Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
March 23 2007
POST-SOVIET SECESSIONIST LEADERS WORRIED BY RUSSIA’S KOSOVO POLICY
By Vladimir Socor
Friday, March 23, 2007
Abkhazia’s `president’ Sergei Bagapsh Russia’s seemingly staunch
defense of Serbia’s `territorial integrity’ and threat to veto any
form of recognition of Kosovo’s independence is alarming the
post-Soviet secessionist leaderships. These had counted on quick
international recognition of Kosovo — whether against Russia’s will
or as part of a Western bargain with Russia — in order to use the
`precedent’ or `model’ thus created for recognition of Abkhazia,
Ossetia, Transnistria, and Karabakh.
The Kremlin had publicly and repeatedly encouraged these leaderships
to expect such a course of events. From President Vladimir Putin on
down, Russian officials threatened the West and the United Nations
with just such a scenario. Conversely, and using parallel or
alternative discourses to different audiences, Moscow is increasingly
implying that international recognition of Kosovo would establish a
dangerous `precedent’ with a domino effect and should therefore be
avoided. Moscow’s overall goal is not an outcome of either type and
probably not yet even a compromise between the two scenarios, but
simply to delay any decision and exploit all the negotiating
processes for maximum Russian advantage.
Now that Moscow has succeeded beyond expectations to slow down or
even block the international negotiations on Kosovo’s status, the
post-Soviet secessionists’ chances of official recognition, at least
by Russia, seems to be slipping to their fingers. Hoping to retrieve
that opportunity, delegations from Abkhazia and South Ossetia — as
well as, covertly, from Transnistria — rushed to Moscow in recent
days to plead for quick Russian recognition of their secessions.
Abkhazia’s `president’ Sergei Bagapsh and `foreign minister’ Sergei
Shamba, as well as South Ossetia’s `president’ Eduard Kokoiti, met
with Russian government and Duma officials and held news conferences,
one of which also featured Kremlin consultant Sergei Markov. Their
core demand is for unilateral Russian recognition as soon as
possible, before any international decision is reached regarding
Kosovo’s status. If that decision endorses Serbia’s territorial
integrity, or if it produces a compromise, the post-Soviet
secessionist leaderships fear being dealt a corresponding setback.
Consequently, their motto at the public appearances in Moscow became,
`It’s now or never’ for Russian recognition of their `republics’
(Interfax, March 18-20).
Should the negotiated status of Kosovo fall short of independence and
international recognition, Sukhumi and Tskhinvali as well as Tiraspol
and to some extent Karabakh fear that Russia would have to adopt at
least publicly a more ambiguous stance regarding their interests.
Thus, they packaged their own demand for recognition in the language
of Russia’s geopolitical interests. They argued that Georgia’s
admission to NATO is a foregone conclusion, would occur sooner rather
than later, would be followed by Azerbaijan, and even Armenia might
have no choice but to follow suit. Abkhazia and South Ossetia would
become Russia’s last remaining outposts in the South Caucasus and
buffers against NATO, they pleaded.
Moreover, they warned, a younger generation of politicians might come
to power in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, with formative experiences
different from those of the incumbent generation of leaders. Those
future leaders’ behavior would be difficult to predict, particularly
when faced with a NATO presence on their doorstep. Inasmuch as the
present generation rules out being part of a NATO member country if
Georgia joins the alliance, Russia can choose between recognizing
Abkhazia and South Ossetia now or `losing the South Caucasus
entirely’ before long.
For its part, Russia does not at all feel that it must follow the
same set of rules or standards for settling the Kosovo and the
post-Soviet conflicts. While professing to link those processes for
bargaining purposes, Moscow keeps the two tracks starkly distinct
from one another in practice. Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei
Lavrov implicitly underscored that dual approach in his March 21
government-hour speech to the Duma. For the first time on the record,
Lavrov termed Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria `republics,’
soon after his MFA had begun referring to those enclaves’ leaders as
`presidents’ in its official documents. Lavrov’s deliberate choice of
words delighted the ultranationalist opposition politician Sergei
Baburin, who is a staunch advocate both of Serbia’s `territorial
integrity’ and, simultaneously, of recognizing the post-Soviet
secessionist territories.
The Russian government itself follows that dual approach increasingly
boldly. In his speech, Lavrov asserted that any link between the
Kosovo resolution and post-Soviet conflict resolution would not be
direct or automatic. Whatever the outcome in Kosovo — that is, even
if it preserves Serbia’s territorial integrity — Russia will in any
case be responsible for the populations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
because they are citizens of Russia, Lavrov argued. The clear
implication is that Russia would hold on to these occupied
territories of Georgia while at the same time advocating for
territorial integrity in the case of Serbia (Interfax, March 21).
Similarly, and on the same day, Russian State Secretary and Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory Karasin staunchly defended
Russia’s control of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sectors of the
Georgia-Russia border. Refusing to admit to any violation of that
internationally recognized border, Karasin adduced for justification
that Russia controls those borders effectively, interdicting
contraband and arms trafficking (demonstrably a false claim). Russia
has officially informed Tbilisi in January of Russia’s position on
this issue, Karasin said (Interfax, March 21). However, Russia this
simultaneously calls for the inviolability of Serbia’s borders in the
case of Kosovo.
The leaders of Armenia and Karabakh are adhering to the familiar
position — which was also long shared by their post-Soviet
counterparts — that the outcome in Kosovo has little or no bearing
on the outcome in their cases. Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vardan Oskanian sums up this position as follows: If Kosovo is
internationally recognized as an independent state, Karabakh would
gain an additional argument. If the Kosovo conflict is settled in
some other way, short of independence and recognition, Karabakh will
go its own way in any case (Arminfo, March 21).