Russia’s comeback to Central Asia is not just pipe dream
23:11 | 08/ 05/ 2007
MOSCOW. (Mikhail Pereplesnin for RIA Novosti) – When Vladimir Putin
became president seven years ago, he made a blitz tour of post-Soviet
Central Asia.
One of the problems he inherited from Boris Yeltsin was lack of proper
relations with the former "fraternal" Central Asian republics, which
had become members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
The niche voluntarily vacated by Russia did not remain empty for a long
time. Central Asian republics were showered with cooperation proposals
from all kinds of investors – Turkey, Iran, Arab states, China, Japan
and Indonesia. The Americans hastened to proclaim the Caspian a zone of
their vital interests. Even Ukraine left Russia far behind in trade
with Turkmenistan.
Ashgabat managed to stick to the wait-and-see attitude and avoid
choosing a strategic partner during numerous Turkmen visits by wanted
and unwanted guests that were rushing to divide the Caspian pie. With
many reservations, Putin’s trip to Ashgabat seven years ago can be
qualified as an attempt at comeback – Russia had lost many good
opportunities, and economic cooperation was reduced to the purchase of
Turkmen gas in tough competition with Ukraine. However, it was during
that visit that a new round of top level meetings was launched.
Putin’s current visit to Ashgabat will be inevitably analyzed in the
historic context as the summing up of his activities in Central Asia.
Let’s count its pluses and minuses.
The main plus is that Russia has finally got rid of its imperial
ambitions towards a former constituent province. A flexible and gradual
increase in prices on imported Turkmen gas allowed it to edge out its
Ukrainian rivals and sign in 2003 a long-term agreement (valid until
2028) on the purchase of almost all Turkmen gas exports with the
exception of 5-7 billion cubic meters that are annually pumped into
northern Iran. Moreover, the monopoly position allowed Moscow to derive
not only economic but also geopolitical gains by reselling gas to
Ukraine.
The biggest minus is that the old Central Asia-Center pipeline that
supplies Russia with gas is badly worn out. In 2006, the pipe pumped a
little more than 41 billion cubic meters of gas. By comparison, in the
Soviet times, the relevant figure was 85 billion.
The second plus of Moscow’s efforts to upgrade its economic presence in
the region is expansion of markets for Russian businesses and
introduction of domestic technologies. Ashgabat visits by regional
business delegations have become Russia’s foreign policy know-how. St.
Petersburg Governor Valentina Matviyenko came to the Turkmen capital
with the leading businessmen from her region, while Sverdlovsk Governor
Eduard Rossel arrived with their colleagues from the Urals. Direct
contacts between producers and consumers have given a considerable
impetus to bilateral trade. In the past year, it reached $307.5
million, an almost double increase compared to 10 years ago.
Trade could have been even bigger if Russia risked direct investment in
the Turkmen economy instead of limiting itself to strictly commercial
relations. At one time, Turkmenistan offered Gazprom a very promising
project – exclusive rights to the exploration and industrial
development of gas deposits in the Amudarya’s right bank. Ashgabat
patiently waited for several years for Gazprom to make a decision.
Eventually, it offered the project to the Chinese. With a view to
future profits, they quickly signed the agreement, showing more
flexibility than Russia’s gas monopoly.
Japanese, Turkish, Ukrainian and many West European companies have
already made investment in the Turkmen economy – processing of
agricultural produce, capital construction, and oil production and
refinery. Russian companies have just appeared there. This delay is an
obvious minus.
Russia has even fewer achievements in the cultural and social spheres.
During the recent Moscow visit of President Gurbanguly Berdymuhammedov
it transpired that Russian education technologies were in high demand
in Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan has only one Russian-Turkmen general
education school. It is more difficult to get into it than into a
prestigious college.
The Russian drama theater is also on the Turkmen government payroll.
Moscow’s long-standing plans to pay for it and create a Russian
cultural center on its basis have remained on paper. But humanitarian
contacts are secondary to economic relations. If Russia wants to
restore its positions in this dynamic region, it should consider big
joint projects such as development of hydrocarbon reserves on the
Turkmen part of the Caspian shelf and construction of pipelines to link
Turkmenistan with Russia "as a crow flies" – along Kazakhstan’s eastern
Caspian coast.
The itinerary of Putin’s current trip shows that the political ground
for promising long-term tripartite projects is ready. If the Russian,
Kazakh and Turkmen presidents decide to build a railway or a gas
pipeline on the Caspian eastern coast (preferably both), they will
determine the direction of Central Asia’s economic and political
development for years ahead. In this case, Vladimir Putin will crown
his presidency with a major achievement.
Mikhail Pereplesnin is editor-in-chief of the Russian analytical
magazine Turkmenistan.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s and do not
necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.