David Simonyan: Surrender of territories to Azerbaijan: strategic
consequences for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh
Regnum, Russia
July 27, 2006
REGNUM publishes the article of security expert David Simonyan
(Yerevan), which reflects his vision of the future of the Karabakh
conflict. The article is published in the author’s wording.
In the light of the continuing discourse on how to preserve the
"favorable window of opportunities" in the Karabakh peace process,
people in Armenia keep actively talking about the settlement
principles that have reportedly been presented to the Armenian
and Azeri presidents for discussion and possible signing. These
principles stipulate that Armenian troops be withdrawn from the
liberated territories and the territories, except for the Lachin
corridor, be given back to Azerbaijan.
The article is about the importance the liberated territory has for
ensuring the key element of Armenia’s national security – its military
component. When speaking about Armenia, you should keep in mind two
states, the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic
(NKR), who are fully integrated in military and economic terms. As
you may know, military security is a condition of a state that allows
it to exclude any damage to its vital interests that can be caused
by threat or practical armed violence.
The given analysis is based on an axiom that is generally accepted
among experts: for ensuring national security one should be ready
for the worst scenario. And now, let’s more thoroughly consider the
significance the liberated territory has for ensuring the military
security of Armenia (RA and NKR).
The military conflict of 1991-1994 has improved the quality of the
following elements of the military-strategic position of the Armenian
states:
1. Frontline configuration
The present configuration of the frontline is optimal for the
Armenian side. The southern flank of the Artsakh front is shielded
by the Iranian border, the northern flank – by the hard-to-access
Mrav mountain range. In the east – from the mountains of Mrav to the
river Arax – the Armenian side has a well-fortified multi-echelon
defense line.
Should the Armenian side give back the territories of six districts
and keep only Lachin, the total frontline of the two Armenian states
with Azerbaijan, including Nakhichevan, will get 450 km longer to 1,100
km. The frontline between Artsakh and Azerbaijan will lengthen by 150
km to 360 km. For you to have the full picture of how long a border
Armenia will have with its conflicting neighbors, we should remind
you that Armenia also has a poorly protected 268 km border with Turkey.
In order to effectively fortify the extended frontline the Armenian
side will have to mobilize substantial human and financial resources.
First, the Armenian side will have to increase its army personnel (the
Armed Forces of Armenia and the Defense Army of Artsakh (Karabakh))
and, therefore, to prolong the compulsory service term for privates
and to enroll contract officers.
Second, after withdrawing troops, the Armenian side will have to
undertake big expenses to create new defense lines. To carry out the
above measures, the Armenian side will have to augment its military
budget, but to do this, it will have to further curtail its scarce
social financing and to face the ensuing negative consequences.
2. Depth of defense
The liberated territories have allowed the Armenian side to ensure
the minimum defense depth and to solve several important strategic
problems:
First, the present depth of defense has allowed the Armenian side to
form a multi-echelon defense line. Should the first line be broken, the
Armenian side will be able to resist on the following ones and to keep
the enemy outside Artsakh until additional troops come from Armenia.
Second, the central densely-populated areas of Artsakh, including
its capital, Stepanakert, as well as the settlements of the Goris,
Kapan and Meghri districts of Armenia have become inaccessible for
shelling by Azeri artillery and multiple rocket launching systems
(BM-21 "Grad").
Third, by liberating the Zangelan, Jebrail and Fizuli districts
and moving the frontline over 100 km eastward, the Armenian side
has liquidated the threat to the vulnerable, just 40 km wide Meghri
district of the Republic of Armenia.
If the six districts are given back to the enemy and the frontline is
moved back to the former administrative border of Nagorno-Karabakh
Autonomous Region, the Armenian side will lose the necessary depth
for effective defense and will face bigger difficulties in defending
Artsakh should a new war begin.
The new frontline will run just 5 km away from the district centers of
Mardakert, Askeran and Hadrut and 18 km away from Stepanakert. If the
Armenian side gives back the Karvachar (formerly Kelbajar) district
too, the Martakert district will get vulnerable to possible military
attacks from three sides.
Even fortified to the maximum, the new defense line will not be a
reliable guarantor of Artsakh’s military security. As we know from
military history, any well-fortified defense line (Mannerheim line,
Siegfried line, Bar-Lev line) can be broken by the attacker, and only
sufficient depth of defense can allow the defender to organize new
resistance lines and by wearing the enemy out to stop his attack. For
example, during the Yom Kippur War (1973), when the Egyptian troops
overran the 157.5 km long and 15 km deep Bar-Lev line in Sinai in just
six hours, it was exactly the depth of the line that allowed Israel
to stop the Egyptian troops, to prevent them from going deep into
its territory, to mobilize new forces and to turn around the situation.
Besides, if the border is moved, most of the settlements of Artsakh
and the Sunik region of Armenia, first of all, Stepanakert, Kapan and
Goris, will find themselves unprotected in the face of possible massive
shelling by the enemy. If a new war starts, a sudden massive bombing
of towns, district centers and villages by artillery and "Grads"
will cause big casualties among civilians and heavy in destruction
in Artsakh and Sunik. This may result in a mass exodus of people from
the area.
3. Military communications
Efficient military communications, well-trained and equipped mobile
troops, timely supply of arms, hardware, ammunition, fuel and other
stuff and quick evacuation are really crucial in modern war. For
the Armenian side, regular military communications would be really
indispensable, should the enemy get big superiority during the first
days of the war.
Let’s see in detail what military communications each side has:
Azerbaijan
The densely-populated areas of Azerbaijan are connected with the
Artsakh front by two railroads: Baku-Yevlakh and Baku-Horadiz station
and several motor roads: Baku-Shemakha-Yevlakh, Baku-Kurdamir-Yevlakh
and Baku-Birmai-Bailakan (Zhdanovsk) as well as belt road
Yevlakh-Barda-Agjabedy-Bailakan – quite a convenient road running
along the frontline. All running via steppe, these roads will allow
the enemy to quickly send mobilized troops to the Artsakh front and
to get multiple superiority in personnel and hardware before the
approach of the Armenian troops.
Artsakh
With the present frontline configuration, there are four motor roads
connecting Armenia with Artsakh and the frontline: Vardenis-Mardakert,
Goris-Stepanakert-Askeran-Agda m, Kapan-Zangelan-Jebrail and
Meghri-Mijavan-Horadiz. If the war resumes, these roads will allow
the Armenian sides to bring up quite big troops from Armenia to the
Artsakh front in just a few days.
So-called belt roads – communications running along the frontline
– are crucial for the frontline resistive capacity. They allow
to quickly redeploy troops to wherever there is a danger of
breach. At present the Artsakh Defense Army has two belt roads:
Mardakert-Agdam-Fizuli-Jebrail and the North-South highway project
to connect Mardakert-Stepanakert-Red Bazar-Hadrut.
If the six liberated districts are surrendered, the Armenian armed
forces will control only one belt road – Mardakert-Hadrut and
only one road connecting mainland Armenia with Sunik and Artsakh –
Yerevan-Goris-Stepanakert. This road runs through a highly mountainous
area with many passes.
If a new war starts, the Armenians will find it extremely difficult
to keep the narrow Lachin corridor from the enemy’s two-side strikes,
but even if they retain Lachin, the enemy will use its artillery and
aviation to make it as hard as possible for Armenia to quickly transfer
big military forces and material and medical assistance to Artsakh.
Meanwhile, the fate of Artsakh will depend exactly on how quickly
Armenia will supply it with troops as the Defense Army of Artsakh
may prove not strong enough to resist the onslaught of the greatly
prevalent enemy.
Thus, you clearly see that the liberated territory is extremely
important for keeping the military balance between the conflicting
sides, while its surrender by the Armenian side will break
it to Azerbaijan’s advantage and will strongly aggravate the
military-strategic situation of the Armenian states – something
neither peace agreements nor international peacekeepers will compensate
for. This is especially dangerous as Azerbaijan is heavily swelling its
military potential, particularly, by redoubling its military budget
in 2006 – from $300 mln to $600 mln – while Armenia will hardly be
able to keep pace in the coming years for the following reasons:
1. The state budget of Armenia is 3.5 times smaller than the
state budget of Azerbaijan ($1 bln against $3.5bln) and this gap
will continue to grow as Azerbaijan will increase its oil exports.
Meanwhile, Armenia’s economic potential will not allow this country
to allot as much money to the military as to keep the military parity
with Azerbaijan.
2. Armenia can no longer hope for the big free military hardware
supplies that it got from Russia in the mid 1990s and that helped it
to keep military balance with Azerbaijan for the last decade. The key
military partner of Armenia, Russia has begun to show more pragmatic
policy in the last years, with no political or economic preferences.
Hence, only by retaining the liberated territory, carrying out military
reforms and improving the state administration system as a whole will
the Armenian side be able to offset the growing military potential
of the enemy and, thereby, to keep the Azeri side from temptation to
resume military actions.
Given the continuing variance of the sides concerning the status of
Artsakh, any change in the present configuration of the contact line
will not stop the conflict but will simply create another, much more
conflict-prone situation in the sphere of security.
Should Azerbaijan, whose leadership keeps saying that it will never
put up with the loss of Karabakh, agree to sign peace agreements, but
will later prove not content with the return of just six districts
and will make up its mind to get back the whole Artsakh by war,
Armenia will get in a serious danger.
Turning to advantage the change in the military balance and the
consequent vulnerability of Artsakh’s whole defense system, Azerbaijan
may use some convenient political moment to launch a blitzkrieg attack
and to occupy Artsakh. In order to break the frontline, the Azeris
will quickly concentrate strongly prevalent forces for one main
blow – not a hard thing to do for them given the big quantitative
and technical prevalence of the Azeri Army over the Defense Army
of Artsakh and the facts that 70% of Azeri troops are deployed near
the frontline and that Azerbaijan has better capacities for quickly
deploying mobilized troops to the Artsakh front. The outcome of the
war will greatly depend on its very first days, particularly, on the
ability of the Defense Army of Artsakh to keep the frontline intact,
which may prove quite a hard job.
Armenia will have very limited capacities to help Artsakh: it will
not be able to use the vulnerable Lachin corridor for transferring
big military contingents. If the frontline is broken and the Armenian
troops fail to stop the enemy at Stepanakert, the Armenian side may
lose not only Artsakh but also Sunik. If Azerbaijan occupies Artsakh,
Turkey will certainly encourage it to try to make true the Pan-Turkic
dream: to seize the Meghri district, thereby, linking Azerbaijan with
Turkey and cutting Armenia from Iran. To this end, the enemy may strike
from two sides – from Zangelan and Nakhichevan. After losing Artsakh,
it will be extremely hard for the Armenian side to keep Meghri:
the district is very narrow and lacks the necessary defense depth,
while the motor roads connecting it with the rest of Armenia are
quite vulnerable.
The liquidation of Serbian Krajina in Croatia in 1995 is one example
of how real this scenario can be: Croatia broke earlier cease-fire
agreements, mobilized its armed forces and suddenly attacked
Serbian Krajina. In some few days they broke the frontline and
occupied the region. As a result, Serbian Krajina stopped to exist
and half million of Serbs were forced to leave their homeland and
become refugees. This tragedy happened in the center of Europe in
the presence of thousands-strong UN peacekeeping contingent and led
to no sanctions against the aggressor side.
Conclusions:
1. One of the key factors keeping the military balance between Armenia
and Artsakh, from the one side, and Azerbaijan, from the other, and
compensating for Azerbaijan’s personnel and hardware superiority and
capacity to increase its military potential is the present optimal
configuration of the Artsakh frontline.
2. The existing military balance rather than the cease-fire agreement
of 1994 is keeping Azerbaijan back from resuming large-scale military
actions.
3. By giving back any part of the liberated territory, the Armenian
side will give Azerbaijan a military advantage and will reduce its
own military security. This may inspire the enemy – should there be
convenient moment – to solve the Karabakh problem by war. That’s why
it is absolutely inadmissible to surrender the liberated territory
to the enemy.
4. Given the aggressive and genocide-prone Azeri-Turkish alliance,
with its overwhelming military prevalence and open desire to destroy
the Armenian statehood, the key security guarantee for Armenia and
Artsakh must be the Armenian Army and the present territory of the
Armenian states (42,000 sq. km.)