ARMENIA IN THE GREAT GAME: THE UNITED STATES WANTS AN ORANGE REVOLUTION IN ARMENIA
by Avtandil Tsuladze, political scientist
Translated by Elena Leonova

Source: Izvestia, March 27, 2007, p. 6
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
March 28, 2007 Wednesday

The Armenian opposition might try to implement an Orange Revolution
scenario in the upcoming elections. Artur Bagdasarian is trying to
make himself the chief candidate for Orange leader. There are a number
of indications that the United States is keeping a close eye on him.

Armenia is one of Russia’s most important CIS partners, and its most
consistent ally. Will it retain its pro-Russian orientation in the
medium-term future?

Armenia’s presidential election in 2008 could be a political
watershed. President Robert Kocharian will not seek re-election,
and the successor problem is becoming increasingly pressing. A
parliamentary election is scheduled for May 12, 2007, and this will
largely determine the configuration of forces in the lead-up to the
presidential race. (…)

The suspense in this election focuses on which of the pro-government
parties will score more points. That’s if the election goes calmly,
within constitutional channels. But there’s no ruling out the
possibility that the opposition might try to implement an Orange
Revolution scenario. Artur Bagdasarian is trying to make himself the
chief candidate for Orange leader. There are a number of indications
that the United States is keeping a close eye on him. Bagdasarian’s
articles have been published frequently in the American media, and
during a recent visit to the USA he said a great deal about the need to
"build democracy" in Armenia. Bagdasarian’s main arguments retransmit
America’s political interests in the region. When he calls on Armenians
not to be "imprisoned by the past," he means the genocide of 1915;
he proposes normalizing relations with Turkey, de-emphasizing the
genocide. He also calls for normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and
"resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of reciprocal
concession." Bagdasarian says: "Improving relations with Azerbaijan
is essential for our long-term energy stability, which can only
be achieved by diversifying our energy policy." That reference to
"diversification" is aimed against Russia.

So far, Bagdasarian is keeping quiet about how far the concessions
may extend.

Where do American interests come into this? The United States is
interested in the trade routes linking this region to the Middle
East and Asia. The frozen conflicts in the Trans-Caucasus are an
obstacle to establishing transit channels. On the one hand, Armenia
is effectively in a blockade: no communications with Azerbaijan,
a closed border with Turkey, and Georgia closed off since Russia
imposed anti-Georgian sanctions. On the other hand, Armenia may be
regarded as the territory that obstructs many communications in the
region. The American objective is to turn the Trans-Caucasus into an
integrated region controlled by the United States. That’s the point
of the Orange project in Armenia. That’s why Bagdasarian is portraying
himself as a "peacemaker."

It would be naive to think that the Armenian authorities and Armenian
society aren’t concerned about the blockade around their country. The
problem is the price to be paid for lifting it. Former president Levon
Ter-Petrosian was forced to resign after arguing for substantial
concessions on Nagorno-Karabakh and facing resistance from public
opinion and the political establishment. The present administration,
with the help of international mediators, is striving to find a
solution that doesn’t compromise Armenia’s national interests.

Another sign pointing to the possibility of an Orange Revolution
scenario in Armenia is the fact that the opposition is pedalling the
issue of election fraud. But the configuration of political forces in
Armenia is such that the authorities simply have no objective motives
to rig elections; the pro-government forces are already certain
to win by a large margin. The opposition’s only chance of turning
the situation around in its favor is to claim election fraud. The
examples of Georgia and Ukraine have shown us how this technique can
work. In Georgia, the key factor was Eduard Shevardnadze’s unpopularity
(but Kocharian is the most popular politician in Armenia); in Ukraine
there was a split between the Western and Eastern regions (but Armenia
is a unified country). The opposition’s only hope lies in the dirty
techniques of an Orange Revolution project.

Experts don’t rule out the possibility that the West (certain circles
in the West) may assist the Armenian opposition by organizing
appropriate media coverage, sending an impressive contingent of
election observers, and so on. A brigade from the BBC will arrive
in Armenia a week before the election. The forces being drawn
into this are substantial. Will they suffice to cause a social
explosion in Armenia? There is no sign of that as yet. But Russia,
with an interest in its stragegic ally’s stable development, needs to
monitor this situation closely. It should also provide Armenia with
media support and send election observers, facilitating legitimate
democratic processes. Armenia will also need our political support.