ISSUE OF TERRITORIES IN THE PERIOD OF POLITICAL TRADE
Hakob Hakobyan

Lragir, Armenia
Nov 22 2006

The myth of the year 2006 died before it was born. The OSCE Minsk
Group co-chairs are already preparing the publics for the year 2007.

It is realistic. Moreover, if they started to prepare the publics
for the year 2017, they could be referred to as not only realistic
but prophets. But there is something that does not allow referring to
them by this title. When they assured that 2006 is a favorable year,
they always added that if the issue were not settled in the year of
the open window, it would be very painful, and we would have no hope
to settle the issue in the next two years because it was a period of
elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan. In this situation, it is amazing
when suddenly the co-chairs start moving the hope of 2006 to the year
2007. In addition, the U.S. co-chair Matthew Bryza was the first to
do this, who stated that the pre-election reality in Armenia does not
mean that the settlement of the conflict in the pre-election period in
Armenia is impossible. And Bryza was right. The pre-election period
is the best period to settle the conflict, for in this period the
government is more vulnerable. In other words, it is ready to reach
any agreement to prevent a flower revolution. On the other hand, there
is an opinion that by signing an agreement the Armenian government
writes its own verdict. In other words, the political forces will
come together and remove the government from power.

Perhaps this is what logic says. But let us see how many of the
political forces of Armenia differ in their approaches to the
settlement. One example is enough. Even Samvel Babayan, who claims
to the laurels of the victory in the Karabakh war, is stating that
a compromise is inevitable. The liberal wing descending from the
former government are stating this, the opposition is stating this
without an exception. Presently Robert Kocharyan is accused of not
only willingness to return the territories but also for having come to
power vowing not to return the territories. In other words, they are
not indignant that he returns the territories but that he "cheated".

In other words, the political sphere has nearly such an approach,
"We might return it as well, why you should?"

Strange though it may seem, we have to confess that there is no
influential political force in the country which won, which would
stand up for not returning the territories. Moreover, not only with
the groundless romantism of "not a patch of land" but logically,
explaining that returning the territories attacks the interests of
the Armenian state which cannot develop on its own security which
is taken away from the one who returns, and returning, according to
Aghasi Aivazyan, is endless. And this prejudice of returning which
is viewed by the Armenian political thought as a guarantee of their
own success can be used best in the pre-election period, because
it is not but a period of political trade. The problem is with whom
the political forces are likely to deal, Robert Kocharyan and Serge
Sargsyan who are ready to return the territories or the West which is
ready to take these territories. It is natural that Robert Kocharyan
and Serge Sargsyan can give less than the West – only a parliamentary
mandate. But what else do our political forces need to be happy? It
is good that they are satisfied with the little they have, otherwise
they would trade with the West on every matter. When they "bargain"
over the territories with the government, there is danger that we will
get away with little losses. In other words, we will return as much
as Kocharyan and Sargsyan want, in other words, in return for several
seats in the parliament the political forces will agree to justify
the return of territories by the prospect of economic development of
Armenia, and mitigate the possible dissatisfaction of the society.

If they wanted more, naturally, a wild competition would occur in the
political sphere of Armenia where the opposition, the pro-government
forces and the government would try to prove to the West that they
will return more if they come to power or stay in power. After all, it
makes no difference for the West whether the deal is made directly or
with Kocharyan as a middleman. The process is important, which leads to
the same goal, in fact. In addition, they would not like the Armenians
to give away whatever they have. And maybe the hopes connected with
2007 are that Armenia will, nevertheless, agree to keep some territory.