Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
October 13, 2006 Friday
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS UNDER ME;
Changes in the format of Russian-Georgian relations will only
strengthen Russia’s positions in the region
by Anatoly Tsyganok
PUNISHING GEORGIA: WHAT RUSSIA CAN AND SHOULD DO; Georgia confirmed
that it is an authoritarian state where the letter of the law is
worthless and the justice system can easily fabricate any case at all
– or close it just as easily, for a price. Several fundamental
conclusions can be drawn from the current situation in and around
Georgia.
(…)
Several fundamental conclusions can be drawn from the current
situation in and around Georgia.
The first is that the nationalist policy pursued in Georgia over the
past 15 years – instilling into the citizenry the idea that Georgia’s
historical experience is unique and that the exceptional nature of
the Georgian nation must be recognized by the international community
– has met with full support amongst the majority of the population,
within Georgia and in Georgian diasporas elsewhere, including Russia.
This explains the Georgian public’s general adherence to the
stereotypical notion that Georgia’s inclusion in the Russian Empire
and the USSR was unacceptable, and the reluctance to recognize the
right of the Ossetians and Abkhazians to self-determination – while
simultaneously upholding Georgia’s rights to the territories that
were attached to Georgia during the "Soviet occupation" period.
Therefore, Russia should differentiate its retaliatory response to
Georgia’s anti-Russian syndrome and its historical superiority
syndrome, in dealing with the Tbilisi government and the Georgian
population, as well as the Georgian diaspora in Russia.
The second conclusion is based on the failure of Georgia’s peaceful
reintegration policy for the "rebel autonomous regions." For the past
15 years, Georgia has refused to amend its constitution to grant
autonomy to ethnic minorities, and rejected UN Security Council and
OSCE recommendations to sign agreements with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia against the use of force. This clearly shows that options
for peacefully resolving the problems of the self-proclaimed states
and Georgia’s federative structure – options which still existed
three years ago – have now failed completely. Therefore, Russia
should revise its own views on the unrecognized republics: South
Ossetia and Abkhazia.
The third conclusion entails recognizing the fact that Georgia,
striving to expel Russia from the peacekeeping formats in the
conflict zones by any means available, has managed to establish a
perception in the media that the Georgian-Ossetian and
Georgian-Abkhazian conflicts are escalating into a Georgian-Russian
conflict. This has formed the foundation of Georgia’s push to join
NATO – in order to protect its independence, or so Georgia claims. In
effect, Georgia has achieved its purpose already, forcing Russia to
enter into a conflict with it.
The fourth conclustion is that after Russian military bases are
withdrawn from Georgia, Russia will face the prospect of the
Russian-Armenian group of forces being completely isolated and
Armenia reorienting itself to NATO standards. If Russia wishes to
prevent this, it must create conditions that ensure Armenia’s
security and Russia’s presence in the Nagorno-Karabakh negotiation
process.
The fifth conclusion follows from an assessment of Russia’s role in
the overall energy sector of the South Caucasus. Russia’s positions
with regard to using energy leverage in the South Caucasus require
substantial corrections and accelerated decision-making.
The sixth conclusion is that Russia’s severance of relations with
Georgia in the areas of diplomacy, transportation, and mail services
represent only one direction of political action with regard to our
recalcitrant neighbor. At the same time, Russia needs to accelerate
the process of making some equally important decisions, with the aim
of enhancing its political influence throughout the Caucasus region.
Primarily, this means using our levers of influence on Ukraine and
Azerbaijan with the aim of minimizing their involvement in the GUAM
organization.
The seventh conclusion is that changes should be expected in the
format of Russia’s relations with Turkey and Iran in Caucasus
politics. We could also draw China’s attention to resolving these
problems – and this would do substantial damage to British-American
energy interests and military strategy interests in the South
Caucasus.
The eighth conclusion is that following Moscow’s move to impose
diplomatic, transport, and mail sanctions, and the intervention of
Washington and London, Russia’s confrontation with Georgia will grow.
Thus, the current Georgian-Russian confrontation has entered into a
new phase, in which events may develop along the lines indicated in
the abovementioned conclusions. The events in Georgia provide a good
pretext for an effective analysis of Russia’s immigration policy, and
its policy on relations between the authorities (federal and
regional) and ethnic diasporas. Some members of the Georgian diaspora
have been acting aggressively on radio and television, providing
assistance to official Tbilisi in promoting the Saakashvili regime’s
interests on Russian territory (the possibility that they were paid
to do so cannot be ruled out). This necessitates a review of the role
of these diasporas in our society’s economy and politics, as well as
the legislative basis for the presence of diasporas on Russian
territory. But it’s short-sighted to start a campaign of identifying
"individuals of Georgian ethnicity" with the aim of deporting them.
Yes, it is necessary to restore order with regard to employment and
taxation for all immigrants, without exception. I repeat: deporting
hundreds of thousands of Georgian citizens to their homeland will
only do harm to Russian-Georgian relations. At the same time, we need
to expand opportunities for all, including the Georgian diaspora, to
promote Georgian-Russian friendship.
On the topic of Tbilisi’s military policy, it’s worth citing a few
figures. Aiming to reintegrate the unrecognized territories at all
costs, Georgia has increased funding for the military component of
the state almost ten-fold since 2004, raising it to $500 million.
This year alone, Tbilisi has expanded the Defense Ministry’s budget
by over a third: the state treasury is now spending over 600 million
lari (around $336 million) on military requirements. This is 15.8% of
Georgia’s total state spending, or 4.6% of GDP. The Saakashvili
administration is getting the rest of the money from various
"extra-budget funds." Additional money for defense spending is mostly
supplied from Turkey and America.
Since the Rose Revolution, the Americans have provided Georgia with
$1.5 billion in aid. Georgia has also received over $64 million from
the American Train and Equip program, and $60 million in 2005 alone
from Operation Maintaining Stability. Turkey has provided Georgia
with $40 million a year in military aid. In the meantime, the
Georgian government has been spending only 100.9 million lari ($55
million) a year on social services. This figure hasn’t been increased
for several years.
Over the past four years Georgia has purchased 24 tanks, 97 armored
vehicles, 95 artillery pieces, around 100,000 firearms, four Su-24
aircraft, four MiG-23 fighter jets, and five helicopters. The
Georgian Armed Forces now have 26,000 personnel, 80 tanks, 18 rocket
systems, seven Su-25 aircraft, ten training aircraft, and 15
helicopters, including two Mi-24 strike helicopters. The Georgian
Navy has eight patrol boats, two small landing vessels, and two
tank-landing vessels.
Obviously, given that it possesses these forces and is constantly
increasing its military budget, Georgia will persist in its refusal
to comply with UN Security Council and OSCE recommendations to sign
agreements with South Ossetia and Abkhazia on not using force. Under
the circumstances, Russia is justified in assuming that the regional
security of the entire Caucasus is under threat. Therefore, Moscow
has every right to revise its stance on the territorial integrity of
Georgia – and, giving priority to the right of nations to
self-determination, every right to recognize the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The current conflict between Moscow and
Tbilisi is highly likely to convince the Russian leadership that
Russia shouldn’t wait for the Kosovo precedent before making its
position clear on the frozen conflicts in the CIS; that is, Russia
should set a precedent of its own.
Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has already
stated that Russia may accelerate withdrawal of its military bases
from Georgian territory. Presumably, this statement is based on
apprehensions that our military personnel, now engaged in withdrawing
the bases, might be vulnerable to acts of provocation, and would not
be able to offer substantial resistance in the event of a large-scale
armed conflict. Keeping them in Georgia as Mikhail Saakashvili’s
hostages is simply foolish; besides, if matters do reach the point of
a military conflict, all of Georgia’s territory is well within range
from Russian territory or from the sea. Moreover, if we assume that
Russia will no longer negotiate with President Saakashvili, then
accelerated withdrawal of the bases is also necessary in the event of
energy sanctions against Georgia.
Russia is likely to accelerate Gazprom’s involvement in the plan for
completing the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline as soon as possible, by the
end of 2006; this will guarantee gas supplies to Armenia and prevent
a total blockade of the Russian-Armenian military group by Turkey and
Azerbaijan. Only then will Yerevan use its resources and support
Russia in the confrontation with Georgia. Moreover, Russia should
immediately expand its participation in developing Armenia’s power
generation and distibution system. The confrontation with Georgia has
created a unique opportunity to accelerate the revision of Russia’s
position in the South Caucasus energy sector and reinforce Russia’s
role in developing the region’s energy system. But the introduction
of energy sanctions against Georgia by Gazprom and RAO Unified Energy
Systems should be preceded by sustained, integrated, systematic
action, synchronized with other Russian companies.
It’s equally important for Russia to use all available measures to
increase its influence on one of Tbilisi’s milch cows: Azerbaijan.
Primarily, this should involve minimizing Baku’s involvement in the
GUAM organization. In future, this could even extend to persuading
Azerbaijan to withdraw from GUAM and join the CIS Collective Security
Treaty Organization, which would only be possible if Russia once
again becomes one of the chief mediators in resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Within the framework of its decisions on
sanctions against Georgia, Russia simply must play the Ukraine card
as well. Some compromises are entirely possible in relations with
Kiev. (…)
Source: Voenno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, No. 39, October 11, 2006, pp. 1,
3
Translated by Elena Leonova
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
