ARMENIAN GENOCIDE FOLLY
By Soner Cagaptay

Washington Institute for Near East Policy, DC
Feb 22 2007

U.S.-Turkish relations, already battered since the Iraq war, face a
new challenge this spring: the "Armenian genocide" resolution. This
resolution, introduced Jan. 30 in the House of Representatives,
will likely come to the floor soon.

If passed in the House, the resolution would sever the bilateral
ties between Washington and Ankara. The resolution would also be
the Democratic majority’s first foreign-policy blunder in the new
Congress. At this critical juncture of spiraling instability in Iraq
and a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan, the United States cannot
afford to lose Turkey, a major, if underappreciated, partner for U.S.
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan alike.

An overwhelming number of Turks say that the 1915 deportation of
Armenians from Anatolia to Syria in the Ottoman Empire does not
constitute genocide, yet the House resolution declares 1915 to be a
genocide. By passing the resolution, the Congress would be passing
judgment on Turkish history, which the Turks would see as the ultimate
insult. This is bad news at a time when America’s favorability rating
in Turkish opinion polls is already at an all-time low of 7 percent.

The House resolution would cause a massive public outpouring of Turkish
resentment against the United States. This backlash would inevitably
cripple U.S.-Turkish military cooperation.

In November 2006, the French parliament passed a resolution declaring
1915 a genocide. The Turkish response was unforgiving and harsh,
especially in the military sphere. Turkey halted bilateral military
exchanges and froze all reciprocal military visits and joint military
exercises with France. Paris was barred from bidding for Turkish
defense contracts, and on their own initiative Turkish generals whom
France had honored returned their decorations.

The likely similar Turkish response to the passage of the Armenian
resolution would have a devastating effect on U.S. plans, especially
in Iraq.

For starters, the Incirlik Air Base in southern Turkey, an invaluable
asset for U.S. military operations in the Middle East, would come
under pressure. Three-quarters of all air cargo bound for Iraq
transits Incirlik, and Turkey provides blanket clearance for military
overflights supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring
Freedom in Afghanistan. For instance, KC-135 tankers operating out of
Incirlik have flown 3,400 sorties and delivered 35 million gallons
of fuel to U.S. fighter and transport aircraft on missions in Iraq
and Afghanistan.

With its proximity to Iraq, Incirlik also helps defray the cost of
American operations there. Six U.S. C-17 cargo aircraft based at
Incirlik do the job of nine or 10 military aircraft based in Germany,
saving the United States $160 million per year.

In September 2000, when another Armenian resolution was submitted
to Congress, more than 10,000 Turks demonstrated outside Incirlik,
shutting down the base for three days. U.S. military operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan cannot afford a repeat of demonstrations that
close the airbase.

In addition to Incirlik, the Habur border gate between Turkey and
Iraq is another critical supply line. Turkey is the only developed
economy bordering Iraq, and the provision of goods and services from
Turkey to Iraq through Habur is of crucial importance. Though Iraq
is rich in oil reserves, its crippled infrastructure requires Iraq
to import gas from Turkey. Half of the fuel used by Iraqi consumers
enters Iraq through Habur. Turkey also provides 19 percent of Iraq’s
food and water, and will soon supply 25 percent of its electricity.

Habur is also vital for the U.S. military because one-quarter of the
fuel used by coalition troops enters Iraq from Turkey via Habur.

The passage of the Armenian resolution would also hurt U.S. businesses
and consumers. Ankara is engaged in several major defense cooperation
projects with the United States, including the Joint Strike Fighter,
in which Turkey has $175 million invested and an expected purchase of
100 jets, and the upgrading of 200-plus Turkish F-16 fighters at a
cost of $1.6 billion. The Armenian resolution would jeopardize such
cooperative projects, as well as kill a number of pending Turkish
defense purchases from the United States, including Patriot PAC
III Air Defense System for $1.3 billion, 52 Sikorsky Black Hawks
helicopters at a value of $800 million, 10 heavy-lift Boeing and
Sikorsky helicopters worth $500 million and between 30 and 50 Boeing
Apache or Bell Cobra helicopters worth between $1.5 and $2 billion.

Passing the Armenian resolution would spark a major bilateral crisis
that would be detrimental to American interests. The United States
needs Turkey in Afghanistan. Whether in the end it opts for a smart
surge or a staged withdrawal, the United States cannot succeed in Iraq
without Turkish assets. The Bush administration and the Democrat-led
Congress both should be interested in preventing an Armenian train
wreck in Iraq. In today’s hyperpartisan Washington, this spectacle
should be a refreshing opportunity for bipartisan agreement.

Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for
Near East Policy and an Ertegun professor at Princeton University.

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