POLITIZATION OF THE MENACE POSED BY LANDMINES IS UNACCEPTABLE
by Mamuka Gachechiladze
Translated by A. Ignatkin
Source: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 28, 2007, p. 16
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
May 30, 2007 Wednesday
Lack of information on threats costs people lives
PROBLEM OF LANDMINES IN GEORGIA; An update on the problem antipersonnel
mines pose in Georgia.
Most landmines on the territory of Georgia are in conflict areas.
Even in the relatively tranquil regions, however, landmines and
blind shells constitute a grave danger. Landmines around the still
functioning or abandoned Russian military objects pose a threat to
the locals’ life and limbs as well. According to the Defense Ministry
of Georgia, Russia withheld information on minefields or the location
of other high explosives when it was turning over its military bases
to the Georgian military.
Surveys and assessments appraise the problem at hand as limited or
minimal. Landmines meanwhile are frequently discovered on territories
adjacent to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and on the Dagestani, Chechen,
and Ingushetian parts of the Georgian-Russian border.
Georgian state officials maintain that the country has never made,
exported, or imported antipersonnel mines in all the years of
sovereignty. What Georgia inherited from the Soviet Union is regarded
as a small number of antipersonnel mines but how many exactly is
anybody’s guess. A moratorium on the use of antipersonnel landmines
has been in force in Georgia since September 1996.
The frequency of emergencies is one of the criteria of evaluating the
danger posed by landmines and blind shells. Thirty-one landmine and
explosive devices of other types were triggered in Georgia between
the second half of 2006 and April 2007. Official statistical data on
the noncombatants who perished or were maimed in these explosions are
not compiled by the Georgian state. ICBL GC (Georgian Committee of the
International Campaign to Ban Landmines) alone bothers to compile the
data, but even what it ends up with is not complete because the warring
sides are extremely uncooperative. Constant political speculations
and mutual accusations in the meantime make the compilation of hard
information even more difficult.
There is one other difficulty that should be taken into
consideration. There is no national agency in Georgia responsible
for the coordination of the actions in connection with landmines. The
Defense Ministry is responsible for landmine defusing in the areas of
hostilities and in military bases, while the Interior Ministry is in
charge when the matter concerns settlements, highways, and railroads.
Sources from the office of the president of Georgia announced in
May 2005 that a crisis center was to be formed under the aegis of
the National Security Council and that it would include a department
responsible for the landmine police, the evaluation of needs in this
sphere, and efficiency of defusing efforts.
The situation in the area of the Tskhinvali armed conflict is
particularly problematic. OSCE representatives said in May 2005 that
peacekeepers were surveying the terrain to make maps of minefields.
Georgian officials believe that all major minefields have been
mapped already, but point out that OSCE observers keep gathering
data on the likely minefields and tragic incidents. ICBL GC regularly
brings the matter of landmines and high explosives to the attention of
Tbilisi, the actual authorities running the region, and international
organizations. It is noncombatants gathering wood in the forests and
children who usually fall victim to landmines. The ICBL GC keeps
badgering structures (national and international, recognized and
denied recognition) to take adequate measures both in conflict areas
and throughout Georgia. Unfortunately, the problem is inevitably made
political, and negotiations over it are essentially political too.
All of that impairs the process of defusing, which means that other
measures are desperately and urgently needed.
Engineering reconnaissance of the territories is needed, preferably
with help from international organizations. Experts agree that the
establishment of a joint Georgian-Ossetian bomb disposal squad is
needed (in cooperation with peacekeepers, that is) for the optimal
solution of the problem in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict area. As
a matter of fact, there is certain experience in humanitarian bomb
disposal in the southern part of the Caucasus to draw on. Seventy
US instructors ran training courses for Georgian, Azerbaijani, and
Armenian military specialists in Krtsanisi not far from Tbilisi in
September 2000.
Before getting to defusing itself, however, some serious work should
be organized with the population of the areas in question and with
military contingents quartered there. Defusing and humanitarian
defusing are different procedures. What we need is humanitarian
defusing, and the distinction is vital.
When the OSCE mission and other international organizations state
that they have humanitarian defusing capacity, it is necessary first
and foremost to inform the population of the existing danger.
Humanitarian defusing takes time. If the program suggested by the
ICBL GC is accepted and initiated, the information campaign which is
really a must may begin without delay.
It should also be added that Georgia is not yet a signatory of the
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty but supports the global ban on the use
of antipersonnel mines. Moreover, it has voted "aye" on all annual
resolutions of the UN General Assembly banning antipersonnel mines
ever since 1996. In may 2005, Georgy Dolidze of the Foreign Ministry
announced that the matter of subscription to the Antipersonnel Mine
Ban Treaty was being reconsidered after the Rose Revolution, i.e.
that it would be signed.
Mamuka Gachechiladze is ICBL GC Executive Director, researcher for
and author of the annual Landmine Monitor, Georgia report since 2000.