TURKEY REPLACES THE EU WITH A RETURN TO THE MIDDLE EAST
By Soli Ozel

Daily Star – Lebanon
March 5 2007

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan gave the cue for Turkey’s foreign
policy priorities in this dual election year (first presidential
then general elections) when he declared that Iraq had replaced the
European Union as Turkey’s top priority item. The statement certainly
reflected the legitimate concerns of most observers who assess that
this year could be the defining one for the future of Iraq.

Turkey has felt all the repercussions of developments in Iraq since
even before the beginning of the war. Jealously status-quo-oriented,
the Turkish elites and populace alike opposed the war from its
inception, fearing the potentially revolutionary consequences.

Although negotiations were held with the United States prior to the
war and an understanding was reached on modalities for cooperation,
ultimately Parliament denied the US permission to deploy troops in
Turkey and open a northern front. Since then, US-Turkish relations,
particularly military-to-military ties, have been rocky though never
fatally damaged.

Today, having seen many of its most dire predictions come true, Ankara
is deeply concerned that Iraq’s descent into a brutal sectarian civil
war with seemingly inexhaustible reserves of violence threatens the
stability of the entire region. In addition, as with its neighbors
Syria and Iran, the prospect of an independent Kurdistan deeply
troubles the authorities and the non-Kurdish public alike.

At the same time, Ankara is concerned with other developments in the
region such as the instability in Lebanon and the Iranian nuclear
program. And it is equally worried about American policies on these
questions. Hence it tries to maintain a balancing act by staying on
good terms with Iran and Syria while improving relations with the US
and looking for ways for the two allies to limit the damage in Iraq.

It is therefore only natural that the government would divert its
attention and energies toward the Middle East, and particularly Iraq,
this year.

But there was another sense in which Erdogan’s statement could be
interpreted. Arguably the prime minister and his Cabinet lost much
of their appetite for EU-induced reforms as early as the day after
Turkey got a date to start accession negotiations in December 2004.

Those negotiations did begin on time in October 2005, but only after
acrimonious debates within the EU and between Turkey and the union
over Turkey’s obligation to open its ports to Greek Cypriot shipping.

Some EU members tried their best to renege on their promise to
treat Turkey the same way as other candidates. Politicians in member
countries built electoral platforms on Turkey-bashing.

By the end of 2006, then, much if not all of the momentum was lost
in Turkey’s EU bid. The final blow came when EU suspended 8 out of
35 negotiating chapters and effectively put the process on hold,
although technical work still continues and three minor chapters were
opened. That some of the suspended chapters, such as foreign affairs,
had no bearing on the controversial customs union issue with Cyprus
suggest that the latter was at least partially an excuse to delay
Turkey’s accession process.

Such a drifting apart in the relationship was what the nay-sayers in
the EU and the Euro-bashers in Turkey passionately wanted. Just as
anti-Turkish sentiment in EU member countries was on the rise, so was a
rampant, xenophobic, anti-Western nationalism in Turkey. Both Turkey’s
opposition parties and the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party)
decided to cater to nationalist sentiment.

Evidently the AKP’s higher echelons felt that to continue in an
election year with their reformist and liberalizing agenda would be a
losing proposition. They already had the example of Erdogan’s opening
to the Kurds in the summer of 2005, which fractured the party and cost
it dearly in terms of electoral support. Therefore for all practical
purposes, the reformist wave came to an end in 2006; it is unlikely
to pick up until after the general elections.

As a result of this rising nationalism, Turkey was shaken by successive
court cases brought against outspoken intellectuals. These cases
were all related to Article 301 of the penal code that criminalizes
offenses against "Turkishness." Turkey’s Nobel laureate in literature,
Orhan Pamuk, was among those who were tried and assaulted in court
by self-proclaimed guards of national pride. The AKP government
did close to nothing to contain these movements, nor did it change
or rescind 301. Arguably as an indirect result of such a climate –
jointly created by political classes, old elites and a susceptible,
offended and fearful population – a prominent Armenian journalist,
Hrant Dink, was murdered in January.

All these developments, alongside already existing anxiety about the
AKP’s so-called true intentions (read, seeking to advance Islamic
law), raised concerns in the West. Almost no conference relating
to Turkey in the West can be held lately without a panel entitled:
"Are we losing Turkey?" or "Who lost Turkey?"

Yet nationalist outcries notwithstanding, so far there is no indication
that Turkey’s Western orientation has been replaced by an alternative
one. Still, a number of problems present themselves.

First and foremost is the closing of political space in the country
because of the radicalization of nationalist discourse. Second is the
lack of harmonious relations among Turkey’s foreign policy-making
actors, particularly on Iraq. And third, the prime minister’s
aspiration to be elected president has raised tensions in the country,
corroding the government’s relations with the military.

The combination of these three domestic problems fuels nationalist
fever in Turkey. There are calls to attack the PKK inside Iraqi
Kurdistan. There are also calls for militarily intervening to stop the
Iraqi Kurds from taking over the oil-rich province of Kirkuk, whose
demography has been drastically altered by the Kurdish authorities.

Just last week, Turkey’s National Security Council put an end to
an acrimonious debate conducted mainly in the media between the
government and military. The council called for appropriate diplomatic
and political moves to solve outstanding problems with the Iraqi
Kurds. The fact that such a decision was reached in the wake of
back-to-back visits by Turkey’s defense and foreign ministers and
chief of the general staff to Washington may also suggest that the
Turkish-American dialogue on the sensitive issues of the PKK and
Kirkuk is healthier than before.

Soli Ozel is a professor of international relations at Istanbul Bilgi
University and a columnist for the daily Sabah. This commentary first
appeared at bitterlemons-international.org, an online newsletter.