RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL COUNTER-OFFENSIVE IN THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
Written by Vasili Rukhadze
Abkhazia, CA
May 30 2007
In the last two to three years Russia has been on a geopolitical
offensive in the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet
Union. It has been gradually regaining the ground lost in the aftermath
of the American invasion of Afghanistan and the Georgian, Ukrainian
and Kyrgyz revolutions.
Central Asia
The first major victory for Russia came in Tajikistan in 2004. The
country was drifting towards the West following the ouster of the
Taliban from neighboring Afghanistan. Moscow worked vigorously to bring
the nation back under its sway. The Kremlin repeatedly threatened
the Tajik government of Imomali Rakhmonov with the expulsion of one
million Tajik workers from Russia, while offering debt relief for
the return to Moscow’s orbit. In October of 2004 Russian President
Putin and Tajik leader Rakhmonov signed an agreement. Russia agreed
to let Tajik laborers remain in Russia and forgave the country $240
million of its $300 million debt. In exchange Moscow established its
permanent military presence in Tajikistan, with 5,000 thousand Russian
troops deployed in the southern cities of Kulab and Kurgan-Tyube,
in close proximity to NATO controlled Afghanistan. The Kremlin
also secured a 49-year lease on an anti-Missile warning system at
Nurek. In addition, Russian companies have been awarded controlling
packages in Tajikistan’s major hydroelectric and gas energy projects,
as well as in other sectors of the country’s economy. Surprisingly,
at that time, many Western observers and policy makers did not see
this as the beginning of Russia’s geopolitical counterattack, nor did
they see it posing a major threat to Western interests in Central Asia.
In Kyrgyzstan, after the 2005 Tulip Revolution, the new fragile regime
of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev was plunged into political infighting
and rampant corruption. The government felt threatened by deep public
discontent. The killing of an ethnic Russian driver at an American
military base at Manas and the worsening of Kyrgyz-American relations
(as many suggest, masterminded by Russian security services) scared
Bishkek’s new rulers. Russia easily managed to bend Kyrgyzstan back to
Moscow’s orbit. The country’s energy infrastructure and communications
sector opened to Russian monopolies. In addition, Russia upgraded its
military base at Kant (close to the capital, Bishkek) at the same
time changing its status to that of a "permanent" base. Moscow is
working to expand its military presence in the country and establish
another base in southern Kyrgyzstan at Osh. At the same time, the
Kremlin pressed Kyrgyz authorities to astronomically increase the
annual rent for the US air-base at Manas from $2 million to $150
million. Through the Kyrgyz government Moscow is pushing for the
final expulsion of American military forces from the country. The
Kremlin is also trying to stomp out all the remnants of pro-Western
political forces from Bishkek’s power halls.
After the May 2005 Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan, Moscow swiftly
approached Karimov’s isolated and desperate regime. In a few
months, Russia signed an "alliance" with Tashkent, consisting of a
series of economic, political and military treaties which cemented
Russia’s strong influence in the country. In 2006 Uzbekistan entered
the Russian dominated Eurasian Economic Community and re-entered
another Russian-led military-political block known as the Collective
Security Treaty Organization. All of these initiatives have been
taking place with the eviction of US military base in Karshi-Khanabad
by Karimov as a backdrop. Russian companies started to enjoy almost
unrivaled dominance in the country’s rich oil, gas, mining and telecom
industries. In December 2006 Russia signed another agreement with
Uzbekistan, gaining access to an airfield at Navoi, further shifting
military balance in Central Asia in Moscow’s favor. Lately, Karimov
has been giving weak signals that he wants the revival of relations
with the West. He is also trying to find a new market and transport
route to export Uzbek gas to China, without Russian influence.
Nevertheless, the country effectively remains under Russian sway.
In approaching Kazakhstan, Putin’s Russia has been careful. Moscow
realizes that the country, backed by its abundant gas and oil
resources, has greater leverage to conduct more independent economic
and foreign policy. Consequently the Kremlin chose a more gradual
approach to keep and expand its political-economic influence in the
nation rather than sheer aggressiveness and drastic actions. Russia
watched (and watches) President Nazarbayev’s balancing policy between
Moscow, Washington and Beijing nervously. However, the Kremlin
never failed to make its deep dissatisfaction with Kazakhstan’s
independent ventures absolutely clear. These include the building
of a new Kazakh-Chinese oil pipeline, sending Kazakh oil via
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or the prospects of Kazakhstan’s
participation in the new Trans Caspian energy projects, transporting
Central Asian gas and oil to the West under the Caspian Sea, bypassing
Russia. In his dealings with Moscow, President Nazarbayev has to
remember that 30% of the country’s 15 million people are ethnic
Russians and can be a very disruptive and destructive force if Moscow
decides that Kazakhstan is sharply drifting away from the Kremlin’s
orbit. So far Moscow has managed to bend Astana to its will, making
the country export the biggest portion of its gas and oil via Russian
routes. (Astana also realizes that because of its geographic location,
Russia remains the cheapest and most convenient route to transport
Kazakh oil to the West). Keeping all this in mind Moscow diligently
worked (and works) to bind the Kazakh energy sector even closer to
its own and has scored important victories in this direction. In
April 2006 Russia and Kazakhstan agreed that it would increase its
oil exports via Russia, through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC)
from 28 million to 67 million tons. In addition, they would jointly
develop 3 offshore oil fields known as the Kurmangazy, Khvalynsky
and Tsentralnoye fields. Also Russia and Kazakhstan agreed to reduce
the lease payments for Russian military test sites and firing ranges
by $3 million per year and increased the size of the firing ranges;
they now occupy about 10 million hectares.
In addition, Russia was granted access to Kazakhstan’s communications
and broadcasting satellite Kazsat in the space. In July 2006, Russia
and Kazakhstan agreed to start joint programs ranging from uranium
mining and enrichment to developing new types of nuclear reactors
for domestic use and export.
Moscow’s other great success came on May 12 of this year in
Turkmenistan. President Putin, during his week long visit to
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, reached an agreement with the Central
Asian leaders ensuring Russia’s access to Turkmenistan’s abundant gas
resources. According to Mr. Putin’s announcement Turkmen gas will be
transported via Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. In September 2007
all parties will sign a treaty to build a new pipeline. In addition,
the old Prikaspiisky pipeline, running on the coast of the Caspian Sea,
will be reconstructed. These three states along with Uzbekistan also
agreed that two other gas pipelines will be renewed. When all these
envisioned pipelines go into operation, Russian natural gas imports
from Central Asia will almost double to 90 billion cubic meters per
year from the current 50 billion. In other words, these agreements
assure Russia’s unequivocal dominance over Central Asia’s gas imports.
The Central Asian summit provides the backdrop for the summit in
Krakow, Poland which the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Lithuania,
Poland and Ukraine attended. The Polish summit discussed the prospects
of new Trans Caspian energy projects that would transport Turkmen
gas and Kazakh oil by new pipelines under the Caspian Sea to Europe,
bypassing Russia. Actually the Kazakh President was also scheduled
to attend the Krakow summit but Putin’s deliberately long visit to
Kazakhstan prevented him from attending.
After the death of erratic Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in
December 2006, the European Union and the USA worked intensively
to develop the idea of transporting Turkmen gas via a new pipeline
under the Caspian Sea, through the Caucasus and Turkey to Europe. This
project is also known as the Nabucco project. With this pipeline Europe
hopes to reduce its dangerous energy dependence on Russia. But the
May 12 agreement between Moscow and Turkmenistan gave a crushing blow
to the prospects of a new Trans Caspian energy project and further
to Washington and to Brussels. If implemented, the Russian-Turkmen
deal can effectively kill the Nabucco project.
During self-isolationist Niyazov’s rule Russia successfully managed
to maintain the monopoly over the transportation and purchase of
Turkmen natural gas. Niyazov approached Beijing and Washington to
find new markets and transport routes to China and South Asia (some
say this was just a show to gain more leverage with Russians over the
price of gas.) The absence of valid pipelines prevented his country
from making a breakthrough, leaving it dependent on Russia. However,
he raised the price of gas for the Kremlin from $66 per thousand
cubic meters to $100 in September 2006. Nevertheless, through
various agreements signed between Moscow and Ashgabat in 2003 and
2006 the Kremlin maintained unimpaired access to cheap Turkmen gas,
reselling it in Europe for an almost threefold higher price. The May
12 agreement further cements Russia’s monopoly over Turkmen natural
gas resources and its transportation routes.
Russia had a few setbacks lately in Central Asia. In April of this year
Uzbekistan signed an agreement with China to build a pipeline with a
capacity of 30 billion cubic meters per year. This amount equals half
of Uzbekistan’s annual gas production. Nevertheless, there are several
hurdles to be overcome: first, building a new pipeline; second, finding
a transit country for landlocked Uzbekistan and last, but not the least
Uzbekistan needs to increase its own annual gas production to be able
to export 30 billion cubic meters of gas after domestic consumption.
In April of this year Tajikistan announced the collapse of $1 billion
deal with Russian aluminum concern OAO Rusal because they failed
to build the new hydropower plant known as Rogun Dam. The company
also scaled back its efforts to modernize the huge aluminum plant in
Tursunzade. Tashkent appears to be turning to Iran for help. However,
Iran, in the face of the fierce stand-off with the West over its
nuclear proliferation program, seems highly unlikely to challenge
Russia’s economic or political influence in any parts of Central Asia,
especially, when Tehran badly needs Moscow’s anti-Western voice at
UN Security Council to prevent Iran’s full international isolation.
Despite all the minor setbacks Russia is unquestionably enjoying a much
greater political, economic and military influence in Central Asia than
it did two to three years ago. In the last few years Russia intensively
and successfully worked through two regional organizations-The
Eurasian Economic Commonwealth (EEC) and the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO)-to tighten Moscow’s political-economic
and military grip on Central Asia. The EEC, consisting of Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Belarus, focuses on multi-layer
economic integration. The CSTO, including the same countries, plus
Armenia, deals with regional military-security concerns. Both of
these organizations are heavily dominated by the Kremlin.
Moscow actively worked through another regional security organization,
called Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). It includes China,
Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The CSO
is entirely dominated by Russia and China. It came into existence
in 2001 as a vehicle to counter America’s then rising influence in
Central Asia. However, it is highly unlikely that Russia will share
influence with China in the region. The Kremlin merely used (and
quite successfully uses) China’s increasing might to reduce Western
influence in Central Asia.
Moscow has repeatedly made clear through its actions and declarations
that Russia’s sole goal is to seal off post-Soviet Central Asia from
any foreign political, economic and military influence and integrate it
into a Moscow dominated new "Eurasian Union". This indeed is the grand
project-idea widely entertained by high ranking Russian geostrategic
planners and policy makers.
The South Caucasus
Russia has been equally aggressive on its southern flank in the
Caucasus. Moscow managed to further increase its already overwhelming
influence in Armenia. It upgraded the Russian military base in Giumry,
in the northern part of the country and successfully completed
the process of acquiring Armenia’s power distribution network in
September 2006. The Russian energy monopoly RAO UES already owns
most of Armenian hydroelectric plants and manages the finances of the
nuclear power station in Metsamor. In addition, the Kremlin controlled
Gasprom is Armenia’s single gas provider. Russian gas generates 40%
of Armenia’s electricity, another 40% coming from Russian controlled
Metsamor. Gasprom also owns the country’s biggest thermal plant.
In November 2006 the giant Russian mobile phone operator
Vimpel-Communications bought 90% of the shares in Armenia’s national
telecommunications company, ArmenTel, from the Greek firm OTE.
In April 2007 Moscow announced joint uranium excavation venture of
Armenia’s uranium reserves, which is scheduled to begin later in this
year. Yerevan also agreed to join the International Uranium Enrichment
Center, located in Irkutsk region of Russia.
Some Armenian experts express their deep concern over Moscow’s
suffocating influence in all spheres of the country’s life. However,
this doesn’t change the overall picture. The nation remains bound to
Moscow to such degree that it leaves even President Putin satisfied.
During one of his meetings with Armenian President Robert Kocharian
(in February 2007, after the Russian takeover of the Armenian power
grid) he half happily and half ironically declared that "there is no
issue which can not be solved between Armenia and Russia".
The Kremlin kept Yerevan under close watch to make sure that the piping
of the new Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline (that opened in March 2007,
transporting gas into Armenia) was small in diameter. Thus Moscow
prevented Iran and Armenia from exporting gas to other countries and
avoided international competition with Russian Gasprom.
In contrast to Armenia, neighboring Azerbaijan drifted away from
Russia and closer to the United States and NATO alliance. In 2006
Moscow attacked Azerbaijan, threatening to increase gas prices
twofold. Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev defied the Kremlin and
on his part threatened to stop the export of gas from Russia to
Azerbaijan and the import of oil from Azerbaijan to Russia. In 2005
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became operational, transporting
Azerbaijani oil via Georgia and Turkey to the West. In 2006 the
Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum pipeline went into operation. It significantly
increased the political weight and strategic importance of Azerbaijan,
brought it closer to the West and reduced Russian influence in the
South Caucasus. Nevertheless, Moscow effectively kept the Karabakh
conflict frozen, with a large portion of Baku’s political and
diplomatic resources chained to the issue. The Kremlin also succeeded
in maintaining its lease on an anti-Missile radar facility in the
northern Azerbaijani city of Gabala. Realizing Azerbaijan’s huge
importance as an energy rich country, with a highly geostrategic
location in Caucasus and in the Caspian basin, the Kremlin doesn’t
(and will not) spare its efforts to bring Baku back under Moscow’s
influence. So there will be ever increasing pressure applied from
Moscow towards Azerbaijan in the coming months or even years,
if necessary.
Pro-Western Georgia has been the Kremlin’s main target in southern
Caucasus. Russia fully realizes the huge significance of Georgia. If
it regains influence over the country Moscow kills two birds with
one stone: it gets direct land access to its satellite Armenia and
neutralizes increasingly anti-Russian Azerbaijan, which heavily relies
on Georgia to transport its abundant gas and oil resources to the
West. Moscow has been doing everything it can to bend Georgia and
Mikhail Saakashvili’s pro-Western government to its will. Russia
heightened tensions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the Armenian
populated Javakheti region in southern Georgia; sponsored and
organized pro-Russian political groups to create social protests and
undermine the government; supported anti-government armed revolt of
Georgian warlord Emzar Kvitsiani in western Georgia; banned Georgian
wines and mineral waters from Russian markets; raised gas price
threefold; cut off all air and land connections with the country
and deported hundreds of Georgian immigrants from Russia. However,
Saakashvili turned out to be a hard stone for Moscow to break. He
managed to accelerate significant political, economic and military
reforms in the country. He brought Georgia even closer to the West
and to its goal of integration in NATO and eventually into the
European Union. Saakashvili’s administration, with Western support,
succeeded in starting the withdrawal of Russian military bases from
Georgia. The Russian Army will leave the country entirely by the end
of 2008. The opening of Baku-Batumi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (in 2005)
and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline (in 2006) strengthened
Georgia’s national security and regional and international position.
However, besides many successes achieved in the nation-building
process in the last several years, Georgia’s future is not entirely
certain. Moscow doesn’t seem ready to retreat: it is lobbying hard in
European capitals (using its energy clout) against NATO membership
for Georgia, simultaneously subjecting the nation to almost daily,
heavy political and economic blackmail.
Western Frontline
Russia has been similarly aggressive on its geopolitical frontline
in post-Soviet Europe. After the humiliation of the Ukraine’s 2004
presidential elections, Moscow worked hard to contain and reverse
the Orange Revolution. First, in winter of 2005 Russia heavily hit
the country by doubling natural gas prices (gas raw that caused
a disruption of gas supplies to Europe). Then, the well-organized
and well financed Ukraine’s pro-Russian "Party of Regions" based
on Russian speaking voters in the country’s east, gained a vital
33% in Ukraine’s March 2006 parliamentary elections. The formerly
disgraced Victor Yanukovich (the leader of the "Party of Regions"
and the loser of disputed 2004 presidential elections) was catapulted
into the position of Prime-Minister. Since then, he effectively halted
the country’s integration process into NATO. Profound disagreements
between President Yushenko’s and his pro-Russian Prime-Minister’s
policies’ resulted in the dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament
in April 2007 and plunged the country into a deep political crisis,
that continues to be filled with uncertainty. In addition, by issuing
clear threats to the territorial integrity of the Ukraine, Russia’s
Ministry of Defense succeeded in maintaining its naval military
facilities on the Black Sea coast.
In December 2006 Moscow forced its closest post-Soviet ally Belarus
(after a brief and unsuccessful resistance from Minsk) to pay an
increased price on Russian gas from $44 per thousand cubic meters to
$100. The agreement envisaged further increases in gas price to match
European prices by the year 2011. Authoritarian, isolated and highly
dependent on Russia Belarus is painlessly managed by the Kremlin.
Moscow has kept the country under its grip, regardless of the hike
in gas prices.
Moldova came under Russian geopolitical attack also after the Orange
and Rose revolutions. The country’s President Vladimir Voronin (a
former Communist, who led the Communist Party when he was elected
president) joined leaders of the Ukraine, Georgia, Poland and Baltic
countries in the "Community of Democratic Choice". His administration
announced a pro-Western foreign policy course. The Kremlin increased
gas price for Moldova twofold, to $170 per thousand cubic meters.
This was followed by economic sanctions, banning Moldova’s main
export products, wine and meat from Russian markets. In November 2006
Moscow lifted sanctions to soften Chisanau’s stance against Russia’s
membership in the World Trade Organization.
Moscow, secretly from the USA and European Union, gradually developed
a plan which should bring impoverished Moldova back under Russia’s
wing. The Kremlin’s plan evolved around Transdniestria (in Russian
called Prednestrovia), a tiny piece of land on the eastern bank of
river Dniester. The region, after a brief but bloody armed conflict
in 1991, with Russia’s direct military and financial help, broke away
from Moldova. Ever since, Russian troops maintain their presence
there. The region is run by the gang of shady Russian businessmen,
KGB officers and military personal. Since secession Transdniestria
has turned into Europe’s black hole, engaged in a variety of illegal
activities ranging from the smuggling of chicken meat to Ukraine,
to arms trade, human and drug trafficking.
Moscow offered the following plan to Moldova: Chisinau should
recognize separatist Transdniestria as a legal political entity
and its ruling Russian gang as its legitimate government. Both, the
Moldovan parliament and Supreme Council of Dransdniestria, should be
dissolved. New elections should be called which would grant 19 seats
out of 101 to representatives from the breakaway region. Vice-Premier
of Moldova and Deputy-Ministers in every Ministry of the country
should be from Transdniestria. Russian troops would gradually leave
Transdniestria’s territory on the condition that Moldova would
permanently maintain its "neutrality" by refusing to enter any
Euro-Atlantic organization or alliance. In other words Russia was
"giving up" Transdniestria and in return was catapulting the separatist
region’s shady ruling gang into Moldova’s mainstream politics.
Needless to say, if this is agreed to, Russia would painlessly extend
its influence over Moldova’s entire political system.
This plan was revealed by one Munich based Western political analyst
and it shook Washington and Brussels. As some news suggested in the
beginning, Moldovan President Voronin seemed supportive of the plan.
It appears that sharply negative Western reaction put the plan on
hold for now. However, it is unclear how long impoverished Moldova
will stand out against the Russian geopolitical assault.
Recent massive unrest in Estonia has been one more clear indication of
Moscow’s growing clout. No other NATO and European Union member state
had been so heavily destabilized by Moscow after the collapse of the
Soviet Union. In April of this year the Estonian government relocated
a Soviet era World War II memorial from the center of Tallinn to the
city’s international military cemetery. The monument was considered a
symbol of the Soviet occupation by Estonians (by many called a symbol
of the "unknown rapist"). It caused great controversy between local
Estonians and ethnic Russians after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Kremlin effectively used the removal of the memorial to activate
Estonia’s 300,000 ethnic Russian community (or 25% of Estonia’s
whole 1.3million population). Moscow successfully portrayed the
relocation of the monument as a blasphemous act, aimed to insult the
Russian soldier and Russians in general. Thousands of ethnic Russian
protestors smashed and looted stores in the Estonian capital Tallinn
(one ethnic Russian was killed, allegedly stabbed by another looter).
They attacked the city’s main theater and the Academy of Arts,
chanting insulting remarks against Estonia, the country where they
live. As it turns out the protests were not spontaneous at all.
Estonian security services revealed that Russian community activists
periodically met with Russian embassy officials in Tallinn’s various
neighborhoods prior to the removal of the monument. Soon Russia cut off
all air, land and energy links with Estonia. Pro-Kremlin Russian youth
organizations attacked the Estonian embassy in Moscow throwing stones,
eggs and paint. They ripped down the flag and threatened to destroy
the embassy building. In the days following Estonia experienced an
unprecedented cyber attack from thousands of hackers around the world
that effectively paralyzed the country’s entire internet system, on
which high tech Estonia’s economy and government depends. Estonians,
Western observers and NATO’s IT specialists agree that the cyber
attack was masterminded by the Kremlin.
By these actions Russia achieved several goals: first, it activated
and mobilized Estonia’s 300,000 ethnic Russians. Second, it drew them
closer to Moscow, creating a formidable pro-Moscow force almost in the
form of a fifth column within a NATO member-nation. Third, it sent a
powerful message to all post-Communist and Russian weary states of
Eastern Europe that no country is safe from Russia’s geopolitical
onslaughts regardless of their membership in NATO and the European
Union.
Conclusion
Russia lost a great deal of influence in 1990’s and then in the
first years of the new millennia, following the American invasion of
Afghanistan and Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions in countries of
the former Soviet Union. However, Putin’s Russia never gave up its
hegemonic aspirations. But Moscow also realized that economically
week Russia, with a disastrous war still going in Chechnya, couldn’t
afford an ambitious foreign policy. Putin’s Russia rose quietly
and gradually. After the September 11 attacks, Putin agreed to let
Americans establish military bases in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan. In fact Russia could do very little to stop Washington
at that time. However, in exchange Russia got a free hand in Chechnya.
By 2004-2005 Moscow basically crushed the Chechen rebellion killing
the main Chechen field commanders. At the same time the Kremlin
consolidated Russia’s entire energy sector in the state’s hands,
sending disobedient oligarchs to jails or exile. Moscow gradually
acquired about 30%-40% of Europe’s energy markets and unfolded a
large scale geopolitical counter-offensive in the countries of the
former Soviet Union.
Russia’s tactics were basically the same against post-Soviet states:
Moscow allies with semi-authoritarian, corrupt, stagnant and isolated
regimes (Uzbekistan, Belarus, Tajikistan) guaranteeing their survival
in exchange for their obedience to Moscow. Under the banner of
keeping stability in a country and in a wider region Russia poses
as a policeman, supporting regimes militarily in case of domestic
turbulence. Then Russia establishes (or expands already existing)
military presence in a country, tightly chaining a nation’s military
complex to its own (Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan).
Simultaneously Russian state monopolies move in on a country,
establishing their dominance on a nation’s energy resources
(Turkmenistan), energy infrastructure (Armenia, Tajikistan) and their
transportation routes (Kazakhstan). In the beginning, the Kremlin
backed Russian companies promise many investments, not only in energy
sector but also in other sectors of economy, such as telecom, tourism,
transportation. However, Moscow never invests enough (or any) capital
to make meaningful change. It merely chains local economies to its own,
guarantees its dominance, prevents international economic competition
and leaves local societies frustrated and impoverished (Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Armenia).
Against pro-Western post-Soviet countries Russia deploys various
tactics: supports shady separatist regimes (against Moldova, Georgia,
Azerbaijan); cuts off gas supplies and astronomically raises prices
(Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan); applies economic sanctions
(Moldova, Georgia); manipulates elections in cooperation with local
corrupt and criminal elites (Ukraine); detonates local pro-Russian
or Russian forces (Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia).
Today Russia is not the world’s strongest country, but it definitely
is the strongest power in the former Soviet Union. It had some
setbacks and failures in the last few years but overall Moscow is
in a much stronger position than it was 4-5 years ago. The Kremlin’s
geopolitical successes were contributed to by the instability in the
Middle East, high energy prices, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and not
enough activity from the European Union in the nations of the former
Soviet Union.
Today Russia represents the single biggest threat to the national
sovereignty and security of post-Soviet states. Moscow’s goal is
not a mere dominance in the region. Russian strategic planners and
policy makers have made it amply clear that the Kremlin wants to
bring the whole former Soviet landmass under the Russian dominated
"Eurasian Union". Moscow’s new KGB run regime has political will,
determination and aggressiveness to do just that. As long as America
continues to be bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan and Europe shows
timidity in confronting new Russian neo-imperialism, the Kremlin will
find it less and less difficult to achieve its goals. Undoubtedly,
there are very hard days ahead of those former Soviet countries which
really care for their freedom and future.
Vasili Rukhadze is New York based Georgian political analyst. He
holds Masters Degree in Political Science from the City University
of New York. He is the author of multiple articles, with the focus
on Caucasus, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia. Currently he is
working on the project about the role of Caucasus and Ukraine in the
West’s energy security. Contact vrukhadze@aol.comThis e-mail address is
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Last Updated ( Wednesday,
30 May 2007 )