"THE GREAT WAR" WITH IRAN
Theodore W. Karasik,
PHD in Russian History, Senior Political Scientist, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, USA
Eurasian Home Analytical Resource, Russia
l?lang=en&nic=expert&pid=1068&qmonth=0 &qyear=0
May 2 2007
This war that we started last year (last summer), when Israel and
Hezbollah went up against each other and Israel lost very poorly
in this mismatch. Hezbollah capabilities far exceed most terror
organizations, they are really quite sophisticated in what they do
in terms of the asymmetrical warfare and what we call the fourth
generation warfare and the net-centric warfare. The fact that Israel
took a punishing walk reverberated throughout the Middle East, and
it also reverberated throughout the Hezbollah and into Iran.
The fact is that we are now seeing the both sides – the American side
with its Gulf allies and the Iranian side – both on to the teeth,
and any trigger would set up a military confrontation. When in April
the Iranians seized 15 persisting British sailors, it was actually
the trigger that could have started a military confrontation;
and it started when Hezbollah seized the Israeli soldiers. The
confrontation with Iran if there is a trigger and when there is a
trigger, can quickly become a case of the use of American airpower
against Iranian infrastructure.
Some people would question if the Americans are widespread enough
in Iraq to conduct any kind of operation against Iran. I don’t think
it’s true, I think the Americans clearly have enough firepower to do
significant damage. The trouble with a military confrontation is what
the Iranians are going to do to retaliate. The way the Iranian military
doctrine is done is done on asymmetrical level and they have the
capabilities with them for laying mines, using small patrol boats and
also engaging and enacting the Shiite communities throughout the Gulf
region to attack Sunnis or to attack American and coalition forces.
But the attack on Iran, which I think will not take place at all,
because of the "Firestorm", is something that we need to think about.
If there’s an attack on Iran, we are going to have the implications
not only in Iran itself but also in the countries that surround Iran.
I am particularly concerned with what would happen in Azerbaijan. The
reason why is because of the economic relationships between Azerbaijan
and Iran that would be damaged in terms of the natural death. I am a
little concerned about the ethnic issue with the Azeris of northwestern
Iran and the Azeris in Azerbaijan itself. And if there was significant
damage and there were refugee floats, how would the refugee floats
impact on Azerbaijan? We already know about the refugee floats from
what happened with Nagorno Karabakh. But we can only imagine what
will happen when these refugee floats start pushing into a place like
Dagestan and this would directly affect the Russian Federation.But
we can only imagine what will happen when these refugee floats start
pushing into a place like Dagestan, and this would directly affect
the Russian Federation.
I am not so concerned about what would happen in countries such as
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan – these seem to be places that are a
little more immune, a little more distant from world where this type
of violence would occur.
With Pakistan and Afghanistan, I think that this would be extraordinary
dangerous for them, because if Iran is attacking, there will be
problems with them trying to stand back up against the state.
FUTURE DIRECTORIES FOR IRAQ
This "war" with Iran is a kind of a safe way to the future of Iraq.
We are dealing now with this extraordinary situation between the
Sunnite and Shiite worlds, the sectarian conflict that we see wracking
in Iraq today. And the way that this strife has set throughout the
Gulf region and I think affects the ummah entirely.
The big question is which direction this Shiite community of the Gulf
region is facing: are they looking at the holy cities of Iraq or are
they listening to the Iranian clerics?
The second issue here is how much sectarian violence in Iraq directly
influences both the communities: Sunni and Shiite. And what we are
having in Iraq, what I called a laboratory for military operations
and tactic, is also becoming a laboratory for religion-based
conflict. And we are now seeing that Iraq is being pulled in many
different directions. With the pull out probably coming in about
a year with some minor residuals around, I think that we need to
consider two possible futures for Iraq. One is that there need to
be a strong man, strong leader, someone like Premier Ayad Allawi,
because the central government clearly is not working, it is pulled
apart by the sectarian tensions.
The other possibility for the future of Iraq is the partition option –
break up into three states. This is not only possible but will ignite
new problems because of the Saudi, Iranian and Turkish involvement:
the Turks in Kurdistan, the Saudis in Anbar province and of course
the Iranians of the Shiite community.
Iraq as we all know is a really artificial state created after the
WWI. The situation in Iraq reminds of the same thing in Afghanistan
where partition into two or three different regions may occur,
if the central government fails. For Iraq this future is something
that we need to think about very closely in the implications for oil
policy, and especially the relationship that this country will have
with Turkey, because Turkey right now is also going through a kind
of catharsis in terms of whether it’s secular or Islamic, whether
it’s part of the Middle East or a part of Europe; and some Turkish
generals are already saying that they should invade Kurdistan. But
for the Iranians the Turkish-Iranian relationship actually benefits
from trying to stir PKK guerrillas (the Kurdistan Working Party)
who operate in the North.
AL-QAEDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has recently turned to on-line
jihadism. They put out new tactics, techniques and procedurals,
manuals in how to attack energy installations throughout the Gulf
region. They also have begun to publish more thoroughly their
positions on nonbelievers and Muslims to work with nonbelievers on
the Arabian Peninsula. This is a potential trend for more violence
against individuals whether they are Muslim or not.
Al-Qaeda is an ideology, it is not really a central organization
any more like it was three years ago. This ideology is very easily
picked up by people throughout the ummah who are seeking to reverse
what people call globalization. Al-Qaeda ideology seeks to return
to the past – for them the success of some of the countries of the
Gulf is not appropriate to their doctrine and so they seek to reverse
that order. We see Al-Qaeda’s doctrine being spread throughout the
Islamic world. Recently we saw attacks in Morocco and Algeria and
this is being done under the banner of Al-Qaeda of Maghreb. And this
is an important new plan that is going to destabilize North Africa,
unless the North-African security services and security services in
Europe crack them down. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula will widely
conduct attacks within the Gulf region in order to prove its might.
In addition it’s important to think about, if there’s military
confrontation between U.S. and Iran, how Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula will take advantage of that chaos to attack western
interests. And some people would argue, wait and you will see Al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsular teaming up with Iran. I don’t think this
is true because ideologically and religiously they cannot cooperate
with each other, but nevertheless Al-Qaeda can take advantage of
the situation.
WORKERS AND ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION WITHIN THE GULF REGION
Because of the Iraq war, there is a major refugee problem in Jordan and
some of the other countries of the region. Many Iranians are coming
to work in the Gulf, particularly in Dubai. These are also workers
from throughout the region: India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia.
Because of the economic boom of the region, there are much more
immigrants now who are paid very low wages working in unbelievable
conditions in labour houses. As a result there are more and more
riots and work stoppages and so on in the Gulf region. And this is
being whipped up by what happens in Iraq and what potentially can
happen in Iran.
I think that increasingly the Gulf states will have to deal with the
workers’ illegal immigration issue in a much more heavy-handed way.
Eventually this could become a ‘fifth column’ to some of these
countries and could ignite particular problems.
IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA
The first implication is the Russian-Iranian relationship, where does
it go? Currently with the movement towards open confrontation, on the
one hand, the prices on oil will go up and this will benefit Russia
greatly, but there is the issue of sanctions and how it serves Russia.
I think Russia acts in a very courageous and good way towards Iran
and does come through when it needs to. It is my vow, that Russia
can play a very positive role in trying to make sure that there is no
armed confrontation, in other words it is trying to use connections
into Iran to lessen the tensions. We all know that Ahmadinejad, when
he talks publicly, is more talking to domestic audience than he is
to the international audience and I think we have to remember this.
Other implications for Russia are very interesting. After President
Putin gave his speech in UN attacking the United States for its
policies in Iraq and around the world, he immediately went to Saudi
Arabia, Qatar and Jordan. I think it was a brilliant master stroke
for business development in the region. This was the first visit of
the Russian president to these countries; it was also significant
because it was like a make up with the Sunni world. Visiting both
Qatar and Saudi Arabia was very positive for Russia and now you have
the potential for Russian Railways to be heavily involved in Saudi
Arabia, a LUKOIL subsidiary is already operating in the eastern
province of Saudi Arabia. Russia’s relationships with the Shiites
have always been very good because of Iran but the country’s opening
to the Sunnite world is very positive as well.
I think that these trend lines are very important as they bare
potential for great catastrophe. But by grater involvement the
international community and trying to resolve some of these issues
like having international conference, not having G8 solution, the
region will benefit better. I still believe it is up to the people
in the region to decide what needs to be done. The Saudis need to
negotiate with Iranians and vice versa, the Saudis really need to
negotiate with the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) allies, who are
really not the allies at all but just neighbors.
This text summarizes Dr. Theodore W. Karasik’s lecture "Tendencies
in the Gulf Region: Iran, Iraq and Beyond" disseminated at the Moscow
Carnegie Center on April 27.