U.S. Department of State
Turkey: International Religious Freedom Report 2006
Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, the Government imposes
some restrictions on Muslim and other religious groups and on Muslim
religious expression in government offices and state-run institutions,
including universities.
There was no change in the status of respect for religious freedom during
the period covered by this report, and government policy continued to
contribute to the generally free practice of religion.
The generally tolerant relationship among religions in society contributed
to religious freedom; however, a sharp debate continued over the country’s
definition of "secularism," the proper role of religion in society, and the
potential influence of the country’s small minority of Islamists. Some
Muslims, Christians, and Baha’is faced a few restrictions and occasional
harassment for alleged proselytizing or unauthorized meetings. The
Government continued to oppose "Islamic fundamentalism." Authorities
continued their broad ban on wearing Muslim religious dress in government
offices, universities, and schools.
According to the general perception, Turkish identity is based on the
Turkish language and the Islamic faith. Religious minorities said they were
effectively blocked from careers in state institutions. Christians, Baha’is,
and some Muslims faced societal suspicion and mistrust, and more radical
Islamist elements continued to express anti-Semitic sentiments.
Additionally, persons wishing to convert from Islam to another religion
sometimes experienced social harassment and violence from relatives and
neighbors.
The U.S. government frequently discusses religious freedom with the
Government as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. Embassy
representatives met frequently with government officials and representatives
of religious groups during the reporting year to discuss issues related to
religious freedom, including legal reform aimed at lifting restrictions on
religious minorities.
Section I. Religious Demography
The country has a total area of 301,383 square miles and a population of
approximately 69.6 million. According to the Government, approximately 99
percent of the population was Muslim, the majority of which was Sunni.
According to the human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Mazlum-Der
and representatives of various religious minority communities, the actual
percentage of Muslims was slightly lower. The Government officially
recognized only three minority religious communities-Greek Orthodox
Christians, Armenian Orthodox Christians, and Jews-although other non-Muslim
communities existed. The level of religious observance varied throughout the
country, in part due to the influence of secular traditions and official
restrictions on religious expression in political and social life.
In addition to the country’s Sunni Muslim majority, there were an estimated
fifteen to twenty million Alevis, followers of a belief system that
incorporates aspects of both Shi’a and Sunni Islam and draws on the
traditions of other religions found in Anatolia as well. Some Alevis
practice rituals that include men and women worshipping together through
oratory, poetry, and dance. The Government considered Alevism a heterodox
Muslim sect; however, some Alevis and radical Sunnis maintained Alevis are
not Muslims.
There were several other religious groups, mostly concentrated in Istanbul
and other large cities. While exact membership figures were not available,
these religious groups included approximately 65,000 Armenian Orthodox
Christians; 23,000 Jews; and fewer than 2,500 Greek Orthodox Christians. The
Government interpreted the 1923 Lausanne Treaty as granting special legal
minority status exclusively to these three groups, although the treaty text
refers broadly to "non-Muslim minorities" without listing specific groups.
However, this recognition did not extend to the religious leadership organs;
for example, the Ecumenical and Armenian Patriarchates continued to seek
recognition of their legal status.
There also were approximately 10,000 Baha’is; an estimated 15,000 Syrian
Orthodox (Syriac) Christians; 5,000 Yezidis; 3,300 Jehovah’s Witnesses;
3,000 Protestants; and small, undetermined numbers of Bulgarian, Chaldean,
Nestorian, Georgian, Roman Catholic, and Maronite Christians. The number of
Syriac Christians in the southeast was once high; however, under pressure
from government authorities and later under the impact of the war against
the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), many Syriacs migrated to
Istanbul, Western Europe, or North and South America. Over the last several
years, small numbers of Syriacs returned from overseas to the southeast,
mostly from Western Europe. In most cases, older family members returned
while younger ones remained abroad.
Christian organizations estimated there were approximately 1,100 Christian
missionaries in the country.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom
Legal/Policy Framework
The constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice; however, the Government imposes
some restrictions on Muslim and other religious groups and on Muslim
religious expression in government offices, state-run institutions, and
universities, usually for the stated reason of preserving the "secular
state." The constitution establishes the country as a secular state and
provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship, and the private
dissemination of religious ideas. However, other constitutional provisions
regarding the integrity and existence of the secular state restrict these
rights. The constitution prohibits discrimination on religious grounds. Core
institutions of the state, including the presidency, armed forces,
judiciary, and state bureaucracy, have played the role of defending
traditional Turkish secularism throughout the history of the republic. In
some cases, elements of the state have opposed policies of the elected
Government on the grounds that they threatened the secular state.
The Government oversees Muslim religious facilities and education through
the Diyanet, which is under the authority of the Prime Ministry. The Diyanet
is responsible for regulating the operation of the country’s more than
77,500 registered mosques and employing local and provincial imams, who are
civil servants. Some groups, particularly Alevis, claimed that the Diyanet
reflected mainstream Sunni Islamic beliefs to the exclusion of other
beliefs; however, the Government asserted that the Diyanet treated equally
all who requested services.
A separate government agency, the General Directorate for Foundations (GDF),
regulates some activities of non-Muslim religious groups and their
affiliated churches, monasteries, synagogues, and related religious
property. There are 161 "minority foundations" recognized by the GDF,
including Greek Orthodox foundations with approximately 70 sites, Armenian
Orthodox foundations with approximately 50 sites, and Jewish foundations
with 20 sites, as well as Syriac, Chaldean, Bulgarian Orthodox, Georgian,
and Maronite foundations. The GDF also regulates historic Muslim charitable
religious foundations, including schools, hospitals, and orphanages.
In 1936, the Government required all foundations to declare their sources of
income. In 1974, amid political tensions over Cyprus, the High Court of
Appeals ruled that the minority foundations had no right to acquire
properties beyond those listed in the 1936 declarations.
The court’s ruling launched a process, which continued during the period
covered by this report, under which the state has seized control of
properties acquired after 1936. The law also allows the state to expropriate
properties in areas where the local non-Muslim population drops
significantly. Minority religious groups, particularly the Greek and
Armenian Orthodox communities, have lost numerous properties to the state in
the past and continued to fight ongoing efforts by the state to expropriate
properties.
The law allows the 161 religious minority foundations recognized by the GDF
to acquire property, and the GDF has approved 364 applications by non-Muslim
foundations to acquire legal ownership of properties. However, the
legislation does not allow the communities to reclaim the hundreds of
properties affiliated with foundations expropriated by the state over the
years. Foundations have also been unable to acquire legal ownership of
properties registered under names of third parties, including properties
registered under the names of saints or archangels, during periods when
foundations could not own property in their own name.
Government authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine pertaining to
non-Muslim religions, nor do they restrict the publication or use of
religious literature among members of the religion.
There are legal restrictions against insulting any religion recognized by
the Government, interfering with that religion’s services, or debasing its
property.
Alevis freely practiced their beliefs and have built "cem houses" (places of
gathering), although cem houses have no legal status as places of worship.
Representatives of Alevi organizations maintained that they often faced
obstacles when attempting to establish cem houses. They said there were
approximately one hundred cem houses in the country, a number that they
claimed was insufficient to meet their needs.
Alevis in the Kartal district of Istanbul continued to fight a court battle
against a decision by local authorities to deny them permission to build a
cem house. In January 2005, Alevis in the Cankaya district of Ankara applied
to acquire property to open a cem house. Municipal authorities consulted the
Diyanet, which issued a letter stating that Alevis in Cankaya did not need a
cem house because they could worship at a local mosque. Also in January
2005, the Diyanet issued a letter to authorities in the Sultanbeyli district
of Istanbul stating that cem houses violate Islamic principles and Turkish
law.
In May 2006, authorities in the Istanbul municipality of Sultanbeyli
reportedly halted the construction of a cem house on the grounds that the
Pir Sultan Abdal Association, an Alevi group, had not acquired the necessary
construction permits. Association officials said the local mayor and his
staff had attended the groundbreaking ceremony and had promised not to
interfere with the project.
The Diyanet covers the utility costs of registered mosques, but not of cem
houses and other places of worship that are not officially recognized. In
May 2006, Diyanet President Ali Bardakoglu said the Diyanet could not
provide such support to cem houses as it did not have funds for "supporting
mystical worship."
Many Alevis alleged discrimination in the Government’s failure to include
any of their doctrines or beliefs in religious instruction classes in public
schools. They also charged a bias in the Diyanet, which does not allocate
specific funds for Alevi activities or religious leadership.
The constitution establishes compulsory religious and moral instruction in
primary and secondary schools. Religious minorities are exempted. However,
some religious minorities – such as Protestants – faced difficulty obtaining
exemptions, particularly if their identification cards did not specifically
list membership in a minority religion. The Government claims that the
religion courses cover the range of world religions; however, religious
minorities said the courses reflected Sunni Islamic doctrine, which, they
maintained, explains why non-Muslims are exempt.
In January 2004, an Alevi parent filed suit in the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR), charging that the mandatory religion courses violate
religious freedom; the case is ongoing. In a June 2004 report, the European
Commission against Racism and Intolerance recommended that the Government
either make the courses optional, or revise the content so that they
genuinely and fairly cover all religions.
In April 2006, an Istanbul court announced its ruling in favor of an Alevi
father who requested that his son be exempt from the religion courses at
school; in May, however, a higher court overturned the ruling on appeal.
Officially recognized religious minorities may operate schools under the
supervision of the Ministry of Education. Such schools are required to
appoint a Muslim as deputy principal; reportedly, these deputies have more
authority than their nominal supervisors. The curriculum of these schools
includes Greek Orthodox, Armenian Orthodox, and Jewish instruction.
The Caferis, the country’s principal Shi’a community, numbering between 500
thousand and 1 million (concentrated mostly in eastern Turkey and Istanbul),
do not face restrictions on their religious freedoms. They build and operate
their own mosques and appoint their own imams; however, as with the Alevis,
their places of worship have no legal status and receive no support from the
Diyanet.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
Government policy and practice contributed to the generally free practice of
religion; however, state policy imposes some restrictions on religious
groups and on religious expression in government offices and state-run
institutions, including universities.
Secularists in the military, judiciary, and other branches of the
bureaucracy continued to wage campaigns against what they label as
proponents of Islamic fundamentalism. These groups view religious
fundamentalism as a threat to the secular state. The National Security
Council (NSC) categorizes religious fundamentalism as a threat to public
safety. President Sezer delivered a speech in April 2006 in which he listed
separatism and religious fundamentalism as threats facing the country. The
president said that the "fundamentalist threat has reached a dangerous
level" and that "Turkey’s best protection against this threat is its secular
order."
According to Mazlum-Der and other groups, some government ministries have
dismissed or barred from promotion civil servants suspected of anti-state or
Islamist activities. Reports by Mazlum-Der, the media, and others indicated
that the military sometimes dismisses religiously observant Muslims from
military service. Such dismissals were based on behavior that military
officials believed identified these individuals as Islamic fundamentalists;
they were concerned that such behavior could indicate disloyalty to the
secular state.
According to Mazlum-Der, the military charged soldiers with lack of
discipline for activities that included performing Muslim prayers or being
married to women who wore headscarves. According to the military, officers
and noncommissioned officers were sometimes dismissed for maintaining ties
to Islamic fundamentalist organizations, despite repeated warnings from
superior officers.
Mystical Sufi and other religious-social orders (tarikats) and lodges
(cemaats) have been banned officially since the mid?1920s; however, tarikats
and cemaats remain active and widespread. Some prominent political and
social leaders continue to associate with tarikats, cemaats, and other
Islamic communities.
Under the law, religious services may take place only in designated places
of worship. Municipal codes mandate that only the Government can designate a
place of worship, and, if a religion has no legal standing in the country,
it may not be eligible for a designated site. Non-Muslim religious services,
especially for religious groups that do not own property recognized by the
GDF, often take place on diplomatic property or in private apartments.
Police occasionally bar Christians from holding services in private
apartments, and prosecutors have opened cases against Christians for holding
unauthorized gatherings.
The law prohibits imams, priests, rabbis, or other religious leaders from
"reproaching or vilifying" the Government or the laws of the state while
performing their duties. Violations are punishable by prison terms of one
month to one year, or three months to two years if the crime involves
inciting others to disobey the law.
The authorities continued to monitor the activities of Eastern Orthodox
churches, but generally did not interfere with their activities. The
Government does not recognize the ecumenical status of the Greek Orthodox
Patriarch, acknowledging him only as the head of the country’s dwindling
Greek Orthodox community. High-level government leaders often assert
publicly that use of the term "ecumenical" in reference to the patriarch
violates the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. However, government officials privately
acknowledge that Lausanne does not address the issue.
As a result, the Government has long maintained that only citizens of the
country can be members of the Church’s Holy Synod and participate in
patriarchal elections. However, in 2004, Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I
appointed six non?Turkish-citizen metropolitans to the Holy Synod,
representing the first time in the eighty-year history of the country that
noncitizens had been appointed to the body. The Government did not formally
respond to the appointments.
Members of the Greek Orthodox community said the legal restrictions
threatened the survival of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul because,
with fewer than 2,500 Greek Orthodox left in the country, the community was
becoming too small to maintain the institution.
The Ecumenical Patriarchate in Istanbul continued to seek to reopen the
Halki seminary on the island of Heybeli in the Sea of Marmara. The
Government closed the seminary in 1971, when the state nationalized all
private institutions of higher learning. The state provides training for
Sunni Islamic clergy; religious communities outside the Sunni Islamic
mainstream cannot legally train new clergy in the country for eventual
leadership. Co-religionists from outside the country have been permitted to
assume leadership positions in some cases, but in general all religious
community leaders, including patriarchs and chief rabbis, must be citizens.
In April 2005, the Patriarchate filed an appeal with the ECHR concerning the
GDF’s expropriation of an orphanage on the Prince’s Islands that had
belonged to the Patriarchate. There were no new developments in the case.
The Armenian Orthodox community continued a legal battle against the
Government’s expropriation of properties belonging to the Yedikule Surp
Pirgic Armenian Hospital Foundation in Istanbul. In March 2005, the Treasury
attempted to sell a building expropriated from the foundation to a private
company, but the Finance Ministry blocked the sale. The ECHR continued
proceedings related to the appeal by the Armenian Orthodox community of the
1999 expropriation of two other foundation properties.
No law explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions; however,
many prosecutors and police regard proselytizing and religious activism with
suspicion. Police occasionally bar Christians from handing out religious
literature. Proselytizing is often considered socially unacceptable;
Christians performing missionary work are sometimes beaten and insulted. If
the proselytizers are foreigners, they may be deported, but generally they
are able to reenter the country. Police officers may report students who
meet with Christian missionaries to their families or to university
authorities.
By the end of the reporting period, there was no verdict in the trial
proceedings in the case of three members of the Nationalist Movement Party
who severely beat Yakup Cindilli, a convert to Christianity, for
distributing New Testaments in Bursa Province in 2003.
Authorities continued to enforce a long-term ban on the wearing of
headscarves at universities and by civil servants in public buildings. Women
who wear headscarves and persons who actively show support for those who
defy the ban have been disciplined or have lost their jobs in the public
sector as nurses and teachers. Students who wear head coverings are
officially not permitted to register for classes, although some faculty
members permit students to wear head coverings in class.
Many secularists accuse Islamists of using advocacy for wearing the
headscarf as a political tool and say they fear that efforts to repeal the
headscarf ban will lead to pressure against women who choose not to wear a
head covering.
In February 2006, the Council of State ruled in favor of a decision by
education authorities to revoke the promotion of an Ankara teacher to a
nursery school principal position on the grounds that the teacher regularly
wore an Islamic headscarf outside of school. Some journalists and religious
rights advocates asserted that the court’s decision effectively expanded the
headscarf ban into the private sphere. The court, however, maintained that
the teacher had violated the principle of secularism in education by wearing
the headscarf while traveling to and from school.
In May 2006, attorney Alparslan Arslan opened fire in the Council of State
court responsible for the February ruling, killing Judge Mustafa Yucel
Ozbilgin and wounding four other judges. Arslan, who was apprehended at the
scene, reportedly said he was motivated by anger over the ruling. Thousands
of protestors attending Ankara funeral ceremonies for Ozbilgin accused
government leaders of inciting the attack by criticizing the headscarf ban
and the Council of State ruling. There were no similar protests in other
cities.
In another February 2006 ruling, the Council of State upheld a decision by
the Education Ministry to deny the application of religion instructor
Abdullah Yilmaz to be assigned to a position in Central Asia because
Yilmaz’s wife wears a headscarf.
A 1997 law made eight years of secular education compulsory. After
completing the eight years, students may pursue study at imam hatip (Islamic
preacher) high schools, which cover both the standard high school curriculum
and Islamic theology and practice. Imam hatip schools are classified as
vocational, and graduates of vocational schools face an automatic reduction
in their university entrance exam grades if they apply for university
programs outside their field of high school specialization. This reduction
effectively bars imam hatip graduates from enrolling in university programs
other than theology. Many pious citizens criticized the religious
instruction provided in the regular schools as inadequate. Most families who
enrolled their children in imam hatip schools did so to expose them to more
extensive religious education, not to train them as imams.
In December 2005, the Education Ministry issued a regulation allowing imam
hatip students to earn degrees from regular high schools by taking distance
learning courses. However, the Higher Education Council objected to the
regulation, and, in February 2006, the Council of State suspended the
regulation pending a final ruling.
Only the Diyanet is authorized to provide religion courses outside of
school, although clandestine private courses do exist. Students who complete
five years of primary school may enroll in Diyanet Qur’an classes on
weekends and during summer vacation. Many Qur’an courses function
unofficially. Only children twelve and older may legally register for
official Qur’an courses, and Mazlum-Der reported that law enforcement
authorities often raided illegal courses for younger children.
Jehovah’s Witnesses reported continuing official harassment of their worship
services because they were not members of an officially recognized religion.
Jehovah’s Witnesses continued to engage in a legal battle over their efforts
to form an association.
Restoration or construction may be carried out in buildings and monuments
considered "ancient" only with authorization of the regional board on the
protection of cultural and national wealth. Bureaucratic procedures and
considerations relating to historic preservation in the past have impeded
repairs to religious facilities, especially in the case of Syriac and
Armenian Orthodox properties. Groups are prohibited from using funds from
their properties in one part of the country to support their existing
population in another part of the country.
Religious affiliation is listed on national identity cards. Some religious
groups, such as the Baha’i, are unable to state their religion on their
cards because their religion is not included among the options; they have
made their concerns known to the Government. In April 2006, Parliament
adopted legislation allowing persons to leave the religion section of their
identity cards blank or change the religious designation by written
application. However, it appeared that the Government may restrict
applicants’ choice of religion; members of the Baha’i community said
government officials had told them that, despite the new law, they would not
be able to list their religion on the cards.
There were reports that local officials harassed some persons who converted
from Islam to another religion when they sought to amend their cards. Some
non-Muslims maintained that listing religious affiliation on the cards
exposed them to discrimination and harassment.
In October 2004, the Government’s Human Rights Consultation Board issued a
report on minorities, which stated that non-Muslims were effectively barred
from careers in state institutions, such as the armed forces, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the National Police, and the National Intelligence
Agency. Professors Baskin Oran and Ibrahim Kaboglu faced criminal charges
for their roles as principal authors of the report. An Ankara court
acquitted them in May 2006. Members of minority religious communities
confirmed the report’s conclusions. They said non-Muslim citizens were
viewed as foreigners and were therefore considered unqualified to represent
the state.
In January 2006, the ECHR ruled against the country in a case involving
conscientious objector Murat Ulke. The court determined that Ulke, who had
been imprisoned for refusing to carry out his military service, had suffered
ill-treatment.
At the end of the reporting period, court proceedings continued in the
Istanbul trial of sixty-nine suspects charged in connection with the
November 2003 terrorist bombings of two synagogues, the British consulate,
and a bank.
There were no reports of religious prisoners or detainees in the country.
Forced Religious Conversion
There were no reports of forced religious conversion, including of minor
U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the United
States, or the refusal to allow such citizens to be returned to the United
States.
Improvements and Positive Developments in Respect for Religious Freedom
In April 2006, Roman Catholic authorities reopened the Bebekli Church in
Adana for Sunday services. Catholic leaders had closed the church in
September 2005 because local authorities had failed to enforce zoning
regulations requiring a ten-meter offset around the church building, and
noise from an adjacent wedding hall had been interfering with church
services. In April, local Catholic officials thanked municipal authorities
for discontinuing the operating license of the wedding hall.
In June 2006, officials in the Tasdelen municipality of Istanbul allocated
land to an Alevi organization for the construction of a cem house. Members
of the Alevi community said the decision marked the first time a cem house
had been officially recognized as a place of worship, rather than as a
cultural center.
Section III. Societal Abuses and Discrimination
The generally tolerant relationship among religions in society contributed
to religious freedom; however, some Muslims, Christians, Baha’is, and other
religious communities faced societal suspicion and mistrust. Jews and
Christians from most denominations freely practiced their religions and
reported little discrimination in daily life. However, citizens who
converted from Islam to another religion often experienced some form of
social harassment or pressure from family and neighbors. Proselytizing on
behalf of non-Muslim religions was socially unacceptable and sometimes
dangerous. A variety of newspapers and television shows regularly published
and broadcasted anti-Christian messages, and government officials asserted
that missionary activity was a threat to the state and was not covered under
the concept of religious freedom.
Religious pluralism was widely viewed as a threat to Islam and to "national
unity." Nationalist sentiments sometimes contained anti-Christian or
anti-Semitic overtones. Some in the Jewish community reported growing
feelings of insecurity in the wake of the 2003 attacks in Istanbul, and
certain media outlets promoted anti-Semitic propaganda, including
allegations that the Jewish community aided and even orchestrated the
Kurdish nationalist movement.
In January 2006, five assailants severely beat Protestant church leader
Kamil Kiroglu in Adana. One attacker wielded a knife and threatened to kill
Kiroglu unless he renounced Christianity.
In February 2006, an assailant shot and killed Catholic priest Andrea
Santaro in a church in Trabzon. A witness said the gunman shouted "God is
great" as he shot Santaro from behind. A sixteen-year-old was charged in the
case; his trial was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The suspect
reportedly told police he was angry about the caricatures of the Prophet
Muhammad that had been published in a Danish newspaper. Prime Minister
Erdogan and other government officials condemned the killing.
Also in February, a group of young men beat and threatened to kill a
Catholic friar in Izmir. The attackers shouted anti-Christian slogans and
said they wanted to "clean Turkey of non-Muslims."
In March 2006, an assailant entered a Catholic church in Mersin, threatening
church members with a knife and shouting anti-Christian statements. Police
arrived at the scene and arrested the assailant.
In April 2006, a group of young men entered the Syriac compound in
Diyarbakir and shouted threats at church members. Police refused to send
patrols to the neighborhood of the church until a few days later, when the
church’s Easter ceremonies were held.
In May 2006, Greek Orthodox Christians held a mass at a historical church in
Bergama. A group of nationalist and leftist protestors attempted to disrupt
the mass with loud slogans and music. Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I,
who attended the mass, thanked local officials for authorizing the event.
Members of the Syriac community said local villagers, particularly village
guards, often occupied the homes of Syriacs who fled the country, refusing
to leave when Syriacs attempted to return. The village guards are a civil
defense force of approximately 57,000, mostly in the southeast. They were
reputed to be the least disciplined of the security forces.
According to the Syriac community, more than fifty unoccupied Syriac homes
have been destroyed in the village of Bardakci, Mardin province, since 2000.
The majority of the village’s Syriac residents fled the region in the
mid-1980s. One of the village’s two Syriac churches was converted into a
mosque without consulting the Syriac community. Some returning Syriacs
claimed that government authorities reclassified properties while the
Syriacs were out of the country in ways that caused them to lose some of
their lands.
Trial proceedings continued in the appeal of Kerim Akbas, who was convicted
in 2004 for television broadcasts inciting violence against Christians.
Members of the secular establishment fear the influence of Islamism and
reject the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The U.S. government discusses religious freedom issues with the Government
as part of its overall policy to promote human rights. The ambassador and
other mission officials, including staff of the U.S. Consulate General in
Istanbul and the U.S. Consulate in Adana, enjoyed close relations with the
Muslim majority and other religious groups. The U.S. Embassy continued to
urge the Government to permit the reopening of the Halki seminary on Heybeli
Island.
In November 2005, the U.S. charge d’affaires addressed an Istanbul
conference on interfaith dialogue organized by the Appeal of Conscience
Foundation. Speaking to an international audience representing diverse
religions, she emphasized the importance of religious freedom and the need
for leaders of all faiths to stand up against terrorism.
The mission collaborated with the Gaziantep American Corner, the Gaziantep
Rotary Club, and the Anatolian Journalists Union in organizing a photo
exhibit in June 2005 on religious diversity in the country that helped to
engage attendees in dialogue about issues important to the country’s
continued democratic development.
The mission sponsored a series of presentations on religion in the United
States by Wilfred McClay, professor of history at the University of
Tennessee, in March 2006. McClay addressed audiences of students, faculty,
theologians, opinion makers, and others in Istanbul, Bursa, and Ankara,
including at the ambassador’s residence. He explained the basic assumptions
that underpin the U.S. Constitution as part of his discussion of secularism
in the United States.
The ambassador discussed religious freedom regularly in private meetings
with cabinet members. These discussions touched on both government policy
regarding Islam and other religions, and specific cases of alleged religious
discrimination. The ambassador met with Diyanet President Ali Bardakoglu.
During introductory calls in Istanbul, he met with Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew I, Chief Rabbi Isak Haleva, and Armenian Orthodox Patriarch
Mesrob II to show support for religious freedom and to discuss issues
affecting their respective communities.
Other embassy officers held similar meetings with government officials.
Diplomats from the embassy and consulates met regularly with representatives
of the various religious groups. These meetings covered a range of topics,
including problems faced by non-Muslim groups and the debate over the role
of Islam in the country.
The mission utilizes the International Visitor Program to introduce
professionals in various fields to the United States and American
counterparts. Religious issues are included among these programs.
Released on September 15, 2006