RIA NOVOSTI
Political geography is a changing world
19/ 05/ 2007

Interview with Nikolai Zlobin, director of the Russia and Eurasia Project at
the World Security Institute (U.S.) Part II
Interview with Nikolai Zlobin, director of the Russia and Eurasia Project at
the World Security Institute (U.S.) PART I
In your opinion, neither the United States, nor Russia has a clear-cut
policy in the entire South Caucasian region. They both tend to improvise. Is
it a destabilizing factor?
I think that the South Caucasus has suffered from deteriorated Russian-U.S.
relations. If they were strategic allies, as they planned to be just some
time ago, it would be much easier to resolve many post-Soviet problems. But
today the situation is directly opposite – the United States and Russia are
aggressive towards each other in Eurasia; they are trying to oust each other
from the region, and draw the local elites into their political squabbles.
Settlement of any conflict is judged by one and the same yardstick – whose
positions (Russian or American) will it enhance. In effect, a mild version
of the Cold War is taking place on post-Soviet territory. It differs from
the traditional Cold War not only in geographic dimensions but also in its
exclusively tactical character, lack of strategy, and vague interests and
spheres of influence. Moscow and Washington are improvising – they are
reacting to events and taking single steps. This is considerably
compromising regional stability, formation of competent national elites and
elaboration of independent national strategies.
I believe that in the next few years Russian-U.S. relations will continue
worsening, which is bound to affect the situation in the South Caucasus.
Moreover, the election campaigns that are being launched in both countries
may involve the region in the domestic political struggle both in Russia and
the United States; different political forces may be tempted to use the
region for their ends. This may further rock the situation in the South
Caucasus and encourage some of its forces to use the unpredictable election
situation in major countries.
Are you saying that Russia is not likely to pursue a predictable policy?
Unfortunately, I am. There is a whole number of reasons for this. Russia has
not determined its foreign policy strategy and has largely replaced it with
tactical goals and plans. In many respects, its foreign policy is
monopolized by narrow groups that are exploiting it in their interests. Many
of its important aspects remain frozen, for instance, its line on the U.S.
Currently, Russia does not have an influential or even a numerically strong
political or economic group that would be interested in upgrading these
relations. As a result, they are not given proper attention.
Russia’s policy towards former Soviet countries is largely determined by
competition on the domestic market, attempts by big business to get access
to new markets or keep their monopoly, as well as by the quality of Moscow’s
relations with the local governments. All these factors are temporary.
Is it possible that the United States or Russia may toughen their attitude
to one of the parties in the Karabakh conflict under certain circumstances?
If any party tries to resolve this conflict militarily, Russia and the
United States will strongly toughen their position on it. But with time such
measures may lead to the adamant refusal to consider the refugee problem and
restore justice in regard of innocent victims; both sides may be feigning
their desire to resolve the problem.
The question of the Kosovo precedent has already become trite through
frequent repetition. But still, could Kosovo become a model for settling
post-Soviet conflicts?
Kosovo cannot be a model here. It will become a history lesson, a new
experience but not a model. Moreover, I’m convinced that there will never be
a common pattern for settling post-Soviet conflicts. Their character is
different and they are all unique in some ways. They require different
levels of involvement of outside players and international agencies. The
more these conflicts exist in their current state, the more sophisticated
and flexible the methods of their settlement should be. I think we will have
to work out a fundamentally new legal, economic and political approach to
the very idea of settlement — much more intricate than in the case of
Kosovo.
Some politicians claim that the right of the Karabakh people to
self-determination does not run counter to Azerbaijan’s right to territorial
integrity. Do you accept Karabakh’s right to self-determination?
Here we have come to the old dilemma in international law and world
politics – between the right of nations to self-determination and the right
of a state to territorial integrity. I’m convinced that the right to
self-determination certainly overrides the right of a state to territorial
integrity. After all, any state is simply a formalized instrument of
implementing the rights and interests of its people. There is no doubt that
their interests are above those of the state – unless the latter is simply a
dictatorship that is suppressing these rights and interests. I believe that
the priority of the right of nations to self-determination is universal and
unconditional, and stems from world history, which boils down to the
development of nations. As for states, their forms, borders, sizes or
socio-political, economic and geographic characteristics have always been
and will be transient.
Parliamentary elections in Armenia are just starting the big election
marathon. The presidential race is ahead; it will be followed by the
elections in Azerbaijan. Russia and the United States will also hold
elections. What are the chances for Karabakh settlement in the near future?
If we talk about this period, I think there are none. Moreover, before
elections serious politicians tend to avoid sudden steps, particularly in
foreign policy, because they may destabilize the situation at home and have
many unpredictable consequences.