"IT IS GOOD THAT THE SECRECY IS NOW GONE"
(The exclusive interview of Zeyno Baran, Director of the Center for
Eurasian Policy, Hudson Institute, to Armenian Mediamax news agency,
July 2006)
The situation around the Nagorno Karabakh conflict settlement in
recent several weeks has been developing like a "snowball". Shortly
after the meeting of Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Bucharest
the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs issued a statement that was perceived
in the region as an "ultimatum" to the parties in the conflict. Do
you agree with such definition?
– I don’t consider the OSCE Minsk Group Co-chairs’ statement as an
"ultimatum". It is a statement, however, that makes clear that the
co-chairs believe they have done all they can in this process. From
here on, the burden is going to be on the Armenian and the Azerbaijani
sides–if they want a solution, then they need to work with what
there is. Neither side is very happy with what is on offer, but each
side would be better off if this conflict is resolved, so the two
Presidents and the two peoples need to figure out what they want.
I think it is good that the secrecy is now gone and the people of
Armenia and Azerbaijan see clearly what is on offer. For too long
people were debating the plan based on speculations; the whole process
was in the hands of the Presidents and a small group of people around
them. Having more of the society engaged is part of the democratic
and much healthier way to go about it.
Unfortunately I still do not see how either of the Presidents will
move. There are very good reasons for both of them to accept what is
on offer, and declare it as a major success to their people. However,
I think their calculations are different and both believe it is better
to wait a bit longer and see how the situation may evolve. For example,
we still do not know what will happen with Iran; in case of increased
tension with the West, what will Iran’s policy be towards Armenia
and Azerbaijan? What will their positions be vis-a-vis Iran and the
West? How about the deteriorating relations between Washington and
Moscow, especially in areas Moscow still considers to be in its
"backyard". I think without a clearer picture of the future of
the South Caucasus region and the dynamics that affect it, neither
president will risk making a move that may leave their country in a
worse situation than it is now.
– Can a breakthrough be anticipated at the talks if the G8 Summit
in St. Petersburg discusses the Karabakh settlement?
– Of course it would be very important for the G-8 Summit to include
Karabakh (as well as the other so-called frozen conflicts). While just
raising them at one meeting is not going to lead to any "breakthrough"
it would send a message that the G-8 community is committed to the
peaceful resolution of these conflicts. It would also be important to
underline that it is in Russia’s interest too to see these conflicts
resolved and the South Caucasus prosper.
– Speaking at "The future of democracy in the Black Sea area"
hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
European Affairs on March 8th, 2005 you expressed the opinion that
"to change the political and economic conditions on the ground and
the calculations of two sides U.S. needs to get engaged into the
Karabakh conflict settlement at the highest level." To your mind,
can we speak about such engagement today?
– I think over the last year the US has increased its engagement,
but still not at the sufficient level. That is why we need to see
US President Bush raise Karabakh at the G-8 so he commits the US at
the highest levels. Why? Because everyone knows that in addition to
working out the issues between the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides,
there is also the Russia factor, and only the US has the ability to
work with Russia in a way to help them see that solution to Karabakh
is in their interest as well.
– You have also stated: "Azerbaijan is told by the West that it lost
Karabakh in the war and needs to give up this piece of land for
the sake of peace and prosperity and move on with its EU and NATO
integration process. This kind of talk only hardens the nationalists,
who believe that with massive oil and gas revenues starting to flow
into the budget over the next several years, they can strengthen
their military and take back their land." What, to your mind, is
the West doing wrong and what steps should the West take? Can we
describe as nationalists the senior Azerbaijani government officials
who constantly threaten to increase the military budget and resolve
the problem in a military way?
– There is a lot of frustration in Azerbaijan and a sense that the
international community would have supported them a lot more if they
were Christian. Making compromise is always difficult and especially
in a region where such a tradition is not that prevalent. If one looks
at the facts on the ground in Azerbaijan, especially the two digit
growth rates and oil starting flow in massive quantities, it is easy
to understand that the Azerbaijani people would feel increasingly more
secure and feel that time is on their side. Then there is the rise of
nationalism which is not just an Azerbaijani phenomenon but is seen in
many of the countries, including in neighboring countries like Russia
and Turkey. The talk about the military option may be part of the
negotiating tactic, or it may reflect the sense of frustration. I am in
general opposed to people -including senior government officials–using
such language as it fuels mutual mistrust and makes compromise
even harder.
– How viable the prospect of determining Nagorno Karabakh’s status
at a referendum is?
– I do not believe there can be a referendum held in the short
term that would have international legitimacy, but there could and
probably will be one in the future. It all depends on when and under
what conditions.
– In last several years, the representatives of the U.S. Administration
have stressed that unlike other post-Soviet frozen conflicts, Russia
and the USA cooperate closely in Nagorno Karabakh. Is this conditioned
by the specific character of the Karabakh conflict or you may outline
other reasons?
– There is a major difference between Karabakh and the other frozen
conflicts–in the others, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia
is almost a direct player. Whereas in Karabakh, it is only an indirect
player and hence it is easier for the US and Russia to cooperate.
– The opinion that the USA will henceforth connect the Nagorno Karabakh
settlement with the internal political developments in Armenia and
the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections abandon in
Armenia. How justified this
tactics will be?
– I frankly have not heard anyone mention this in the US
administration. The only thing I hear being mentioned repeatedly is
that 2006 is the "window of opportunity" to reach a solution as after
this year Armenia will start the election cycle and in that climate
it is much harder to resolve a difficult issue like Karabakh.
– Addressing the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs last March you said that "the strength of Armenian Diaspora
limits U.S. ability
to encourage democratic change in Armenia." You noted then that
"the U.S.
simply cannot put the same kind of pressure on President Robert
Kocharian as it was able to do with President Leonid Kuchma of
Ukraine. It is inconceivable to think that Washington would threaten
to keep senior Armenian government officials out of the U.S. in case
of falsified elections." To your mind, will this tendency be preserved
or Washington will be ready to harden its position if the elections
in Armenia again fail to meet international standards?
– Well, I guess I do not foresee any change as the Armenian Diaspora
is still as effective as it has been and would not want the Armenian
government to come under any kind of criticism. But Armenians should be
able to join the community of democracies and all those civil society
and NGO activists, as well as those reformers in the government,
should be able to get the kind of support other pro-democracy people
in other parts of the world get from the US. There has to be a way
to come up with some sort of a constructive and effective criticism,
but I don’t have the answer as to how.
– What do you think, has Washington already defined its "allies"
at the upcoming elections in Armenia?
– No, I don’t think anyone in Washington is really thinking about
the elections at this point–those few who cover the region are all
focused on the Karabakh conflict. When it gets closer, Washington (by
that I mean the US government) will of course be mostly interested
in the pre-election process; if there will be some "more favored"
candidates, these will be people who will have a vision for Armenia
that is democratic, on its path to integrate closer with the European
and Euro-Atlantic institutions, has a clear and workable reform
agenda, etc.
– Why do U.S. efforts to normalize relations between Armenia and
Turkey turn out to be fruitless? How real is it to speak about the
possibility of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations before the
settlement of the Karabakh conflict?
– I always had difficulty seeing how Turkey would normalize relations
with Armenia, mainly open the border, before there is some progress
on the Karabakh issue–it does not have to be fully resolved, but
there has to be sufficient progress so that the Turkish people and
the Azerbaijani people would let their leaders make such a move. Of
course there are regular flights between Turkey and Armenia, and
people-to-people exchanges and dialogues are going well. But no matter
how much pressure (or encouragement) there is from the US (and the EU),
Turks will not be able to change policy before the conditions on the
ground change. Turks are simply too close with Azeris in many ways
(ethnic, religious, culture, etc) for them to just act on their own.
