conflicts, organized crime, terrorism and illegal trafficking of
people, drugs and arms – and their immediate threats for the European
security.
As the engaged European policy to the South Caucasus has as well to
keep in mind its effects on the relations with Russia, the main change
in the new government’s thinking is related to a slightly adjusted
German policy towards Russia. Russia remains a strategic partner
and the most important neighbor of the EU, but that doesn’t exclude
different understandings and approaches for the stabilization of
the South Caucasus and the whole common neighborhood region. As a
smart pupil of Helmut Kohl and by her own biography as a German of
the former GDR, Mrs Merkel has a particular sensibility for the
worries of the Eastern European states about Russia.
The security of energy transport routes via the South Caucasus and
the Wider Black Sea region is certainly a reason for the raising
importance of the region for Europe; Germany itself though doesn’t
have a big stake in this energy market. The broader geopolitical
context of the problems of the South Caucasus with its immediate
consequences for Europe has mainly driven the recognition of the
German government that Europe in its own key interest can’t anymore
afford a destabilization of this region.
– Should we consider Germany’s new view on the South Caucasus
in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy or in the light
of initiatives related to the Wider Black Sea region, or a separate
initiative is only meant?
– The German government has increasingly become aware of some
weaknesses of the existing European Neighborhood Policy. Even if the
EU can’t give any immediate membership prospective to the Eastern
European Neighbors, the long lasting implementation of the acquis
communitaire in these countries as the ultimate goal does not meet
the urgent challenges of stabilization of this region. Instruments
beyond the ENP have to be offered to these EU neighborhood countries
like the Barcelona process for the Mediterranean Neighborhood.
In particular, the regional cooperation of these countries has to
be strengthened. Russia is part of many problems, but has to be part
of the solution to establish regional security as well. Additional
ENP instruments therefore should contain elements enhancing regional
cooperation and including offers to Russia. A further developed ENP
will include elements of Wider Black Sea region cooperation.
The German government intensively reflects about a modified Black Sea
Stability Pact or an ENP Plus that contains additional support for
regional cooperation in areas like environmental protection, energy
security, infrastructure, security and trade regulation. With the
EU accession of Bulgaria and Romania by January 1st, 2007 the EU
will already consist of Black Sea states as member states.
– Can EU’s closer interest in Caucasus assist in softening existing
problems, for instance, normalizing relations between Armenia –
involved in the European Neighborhood Policy – and Turkey, striving
for the EU membership?
– The EU can only offer additional instruments for regional cooperation
and European integration. To which extend they will be fruitful depends
ultimately from the political will of the addressees. During the
long process of the negotiations with Turkey about its EU accession
it will be a key question to which extent Turkey is able and wishes
to contribute to the stabilization of the South Caucasus. Given her
close historical and cultural ties with the region Turkey can offer
a lot, if it is ready to accept its own history and the genocide like
prosecutions against the Armenian people by the Ottoman administration
at 1915.
– Do you agree with the viewpoint of the EU Special Representative
for the South Caucasus, Peter Semneby that all three South Caucasus
countries move "in various directions"? If yes, then what dangers these
"various directions" may entail?
– There are no doubts that the South Caucasus consists of three very
different states, different in the status of democratic transition,
different in economic reforms and size, and different in some foreign
and security political aspects. All in all, however, I see a broad
overall strive of all the three countries for integration into
the EU and from a long term point of view even into NATO. Georgia
is strongly aspiring for NATO integration, Azerbaijan is carefully
assessing the ground for a more intensive NATO integration and Armenia
is looking for an active participation in the ENP and tries to easy
Russia’s strong grip. In some regard there is even a sort of common
competition among all three states who rushes quicker on the path to
Western integration. The people and the governments in all 3 states
are going to understand more and more that on the long term the West
has something to offer that other influential powers in the region
don’t: security and prosperity and freedom.
– In early and mid 90s, it has been suggested that the European
countries have "divided" the South Caucasus the following way:
Germany "supervises" Georgia, France – Armenia, and Great Britain –
Azerbaijan. May we say that the time for such schematic approaches has
gone and Germany’s ambitions now cover the whole South Caucasus region?
– This scheme, indeed, reflects some historical and economical
relations, but is driving neither the German nor the French nor
the British nor the EU policy. Neither Germany nor any other EU
member state can successfully pursuit any unilateral policy towards
the region. The only way to success is a more active, common EU
Neighborhood Policy as difficult as it is to find a common EU South
Caucasus policy among 25 member states with equal voting rights. During
its EU presidency the new German government will definitely go for
an improved ENP to make the EU integration of the 3 South Caucasian
states real.