Stratfor
Oct 6 2006
Turkey, EU: Accession Reluctance on Both Sides
October 06, 2006 19 16 GMT
Summary
During a state visit to Turkey, German Chancellor Angela Merkel laid
out the conditions under which Turkey can continue membership talks
with the European Union. The conditions are ones the Turks do not
particularly care for, and mark an inflection point in Turkish-European
relations. This time next year, Turkey will be a very different place.
Analysis
In an Oct. 5 speech in Turkey, German Chancellor Angela Merkel flatly
informed the Turks that restarting the country’s stalled EU accession
negotiations would require Turkey to first allow for unrestricted
trade with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot ports — a step it has
already agreed to but that is tantamount to recognizing Cyprus.
Merkel’s statement marks the beginning of the end of rapprochement
between the Europeans and the Turks, and the beginning of a new era
of Turkish angst.
By many measures, Turkey is the perfect candidate for EU membership,
but from Europe’s point of view, every bonus has a drawback. The
Turkish market might be large and growing, but the country’s wealth
level is at the low end of the European scale. Turkey might have a
long history of interaction with Europe, but most of that was as a
conqueror that laid siege to Vienna twice (which explains why Austria
is the most hostile to Turkish membership of any EU state). But most of
all, though Turkey’s population is young and large, it also is Muslim.
Thus, though all European leaders have voiced their commitment to
Turkey’s accession process, few are genuinely excited about it.
Merkel’s statement simply publicized the feelings of most of Europe:
Turkey cannot join.
However, contrary to conventional wisdom, Europe is not the only
partner in this tango who is having second (and third, fourth and
fifth) thoughts about Turkish admittance.
Turks love the idea of being a member of the European Union, but
there are some big steps that country would have to take before it
could even begin implementing the reforms necessary to qualify.
Turkey would have to admit to ongoing persecution of the Kurds
and to Armenian genocide — and perhaps even pay reparations and
allow limited resettlement. The country would have to surrender
all territorial claims it has with existing EU states, most notably
islands in the Aegean Sea that are disputed with Greece. Turkey would
have to fully and irrevocably sever all political connections between
its government and its military — the EU only admits states with
full civilian control. And, as per Merkel’s statement, Turkey would
have to not only allow trade with Cyprus, but fully recognize it as
a political and economic ally.
Once these steps — which all existing EU states took early in their
own accession negotiations — are done, Turkey can seriously begin
to discuss joining the European Union. However, any Turkish leader
who did these things would be lynched in the streets — assuming he
lived long enough to reach them.
Policymakers in both Brussels and Ankara have sought to sidestep
these thorny problems for the past several years, with leaders on
both sides suggesting the issues be put off until the tail end of
the accession process. This is good in theory but bad in practice —
particularly if neither side ever really intends to budge.
The Turks now need to answer one very simple question: What is next?
First, they will seek confirmation of Merkel’s stance. This will not
be difficult; they need simply look to places such as Vienna, Athens
and Nicosia to discover that the anti-Turk feeling is alive and well.
Should they want further confirmation, they need wait no longer than
May 2007, when French elections will likely replace the pro-Turk
Jacques Chirac with a far more circumspect leader. Whether the French
choose Segolene Royal or Nicolas Sarkozy, both have argued that Turkey
does not belong in the European Union as a full member.
After that, the Turks will have some soul searching to do. Though
the customs agreement they currently enjoy with Europe can withstand
a change in the relationship’s overall tenor, Turkey has framed its
policies for more than a decade with the goal of knocking on Europe’s
door. The Turks will now need to re-evaluate their other (less than
spectacular) options.
Ankara wants to enhance its influence in Central Asia, given its
linguistic and ethnic ties to the region, but this is something that
provided only middling returns in the 1990s. It also is looking to
assert itself as a leader of the Muslim world through the Organization
of the Islamic Conference, in which Ankara currently holds the position
of secretary-general; yet since Turkey was one of the non-Turkic
region’s past conquerors, it is not altogether trusted. The only
option left — as politically unpopular as it might be — is a firmer
U.S. alignment.
For obvious reasons, none of these is a good choice. What is certain
is that Turkey’s identity crisis will resonate most strongly at home.
If secular Europe is not to frame Turkey’s future, then Islam will rush
in to fill the vacuum, setting up a vast array of possibilities for
clashes between Turkey’s Islamophilic government and its Islamophobic
(and coup-prone) military. The Turkish balancing act just got a whole
lot tougher.