ARMENIA’S CHOICE
by Vyacheslav Nikonov, president of the Politika Foundation
Translated by Elena Leonova

Source: Izvestia, April 5, 2007, p. 6
Agency WPS
What the Papers Say Part A (Russia)
April 5, 2007 Thursday

Armenia’s vital elections: maintaining Russia’s influence; Armenian
Prime Minister Andranik Margarian, a true political heavyweight who
held that office for seven years, has died of a sudden heart attack.

Armenia is going into what will be one of the most significant
elections held in the former Soviet Union in 2007.

The sudden death of an Armenian political leader – Prime Minister
Andranik Margarian, a true political heavyweight who held that office
for seven years – is certainly a profound loss for Armenia.

The situation is particularly acute because Margarian, who also led
the ruling Armenian Republican Party (ARP), had his heart attack
in the lead-up to parliamentary and presidential elections. Such
a dramatic turn of events has not only complicated the domestic
political situation in Armenia, but also served to draw attention
to Armenia and the processes under way there. The general public in
Russia clearly fails to appreciate the importance of these processes.

Armenia is going into what will be one of the most significant
elections held in the former Soviet Union in 2007. The outcome of
this election will be very important for Russia.

Armenia is our most reliable partner in the Trans-Caucasus. It is
the only Trans-Caucasus country that hasn’t joined the GUAM alliance
– which is known to be a project aimed at restricting Russia’s
influence in Eurasia. Armenia is one of Russia’s most reliable
allies in the former Soviet Union; it’s a core member of the CIS,
the Euro-Asian Economic Community, and the CIS Collective Security
Treaty Organization. What’s more, it is a sincere partner and ally –
a country where anti-Russian sentiments have never had much public
support. The Armenian diaspora, larger than the actual population
of Armenia, is an influential factor in Russia and many other key
countries – from Iran to the United States.

It’s an open secret that the Trans-Caucasus is becoming a field of
increasing geopolitical rivalry for the world’s leading players. The
United States, which has entrenched itself in Georgia and is building
up its position in Azerbaijan, is becoming a significant factor in
Armenian politics as well. The Trans-Caucasus is gaining importance for
the United States, in light of the long-drawn-out military operation
in Iraq and preparations for other potential military operations
in the Greater Middle East – against Iran, for example (which is
Armenia’s major trade partner). America also considers it important
to promote the interests of its regional allies, primarily Turkey. The
Trans-Caucasus dimension is also clearly increasing in the policies of
the European Union and other European institutions which primarily pay
attention to Georgia, but aren’t ignoring Armenia either. The interests
of Russia and its Western partners aren’t necessarily different,
but they do diverge on the key issue: definitions of policy success
in the former Soviet Union. For Moscow, success means creating a belt
of friendly countries that want closer cooperation with Russia; for
Western countries, success means weakening Russia’s influence in the
CIS and making Russia’s neighbors less inclined to seek integration
with Russia.

In this increasingly complicated situation, it’s very important for
Russia to see certain kinds of political forces in power south of the
Caucasus: forces that welcome constructive cooperation with us. It’s
a dangerous delusion to hope that such forces will win automatically.

Not everything is that simple in Armenian politics.

In a sense, the parliamentary election on May 12 will serve as
primaries for the presidential election. President Robert Kocharian –
a sincere proponent of positive relations with Russia – has served
two terms and cannot seek re-election. The elite and ordinary citizens
alike regard Serge Sarkisian as Kocharian’s successor.

Sarkisian studied philology before the whims of fate made him a
commanding officer in the Karabakh army, and in recent years he has
headed the Defense Ministry and the Security Council. Opinion polls
indicate that most Armenian voters expect Sarkisian to become the
next president. Russia is also satsfied with Sarkisian. A strong but
flexible politician, he has established firm contacts within Russia’s
ruling circles. He is justifiably regarded as a politician who wants to
reinforce cooperation with Moscow. What’s more, the West doesn’t find
him objectionable either. But before Sarkisian can run for president,
the ARP needs to demonstrate its superiority in the parliamentary
election. Sarkisian now leads the ARP.

The election campaign is fast-paced, its outcome is by no means
certain, and the death of Andranik Margarian has added to the suspense
by affecting the configuration of political forces in Armenia.

The ARP won’t find it easy to hold its ground, given the accumulated
weariness of voters, even against a background of rapid economic
growth. It should be acknowledged that to a certain degree, the ARP’s
problems in Yerevan are linked to its support for close partnership
with Russia – due to evident disillusionment with the results of
this partnership.

How can we help Armenia? First of all, by treating our partner
responsibly and attentively, taking note of Armenia’s concerns at
the political level and even the level of daily life. Russia should
uphold the rights of Armenians who are living and working in Russia,
prevent any discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity or citizenship,
and ensure their safety. Ethnic hate crimes must be unequivocally
condemned.

It’s also important to solve the investment problem as soon as
possible, and launch actual production at the Armenian industrial
enterprises which have been acquired by Russian companies as a result
of foreign debt repayments or privatization. Otherwise, this situation
could have a negative political effect as well as a negative economic
effect.

Russia’s move to raise natural gas prices has led to obvious
disillusionment in Armenia. A transition to free-market price formation
was inevitable, of course, but Russia might have considered providing
some compensation to its allies for their financial losses.

This year, for the first time, Russia is allocating funding for
foreign aid; in my view, Armenia should be regarded as one of the
chief recipients of this aid.

If all this is done, we will be helping pro-Russian forces in Armenia –
and thus helping ourselves as well.

And let’s not forget the power of words. Armenians still think well
of Russia, and a great deal depends on the words Russia chooses to use.