A DECISIVE BATTLE FOR THE CAUCASUS
Daily Georgian Times, Georgia
Nov 5 2006
After the rejection of the EU constitution, the expectation was that
European countries would develop a common foreign policy. Had Europe’s
Constitution been endorsed, the interests of traditional European
countries would have been balanced by the new member countries which
are under the strong US influence, and Europe’s foreign policy would be
subordinated to US foreign interests. This outcome would be absolutely
unacceptable to influential countries Germany, France and Italy.
Apparently, this European triumvirate has independently developed a
foreign policy track which would serve the interests of Europe. It
has to decide two strategic objectives today:
1. Not to allow hostilities near the borders of Europe;
2. to provide energy supplies to Europe via independent stable routes.
The Middle East and the Caucasus are near Europe’s borders but
remain potentially explosive regions. Germany gave a tactical and
polite refusal to strike an energy alliance with Russia despite
Russia’s offer to provide gas from the Shtokman deposit exclusively
to Germany. Instead, Germany and France created a French-German
energy consortium.
Thus, "the job assignments" among European states took place. Italy
was assigned to establish and maintain peace in the Middle East while
France and Germany are taking responsibility for peace in the Caucasus
and will protect a Caucasian energy corridor which will deliver energy
supplies to Europe.
European forces are now concentrating on the Caucasus because Europe
can no longer inhabit the role of "independent observer" in the
US-Russia tug of war. Europe has to take action, or it will miss out.
If the US "wins," the energy resources of the Caucasus will be taken
over by Turkey and the US, and will then serve as an important lever
in the hands of the US to pressure Europe. If Russia "wins," it will
acquire total control of Europe’s energy supplies.
The sentiments of Germany, France and Italy are well reflected in
the interview of EU Representative to the South Caucasus, Mari An
Izler Bogen, who said: "Many think today that Georgia has become an
arena of confrontation of the interests of Moscow and Washington, and
that the US tries to acquire control on the Caspian energy resources
and Baku oil deposits. If it is so, than it is really regrettable as
the US is putting its interests above those of all others. Now the
time has come whenever everyone should show their cards and gage the
interests of all parties. I think the EU should condemn such policies
as the whole Caucasus, especially Georgia, is falling victim to this
energy interest."
Apparently Europe is more concerned about US interests rather than
about Russia’s traditional interests in the Caucasus, where it
itself wants to cooperate with Russia and increase its influence in
the region.
France’s decision to punish those who will not admit the genocide
of Armenians (something which Germany could not afford to do because
of its traditional friendship with Turkey) gives evidence that roles
are now being assigned because of the Caucasus. France has suddenly
acquired dominance in Armenia where Russia (a traditional ally)
and the US (with its Armenian lobby in the Congress) have strong
influences. Add to this France’s historically good relations with Iran
and it seems clear that France is building an Armenian-Iranian vector.
Meanwhile, given its relationship with Turkey, Germany has much
at stake with the Georgia-Azerbaijanian vector. If we imagine that
both vectors are directed by the European center it will not be a
difficult to guess how much influence Europe wants to obtain in the
South Caucasus.
Along with these developments, Russia is putting pressure on Georgia
and on the Georgian population in Russia, bringing the domestic
political situation to a boiling point. The domestic political pressure
in the country will explode somewhere.
The solution is certainly in Europe. In a telephone conversation
between Bush and Putin, Putin forbade the US from mediating
Russian-Georgian relations. However, when asked by Germany, Russia
agreed to soften its resolution about Georgia. We can conclude
that mediation by Germany in the South Caucasus would be acceptable
to Russia.
Thus, pressured by Russia, Georgia should look not to the US but to
Germany (and Europe) for assistance.
The impression is that the Russian-German (European) game has been
agreed.
Russia too has two strategic objectives in the region. First,
to ensure the security of Russia by maintaining peace in the North
Caucasus. Second, to control on the Caspian energy resources transited
via Georgia. The key to both of these objectives lies in Georgia.
Russia’s relationship to the breakaway republics in Georgia have much
to do with ethnicity and history, and less to do with security. If
Georgia joins NATO, the breakaway republics cannot create a buffer
zone to protect Georgia from the provocations of Russia, as Georgia
has quite a big border with Russia. All pipelines are run from
Tbilisi. Therefore, control of the breakaway republics is not enough
to help Russia. Russia wants to have a stronger lever in order to
acquire control of the Caucasian pipelines.
An ideal form which would be acceptable both for Europe and Russia
would be Georgia’s neutrality. That would bring security to Russia,
and joint control of the energy routes without the involvement of a
third party such as the US.
And why not? If Germany and Russia cooperate closely on the North
gas pipeline, why not to do the same on the Southern one?
Besides, why not to implement a scheme similar to the one proposed
by Speaker of Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada Oleksandr Moroz to Vladimer
Putin about creation a Russian-Ukrainian-German gas consortium? In
this event the strategic interests of both Russia and Europe would
have been upheld in the Caucasus and in Georgia.
The big European triumvirate will not compromise its relations with
Russia for lobbying Georgia’s entry into NATO, as they do not expect
threat from this region. Georgia’s accession into NATO would be in
the interest only of the US who would like to see Georgia in NATO not
because of security considerations but to implement its aggressive
policy. With that in mind Russia and the three European states would
like to squeeze the US out of the Caucasus. The UK which has a big
interest in the region has apparently saw the game, jumped off from
the Iraqi train and is now trying to get on the European one.
It things go as Europeans want to see in the Caucasus, Georgia
will distance itself from all it existing problems by integrating
into Europe and by providing security at the Southern border of its
Northern neighbor.
But the question is will the incumbent government of Georgia pursue
this political tack? Certainly, it will not. The incumbent government
of Georgia has exhausted the limit of trust and confidence in relation
with Russia and represents the only weapon of the US in the Caucasus.
It could only serve the national interests of the US, not those of
Georgia let alone the interests of Russia or Europe. The US which has
the highest level of democracy in the world assesses democracy of other
states according to the level of loyalty of their governments to the
US while resorts to force to ensure its security. In contrast, Europe
sees the security of its interests in the development of democratic
values in these countries.
The incumbent regime with its domestic and foreign relations does
not fit the above-described sceme. The security of Georgia and the
whole region would depend on how fast the US dominance will retreat
in the Caucasus and how soon the undemocratic governance of Georgia
will be changed by democratic one in a true democratic way.