IGOR MURADYAN: NAGORNO KARABAKH FACED WITH POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICE
Regnum, Russia
Oct 24 2006
"Ice is broken" in the Nagorno Karabakh Republic. The considerably
long period of relatively peaceful existence has refined the interests
of different social groups and sections and has put quite fundamental
questions to the society: What kind of statehood should NK have? What
principles and values should it be based on? What role and place
should NKR have in the Armenian reality? What social priorities
should it have? Having pinned so many hopes on the "restless status"
of the Karabakh idea, the Karabakh society have suddenly found out
that, from now on, they will have to live and assert their rights "on
common ground." They have found out that, besides foreign challenges,
there are no less dangerous internal threats. Limited in quantity and
space, the civil society of NKR feel a steadily growing collective
responsibility for the fate of their country. The negative innovations
they see in the capital of the Republic of Armenia, Yerevan, look to
them as a major threat to traditional society. Of course, formerly,
they could hardly think about such problems – in the pre-Gukasyan
period NKR had little room for any social dynamics. Arkady Gukasyan has
brought tolerance and non-violence in the political life and has laid
the foundations of civil society. However, the parliamentary elections
2005 revealed some democracy and law problems, and responsible for them
was not only the president – but all those groups who sought power.
In fact, they in NKR are already preparing for a new political and
social situation. After a long and unproductive period of stupor and
confusion, they are finally forming an opposition. This is not the
"opposition" of the traditional parties who have lost the game and
have dropped off the political arena, but quite a new and interesting
construction of politically active groups. It is almost known who are
those people seeking the presidency, but the most interesting point
is that they represent not only the opposition as such but also the
opposition inside the current administration.
Local politicians from different parties are actively "turning their
coats." It is quite noteworthy that already today there are some
ambitious people in Yerevan and Moscow who say they seek presidency
in NKR and, probably, have legal grounds for so doing. Of course,
this may disorganize the political processes, but, at least, this
will bring some diversity and a chance of wider choice.
Unfortunately, what we see now is recruitment and re-recruitment of
functionaries and basic forces, especially, in the province, but in
Stepanakert, too, we can see the surplus of choice: various groups
are actively consulting, the ruling regime is fermenting as Gukasyan
is no longer able to control his own functionaries.
In any case, those functionaries seem to be more interested in the
presidential than parliamentary elections – though both may prove
to be early. This inspires little enthusiasm as this proves that the
ambitious "politicians" do not see the tasks NKR is facing.
Meanwhile, one of the urgent state-building tasks in Karabakh today
is to restore the republic and to strengthen the political role of
the parliament through restriction of the president’s authority. This
must be done, first of all, because NKR is an unrecognized state,
and it is absolutely clear that its "sovereignization" will take
place in several stages in line with the general revision of the
international law. The analysis of this problem shows that for the
concerned part of the international community the parliament of an
unrecognized state is more adequate than its president. Of course, much
depends on the personality of the president, but NKR, just like all the
unrecognized post-Soviet states, has no advantage here. Furthermore,
the Karabakh society do not have enough self-control and political
and social culture for ignoring collegiality institutions.
Besides, wide parliamentary powers promote political culture and, most
importantly, imply collective responsibility for crucial decisions. The
political practice has shown that the NKR Parliament should have the
authority to carry out foreign political functions.
The NKR authorities and politicians also realize that, but it was
exactly the lack of foreign policy as such that has resulted in the
present political crisis.
The NKR authorities are presently considering draft Constitution and
are, seemingly, tailoring it to specific situational goals. They
act typically for "transitional" societies. In any case, they
must revise the Constitution – they will hardly avoid this loss of
time. It seems that they in Stepanakert will get big money soon,
and the post-traditional society may fall under it charm – though
new politicians seem to be rather well-educated people, who realize
their responsibility and tasks. What is more important is that the
new elite must draw appropriate conclusions from the past NKR history.
Otherwise, the Karabakh society will not wait so long this time.
Undoubtedly, the political processes in NKR will not develop in vacuum
but will be "adjusted" to Yerevan – something certain politicians in
Stepanakert really hope for. However, in Yerevan, too, the situation
is changing quickly. Most probably, the Armenian authorities will
prefer not interfering in the developments in NKR and just accepting
the reality they will face in their historical homeland. That would
be quite an acceptable scenario as the Karabakh resource can be
effective only if given more freedom. However, this situation is far
from strong-willed decisions or varying moods and ambitions. Simply,
the political processes in Yerevan and Stepanakert are becoming
increasingly autonomous from each other. Whose merit and whose idea
it is, does not matter much – though it must be given its worth. What
really matters is that it is becoming a reality.