Iran’s Diplomacy in Action
In this insider’s assessment of Iran’s long-awaited response to the
incentive package offered by the United States and other world powers,
Abbas Maleki and Kaveh Afrasiabi argue that this is an opportunity for
diplomacy that could actually halt Iran’s nuclear enrichment and address
the concerns of the West.
Agence Global
23 August 2006
By Abbas Maleki and Kaveh L. Afrasiabi
After months of delay in responding to the package of incentives offered
by the UN Security Council’s Permanent Five plus Germany (P5+1), Iran
has submitted a detailed and comprehensive response that puts the
diplomatic ball squarely back in the court of the P5+1.
While rejecting the UN’s demand for an immediate halt to its
uranium-enrichment activities, Iran’s response still leaves the door
open for serious negotiations, and perhaps an acceptable resolution of
the nuclear showdown for all parties.
By agreeing to put the issue of suspension of enrichment activities on
the table and to commence the talks immediately, Iran has sent a strong
signal that the internal debate between power centers in Iran’s
leadership has ended in favor of voices of moderation seeking a mutually
satisfactory resolution of the nuclear standoff with the West. It will
be a pity if Washington overlooks this opportunity for a fair
negotiation with Iran, especially considering the details of Iran’s
response.
Iran has, expectedly, sought clarification on a number of issues,
including the following:
– The incentive package mentions respecting Iran’s rights under the
nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), yet the only NPT articles
mentioned are Articles I and II, pertaining to non-proliferation, and
not Article IV, pertaining to a country’s "inalienable right" to acquire
nuclear technology;
– Iran wants firm guarantees on the proposed offers of nuclear
assistance, such as the sale of light water reactors to Iran, as well as
a secured nuclear fuel supply;
– Iran seeks clarification on the status of U.S. sanctions which
presently prohibit those offers of nuclear and technological assistance
to Iran: Is the United States willing to lift some if not all of those
sanctions?
– The package’s promise of an Iran-EURATOM cooperation agreement needs
to be fleshed out;
– The package’s brief reference to security and its hint of Iran’s
participation in a "regional security" arrangement needs further
clarification; and,
– The timeline on the promised incentives, including the economic and
trade incentives, has to be made specific.
Furthermore, Iran’s response indicates that Iran is willing to re-adopt
the IAEA’s Additional Protocol and to take the steps toward legislating
it as part and parcel of a final agreement.
Meanwhile, Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, has declared
Iran¹s willingness to use its influence in Lebanon for an
Israeli-Hezbollah prisoners’ exchange, reminding the world of Iran’s
stabilizing role.
Clearly, given the tight interplay between the nuclear issue and Iran’s
political identity, no one should be surprised that Iran’s leaders have
opted against committing political suicide by giving in to international
pressure and suspending the nuclear fuel cycle. But, far from rejecting
this demand, Iran’s response makes rather clear its feasibility as a
result of the proposed talks, which Iran is willing to commence
immediately, particularly if Iran¹s abstract rights under Article IV of
NPT are explicitly recognized by the P5+1.
In light of the rights-sensitive Iranian public, Tehran will seriously
entertain suspending the fuel cycle if and when it feels vindicated as a
matter of principle, in a manner which creates conditions conducive to
the idea of suspensions. A face-saving solution appears in which Iran
could decide against implementing as an abstract right hitherto thwarted
by the P5+1.
And now the UN Security Council, which had given Iran until the end of
August to halt its nuclear fuel cycle, has a unique role to play either
as spoiler or catalyst with respect to the opportunity afforded by
Iran¹s response — to put the genie of Iran’s nuclear crisis back in the
bottle. Already Kofi Annan is directly involved in intense negotiations
with Tehran, and, indeed, resolving the nuclear row may turn out to be
one of the enduring legacies of the departing Secretary General.
Should the United States and its UN envoy, John Bolton, decide to ignore
this opportunity and push for UN sanctions against Iran, despite the
positive dimensions of Iran’s offer, the stage will be set for a
full-scale international crisis.
Abbas Maleki is the Director of the International Institute For Caspian
Studies in Tehran and currently a senior research fellow at Harvard
University’s Kennedy School of Government. Kevah Afrasiabi is a
political scientist and author of Iran’s Nuclear Program: Debating Facts
vs. Fiction.
For rights and permissions, contact:
[email protected], 1.336.686.9002 or 1.212.731.0757
Agence Global
1.212.731.0757 (main)
1.336.286.6606 (billing)
1.336.686.9002 (rights & permissions)
Agence Global is the exclusive syndication agency for The Nation and The
American Prospect, as well as expert commentary by William Beeman,
Richard Bulliet, Mark Hertsgaard, Rami G. Khouri, Tom Porteous, Patrick
Seale and Immanuel Wallerstein.