SOLANA BLINKS, DEEPLY
By Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Oct 11 2006

The European Union’s High Representative for Common Foreign and
Security Policy, Javier Solana, opined in a European Parliament hearing
that international recognition of Kosovo’s independence from Serbia
could set "a precedent" adversely affecting Georgia in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. With some trepidation Solana imagined, "We are trapped
here…. President [Mikheil] Saakashvili is trapped; all of us are
trapped in a double mechanism that may have good consequences for one,
but not for the other" (RFE/RL Caucasus Report, October 6).

This statement gratuitously bows to Russia’s untenable, self-serving
theory linking the conflict settlement in Kosovo to the post-Soviet
conflicts. Given Solana’s top position, this statement — inadvertent
or improvised as may be the case in a hearing — is the strongest
public support for Moscow’s position from a Western official thus
far. It undercuts U.S. policy and that of many old and new EU
governments, which rule out any linkage between conflict resolution
in Kosovo and in the post-Soviet conflicts. Those governments —
and also Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, whose territories are
the scene of conflicts — point out that the Kosovo conflict differs
profoundly in its nature from the post-Soviet "frozen" conflicts and
that any outcome in Kosovo can have no bearing on eventual outcomes
in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, or Karabakh.

The timing of Solana’s pronouncement is — again, perhaps
unintentionally — as encouraging to Moscow as its content. The endgame
seems very near in Kosovo. The United States and the European Union
(the latter not without hesitation) are aiming for a solution in
Kosovo by the end of this year, involving international recognition
of Kosovo’s right to independent statehood or at least a decisive
and irreversible move toward such recognition.

In the U.N. Security Council and at the OSCE, veto-wielding Russia
is set for a grand tradeoff. Two options seem equally satisfactory
to Moscow: It would accept Kosovo’s independence from Serbia via
referendum, if Western powers tacitly accept the secession by a
similar scenario of one or more Russian-controlled territories from
Georgia and/or Moldova. Or, alternatively, Russia could use its veto
to support Serbia, block the Western-supported independence of Kosovo,
and exploit such a success to re-enter Balkan politics in alliance
with Serbian nationalism.

A third option, at least as advantageous to Moscow, would be
stalemate and persistent ambiguity on both Kosovo and the post-Soviet
conflicts. Russia aims to manipulate the negotiating processes on
both fronts, in no hurry to reach settlement on either, and leverage
its influence for potential tradeoffs in both. If Kosovo festers
unresolved, Russia will have its fifth "frozen" conflict, this one
in the Balkans, to exploit from next year onward.

Even the relatively moderate (compared to the ultras) Serbian
nationalists currently in power are scurrying to gain Russia’s
support for the latter two scenarios. Thus, Serbian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Vuk Draskovic is seconding Moscow in calling for an
arms embargo against Georgia (Interfax, October 6).

All three Russian scenarios are predicated on linking the negotiation
processes and outcomes in the post-Soviet conflicts and Kosovo,
falsely postulating the equivalency of all these conflicts and calling
for equivalent solutions. Moscow insists that it wants a single,
overarching conflict-resolution model, but it remains ambiguous
and flexible about its choice of such a model. At the moment, it
seems equally prepared to sacrifice Serb nationalist interests for a
"precedent" that would advance the "right" of post-Soviet secession;
or, alternatively, to short-change its post-Soviet secessionist
clients by stalling the resolution in Kosovo with lip service to the
"territorial integrity" principle.

The United States and many other governments point out that each
conflict has its own characteristics and is a case in itself,
requiring specific solutions. In Kosovo, for example, the former
titular state Serbia ethnically cleansed the Albanian population —
a process that the West reversed. In Abkhazia or Karabakh, however,
the local minority ethnically cleansed the majority population with
external support — a process that continues to this day with Russian
support. While Kosovo was an internal conflict within the former
Yugoslavia, the post-Soviet conflicts are inter-state conflicts
pitting Russia against Moldova and Georgia and Armenia against
Karabakh. Whereas the post-Soviet secessionist territories make no
secret of their desire to join another country and have taken the
citizenship of another country, Kosovo is headed for statehood of
its own, with an explicit prohibition on joining another country.

Thus, any "precedent" or linkage is ruled out. Russia, however —
from President Vladimir Putin on down — insists on linkage and
"precedent." Solana could have underscored the major differences
between these conflicts by aligning himself with the United States
and many EU member countries on this issue. Instead, he seemed to
succumb to Moscow’s views in his European Parliament deposition.

Solana has in the recent past displayed an uncertain knowledge of the
post-Soviet "frozen" conflicts and an inclination to appease Moscow.

Last year, he allowed himself to be maneuvered by Putin into meeting
with the Abkhaz and South Ossetian secessionist leaders in Sochi.

Earlier this year, in an interview with Moldova’s officious daily
newspaper, Solana completely mis-described the Transnistria conflict as
one between right-bank and left-bank economic and political elites —
an interpretation apparently designed to obscure Russia role in this
inter-state conflict.