POLICY WATCH: AZERBAIJAN’S GEOPOLITICS
By Mark N. Katz

United Press International
Aug. 20, 2006

WASHINGTON, Aug. 20 (UPI) — The geopolitics of Azerbaijan are
complex. And they could become even more so.

But first, something must be said about what exactly geopolitics are,
and what is involved.

1. Identifying a country’s strengths and weakness vis-a-vis others,
but also the rivalries and alliances of that country, its neighbors,
and global and regional powers concerned with it;

2. Assessing whether these strengths and weaknesses, rivalries and
alliances are stable or likely to change; and

3. Exploring the impact of change in any of these on the existing
rivalries and alliances concerning a country.

Complicating all this is that a country’s geopolitics can be different
with regard to different issues. This applies to Azerbaijan, where
there are five important geopolitical issues: pipelines, division of
the Caspian, Nagorno-Karabakh, Southern Azerbaijan, democratization.

Pipelines: When first proposed, it was uncertain whether the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline from Azerbaijan’s oil fields through Georgia and
Turkey to the Mediterranean coast would ever be built, or whether Azeri
oil would continue to be exported via the existing pipeline through
Russia — with all it implied for continued Russian predominance in
Azerbaijan. But Baku-Ceyhan was built, is functioning, and Azerbaijan
is less dependent on Russia.

On the pipeline issue, Azerbaijan’s allies are the U.S., EU, Turkey,
and Georgia, while its rivals are Russia and Iran (both of which
would have preferred Azeri oil to transit their territory).

The issue now is: Can a pipeline under the Caspian be built so that
Kazakhstan can export oil via Azerbaijan, thus also reducing its
dependence on exporting via Russia? Russia could block this project if
it wanted. But this would be self-defeating since Kazakhstan can also
export its oil eastward to China. Azerbaijan is in a good position
regarding its own oil exports.

Possible side effect?

A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement: Azeri oil could then also be exported
via Iran since the U.S. would no longer object. But a U.S.-Iranian
rapprochement does not seem likely any time soon.

Turmoil in Turkey and/or Georgia: Either would shut down Baku-Ceyhan.

Both are possible. Indeed, Russia seems to be working for this in
Georgia. Azerbaijan would then have to export oil either via Russia
or Iran. Absent a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, its oil would probably
have to go through Russia — and be subject to Russian obstruction.

Caspian Delimitation: Ever since the collapse of the USSR, the
maritime border in the Caspian between Iran and Azerbaijan has been
in dispute. Further, significant oil deposits are believed to be in
the disputed area. Since July 2001 when Iran successfully employed
gunboat diplomacy to halt British Petroleum exploring in the disputed
area on Azerbaijan’s behalf, no further exploration has been possible.

On the Caspian delimitation issue, Azerbaijan’s allies are Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkey, and the U.S., while its rivals are Iran and
Turkmenistan (which also has a boundary dispute with Azerbaijan in the
Caspian). Neutral (or more accurately, neutralized) parties include
EU countries with oil interests in Iran that they do not wish to risk
by supporting Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan’s allies here, though, are not all allied with each other.

Russia in particular does not want "outside" powers (the U.S. and
Turkey) to be involved. Azerbaijan is nervous about depending solely
on Russia for support against Iran. It is possible that Azerbaijan and
Iran could reach a compromise on this issue. Until then, stalemate
is likely to continue. A U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would probably
result in the U.S. being less an ally of Azerbaijan on this and more
of a neutral.

Nagorno-Karabakh: Azerbaijan lost this region as well as other
territory to Armenia in fighting that took place in the years just
before and after the breakup of the USSR. A cold peace has lasted up
to the present with Azerbaijan unable to get back any of the territory
occupied by Armenia.

On the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Azerbaijan’s only real ally is Turkey,
while its rivals are Armenia, Russia, and (because of the Southern
Azerbaijan issue that will be discussed next) Iran. Torn between the
desire both to please their influential Armenian diaspora communities
and to obtain Azeri oil, the U.S. and the EU have made efforts to
resolve this conflict, but so far without success.

Azerbaijan might hope one day to use its increasing oil wealth to
build up its forces vis-a-vis Armenia, but Azerbaijan’s unfavorable
geopolitical position vis-a-vis Armenia casts doubt on its ability
to regain any territory from Armenia by force.

One possible change that could affect this calculation would be
the rise to power of a nationalist or Islamist government in Turkey
alienated from America and the EU — which is something that might
well occur if Turkish aspirations to join the EU are spurned. Such
a Turkey might threaten the use of force against Armenia unless it
relinquishes the territory it captured from Azerbaijan. Under these
circumstances, Russia, the U.S., and even Iran might support Armenia.

A regional war could develop.

Southern Azerbaijan: There are more Azeris living in Iran than
in independent, former Soviet Azerbaijan. Baku has been extremely
self-restrained about the "Southern Azerbaijan" issue. But unrest
among Azeris in Iran has been increasing.

If the situation worsens, Tehran is unlikely to blame itself for
this state of affairs but to blame Azerbaijan. If Tehran believes
(whether accurately or not) that Baku is seeking the breakup of Iran,
it might well behave threateningly toward Azerbaijan.

Although no other country supports Azeri secession from Iran,
Azerbaijan’s allies in any Iranian-Azeri confrontation would be the
U.S. and Turkey, while its principal rival would, by definition,
be Iran. Russia would oppose both Iranian meddling in Azerbaijan
and an American presence there too. The risk that this scenario
might develop does not seem high at present, but Iran’s mercurial
president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has already demonstrated a proclivity
for confrontational behavior.

Democratization: Here we need to focus on the perceptions of
the current authoritarian Azeri government — which has already
demonstrated its disinclination toward democratization as well as
its inclination to halt meaningful progress toward it.

On the democratization issue, the Azeri government’s main allies
are Russia and Iran (which equate democratization with the spread of
American influence), while it perceives as rivals the U.S., neighboring
Georgia (where the "Rose Revolution" ushered in democratic government
in 2003), and the EU.

The current Azeri government fears that a democratic "color revolution"
would lead to its downfall. Strong U.S. support for an Azeri democratic
movement (or even the perception of it) could lead Azerbaijan to
move closer to Russia and even make concessions to it in other areas
in exchange for protection. The U.S. might even be pushed out of
Azerbaijan. On the other hand, if a democratic revolution does occur
— either with or without much U.S. support, the U.S. probably would
become closely allied to the new government.

What this analysis shows is that, with the exception of Armenia, none
of Azerbaijan’s rivals are always rivals. And the Azeri government
undoubtedly feels that none of its friends are always friends either.

—

(Mark N. Katz is a professor of government and politics at George
Mason University.)