Hezbollah: Phoenix From the Ashes?
Middle East Online, UK
Aug 1, 2006
There is a chance that Hezbollah, far from being destroyed by Israel’s
current attacks, may emerge as an even more powerful political force
in Lebanon by the next elections. Popular Lebanese (and wider Arab)
attitudes have changed sharply in the past two weeks from being opposed
to Hezbollah as a Syrian ally, to praising Hezbollah for standing up
to Israel’s aggression, notes Richard W. Bulliet.
The rules are clear: Sovereign states can use all the military force
they can get away with, but violence by non-state organizations is
usually labeled "terrorism." But what if, in Lebanon, Hezbollah and
its well-wishers end up controlling the Lebanese government? Israel
and the United States may come to deeply regret Israel’s reaction to
the Hezbollah capture of two soldiers.
How might Hezbollah pull this off? Today they are winning the worldwide
sympathy war by a large margin. While Hezbollah stands up to the
Israeli air force, navy and ground forces as it rains missiles on
Israeli civilians far from the border, regional television coverage
brings the horrors of Israel’s attacks on Lebanese civilians and the
destruction of the Lebanese economy into every Arab home.
Israel’s relentless pounding of the civilian infrastructure —
and heartless declarations that Hezbollah alone is responsible when
civilians get in the way of Israeli bombs — has blunted internal
Lebanese criticism of Hezbollah for provoking the attack. Prolonging
the bloodshed is unlikely to change this. Is there a single Arab,
Iranian, Turkish, or Muslim heart (and many a non-Muslim heart) that
is not bleeding for the Lebanese dead and seething with anger toward
Israel and the United States? Even the Arab leaders who initially
curried American favor by condemning Hezbollah are scampering to
reverse their positions.
The Bush-Blair axis proposes an international intervention force for
south Lebanon. Its mission: Separate the warring parties, disarm and
dismember Hezbollah, and guarantee Israel’s border security. There
is every reason for Hezbollah to accept this opportunity to exit the
field of battle with honour. It could legitimately claim that its
brave few had fought Israel to a standstill, and has now relented to
save Lebanon from further punishment. Many Lebanese Christians and
Sunnis would still distrust Hezbollah’s motives. But most Lebanese,
starting with the 40% of the population that is Shi’ite, would hail
them as heroes. And so would millions of Arabs and Muslims elsewhere.
What, then, might happen in the next Lebanese election? The 1989 Taif
Agreement that ended the Lebanese civil war set the number of seats
in the National Assembly at 128, half assigned to Christian sects
and half to Muslim. District lines were drawn according to where the
various sects predominated.
In an earlier format, only members of a given sect could vote for
candidates belonging to that sect. But in an effort to make national
interests as important as sectarian ones, the Taif agreement specified
that all the voters should have a say in who was elected from their
district. Thus the Armenian candidates vying for the one Armenian
Catholic seat in the assembly had to campaign for the votes of all
Christians and Muslims in their district. The winner would presumably
be the one with the strongest appeal across sectarian lines.
The Cedar Revolution of 2005 indicated that the Taif formula succeeds
in making Lebanon’s election turn on national interests. The Rafiq
Hariri Martyr List, a coalition opposed to Syrian domination,
won 72 seats. Winning candidates included Christians, Sunnis, and
Druze. The Resistance and Development Bloc, a pro-Syrian coalition,
won 35 seats. The winners were mostly Shi’ite – 14 from Hezbollah
and 15 from Amal, the party run by National Assembly Speaker Nabih
Berri – but two seats went to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party,
a non-Shi’ite group.
Rage over the Hariri assassination galvanized the formation of the
anti-Syrian coalition. Could rage at Israel, pride in Hezbollah’s
resistance, and admiration of its leader, Sheikh Nasrallah, create
an equally potent coalition? Such an alignment would have to be
inter-sectarian because no one wishes to change the Taif formula for
the sectarian allocation of assembly seats. But Israel’s attacks have
affected all Lebanese.
If an anti-Israel alignment controlled the National Assembly,
Hezbollah’s militiamen would probably be incorporated into the
Lebanese army. Syria would be rewarded for sticking by its proteges.
And Iran would increase its prestige as Israel’s foe and become the
legitimate weapons supplier for an anti-Israeli Lebanese army. As
for the West’s hopes for the Cedar Revolution, these would die in
the smouldering wreckage of the Israeli bombardment.
When an international force deploys in south Lebanon, Israel and the
United States will probably claim victory. But it will be a hollow
victory indeed if an angry and democratic Lebanon with a new militant
leadership takes the place of "terrorist" Hezbollah.
This scenario may not play out: Lebanon’s next elections are slated
for 2010. So the passions of Lebanese who now rage against Israel
and cheer for Hezbollah will have time to cool. Whether they do cool
will depend on Israel. If Israel continues to punish Lebanon – or in
Israeli terminology, "to defend itself" – and the international force
fails to fulfill the vain dream of totally eradicating Hezbollah,
Lebanon may become a nightmare for Tel Aviv and Washington.
Israel’s best hope is not to ferret out every Hezbollah missile,
but to grab the earliest opportunity to withdraw – the Qana tragedy
may be that opportunity – and then keep their fingers crossed, and
their bombers on the ground, until 2010. Maybe the normally sensible
and pragmatic Lebanese will forgive and forget… again.
Richard W. Bulliet is Professor of History at Columbia University and
author of Islam: A View from the Edge and The Case for Islamo-Christian
Civilization
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