PARLIAMENTARY LABYRINTHS
By Nazlan Ertan

The New Anatolian, Turkey
Sept 26 2006

Opinions

Relations between Turkey and the European Parliament have always been,
to say the least, bombastic, although, admittedly, Turkey has never
gone as far as member state France, whose onetime Foreign Minister
Herve de Charette called the European Parliament "a parliament not
worthy of that name," when the latter criticized a French bill to
crack down on illegal immigration and toughen conditions for residence
permits. Yet, the tone between Ankara and the only directly elected
body of the European Union has remained cold, hostile and laden with
mutual name-calling.

Part of the reason for this has been the European Parliament
itself. Many would refer to the Parliament as the "conscience of the
EU" — based on its focus on human rights, individual liberties and
freedom of expression. Others would refer to it as the cacophony of
Europe, where any idea, any national interest or even cliche will
find at least one supporter.

For some time, European Parliament deputies have come under strong
pressure for mismanagement, misconduct, even corruption, that ranged
from employing their own family members as staff to acceptance of
gifts, trips and even cash from lobby groups. The deputies have also
been accused of ignorance, lack of research and having no idea of
what they were voting on, or, indeed, what they are proposing. They
have also been accused of carrying their national agenda to that of
Europe and prioritizing their national interest over the collective
one of the Union.

In my years as Brussels correspondent, I have come across both
excellently formed, independent minded and knowledgeable deputies who
looked for innovative ideas and, alternatively, backbenchers who were
at the mercy of their assistants, lobbies or national interests.

Among the many rapporteurs of the past decade, there were those
who carried great weight in their party group, such as Austrian
Socialist Hannes Swoboda, or French Conservative Alain Lamassoure;
or those who were selected because of a certain vision toward the
Eastern Mediterranean and Turkey, such as French Gen.

Philippe Morillion. There was also the problematic Arie Oostlander,
who looked and acted as if he paid his first-ever visit to Turkey
only after he was appointed to the post.

Then came Camiel Eurlings, an excellent representative of the young
generation of politicians in the European Parliament, open, photogenic
and plainly devoid of political weight in his party group, Foreign
Affairs Committee and Parliament.

Then the result: a European Parliament report that establishes,
for the first time, the recognition of the Armenian genocide as a
precondition to Turkish accession to the European Union. It adds two
other "genocides" — that of Pontic Greeks and Syriacs to the bill.

Because we journalists have the memory of elephants, we know that
this is hardly the first time that certain groups in the European
Parliament wanted this done. In the late 1990s, there were efforts to
attach a similar amendment to the report of Swoboda, who rejected it
and announced, if this was ever done, he would remove his name from
the report — a major scandal, had it happened.

Turkish diplomacy has certainly come a good way in playing the game in
the labyrinths of the European Parliament. Through laborious attempts
at all levels, it has established relations with different committees,
Parliament civil servants and leaned heavily upon certain key members
of important parliamentary groups. Experienced ambassadors who made a
lifetime career of the European file, as well as bright young diplomats
continue to pass through the Turkish Representation to the European
Union in Brussels.

So what happened?

Before the EP’s key vote this week on the Eurlings report, where
the young MEP is certain there will be improvement, let us ask the
following questions: At what stage did Turkey become aware of those
amendments? Does it have the necessary links with Parliament and key
party groups to be told about such amendments in time? What did Turkish
diplomats and politicians do when they learned about it? Does Turkey
have the necessary network in Parliament to counter the anti-Turkish
lobbies, from Armenians to Greek Cypriots to pro-Kurdish groups? Are
we benefiting from the parliamentary dimension of the Civil Society
Dialogue with the European Union?

Or do we think that sending Parliament delegations to the EPA so that
they can fight among themselves is effective diplomacy?