This is an English translation of the interview published in Russian by
REGNUM News Agency on May 30, 2007 ().

Armenia cannot constantly "bluff" in the regional geopolitical game:
interview by Armen Ayvazyan

Interview by Armen Ayvazyan, Doctor of Political Sciences, Director of the
"Ararat" Center for Strategic Research ()

REGNUM: After the May elections in Armenia the authorities have
succeeded to further strengthen their positions internally and, it
seems, to gain a free hand in the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. How would you then explain the unprecedented harsh statement
of 28 May 2007 () by the
leading Armenian internet-resources, who represent a rather serious
contingent of active and professional part of the Armenian society?

During the pre-election campaign the problem of Artsakh
(Nagorno-Karabakh – REGNUM) and the liberated territory of Armenia
(the regions around Nagorno-Karabkh currently under Armenian control
are implied – REGNUM) were practically left out from the
discourse. Almost all parties side-stepped this question, at best
offering banal, declarative and vague formulas about the necessity of
achieving the conflict’s settlement by the way of "mutual concessions"
and the like and so on. Meanwhile, during a brief period after the
elections the rhetoric about the surrender of the liberated territory
to Azerbaijan has sharply galvanized. The announcements have been made
on the level of the co-chairmen of the OSCE’s Minsk Group, to leave
aside the victorious proclamations by Azerbaijan’s highest
dignitaries, about reaching agreements on factual capitulation of
Yerevan and its readiness to surrender six or even all seven districts
of the former Azerbaijani SSR. Rather than being categorically and
unequivocally refuted by official Yerevan, at times these discussions
have been receiving direct and indirect approval in the statements by
Foreign and Defense Ministers of Armenia about the inevitability of
"painful concessions" as well as in Yerevan’s frequent speechlessness,
which many interpret as tacit consent. All of this compounded with the
secrecy of the negotiations is generating great concern in Armenian
society about the fate of the liberated territory, that is – about
their very own security.

REGNUM: What is the value of these territories for the Armenian society?

The liberation of Armenian territories around the former
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast has been generally viewed as a
military necessity – the only means of suppressing the Azerbaijani
launching points in 1991-1994. This explanation, reflecting the field
situation during the Artsakh war, is absolutely correct in a military
sense; nevertheless, it is not comprehensive and, consequently, is
deficient in several aspects.

Chronologically, this lone explanation corresponds to the strategic
thinking of the Armenian leaders in the early 1990s. They refused to
recognize several other components of the Karabakh conflict, in
particular, they were ignoring the incompatibility of
Armenian-Turkish-Azerbaijani strategic interests in the foreseeable
future; believing that the role of history in international politics
is anachronistic (an outdated reality); naively perceiving the
developed countries of the West as unbiased mediators and omnipotent
guarantors of security, at the same time perceiving the development of
the international political system as a uni-linear progressive
movement in the direction of ‘general well-being and freedom’.

This worldview was in many aspects erroneous and vulnerable, because
it viewed the problem of the liberated territory as alien to and in
isolation from the Armenian Question. While the essence of the
Armenian Question has been and remains in the creation of viable
political and territorial conditions for the Armenian people to live
freely and independently on their native soil of the Armenian
Highland. There is only one solution to the Armenian Question – to
restore Armenian statehood if not in the entirety of Armenia (350,000
sq/km), then at least on a substantial piece of it, such that safe and
long term existence and development of Armenian civilization can be
secured. In other words, the Armenian Question is about the security
of the Armenian nation, and it requires the provision of two
prerequisites: The first is the creation of comprehensive and strong
statehood, and the second is the territorial guarantees fortifying the
security and viability of that statehood.

The experience of independent existence in the last decade and a half
proves that Armenia has managed to survive only thanks to establishing
of its control over the 42,000 sq/km of native Armenian land. This
territory is that minimally necessary area with fairly natural
boundaries which provides for the security of modern Armenia
(including the Republic of Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic). Armenian statehood will hardly be capable to survive, let
alone develop successfully, on a smaller territory.

Hence, the liberated territory is a guarantee of geopolitical weight
and international authority of modern Armenia. It is a precondition
for its military, water, food, energy, psychological, and, in the near
future, demographic security. It is a part of the Armenian homeland in
terms of history, cultural heritage and physical geography. The
liberated territory is the means for restoring the historically
traumatized psyche of the Armenians. It is a medium for the true
meaning of Armenia. Finally, the liberated territory is a just, though
minimal, compensation for the Armenian territorial, cultural, material
and human losses and sufferings caused by the Turkish and Azerbaijani
genocides, a compensation which has been attained by Armenian blood.

REGNUM:So, what is the formula of the settlement? And why is it so
unacceptable for the Armenian public?

The available information suggests that Armenia and Azerbaijan, upon
the mediation of the co-chairmen of the Minsk Group, work over a one
or two page document on the main principles of settlement. These
principles include the following: during the first phase of the
`settlement’ the Armenian forces withdraw from the liberated
territory, except for the Kashatagh region (the Lachin corridor); a
multi-national peacekeeping force enters the conflict region, then its
re-settlement by the Azerbaijanis is organized. During the second
stage, the Kashatagh region is being gradually passed over to the
control of peacekeepers, and, then, according to official Baku,
Kashatagh and also Shushi are to be re-inhabited by the Azerbaijani
population. In 10-15 years a referendum is held on the future status
of Artsakh, which, as Baku states, will be held on the whole territory
of Azerbaijan and will in any case respect the "territorial integrity"
of Azerbaijan in the traditional meaning of this concept held by Baku.

Obviously, these principles are so far off from the legitimate demands
of the Armenian side that they can effectively never be accepted. They
had been already rejected once in 1996-1997. However, the
aforementioned document on the principles of the settlement may be
drawn up by using as blurred and ambiguous terms as to allow Yerevan
and Baku to interpret it each in their own ways.

Here is precisely the major menace for the Armenian side, since the
single clearly defined provision in this document will demand the
withdrawal of Armenian troops.

There also exists a widely held opinion that the Armenian authorities,
in an attempt to outmaneuver their adversaries, create a favorable
image in the eyes of the mediators and escape international isolation,
imitate the seriousness of their intentions in the negotiations and
play ‘diplomatic poker’ with Baku, hoping or being confident that Baku
itself will reject the proposed portfolio of settlement, as it has
happened more than once.

REGNUM: But perhaps imitation in the negotiations is a successful
tactic by Armenia? So far, Azerbaijan has adopted a principle of
"everything or nothing", thereby affording Armenia the chance to
preserve the status quo.

Even if we consider this an imitation of negotiations (unfortunately
we don’t have enough evidence to be sure here), such imitation
seriously undermines Armenian interests.

First of all, the constant propaganda by the first political
dignitaries of the Republic of Armenia about the inevitability of
making territorial concessions infects the Armenian public with
defeatism, undermines the national victorious spirit among the
Armenians and the Armenian army, and does so on the threshhold of
possible Azerbaijani further aggression. In the meantime, a
significant portion of the Armenian bureaucracy, as well as those
young people who aspire for careers in public service, in the absence
of any other official position, fully trust the rhetoric uttered by
those at the top of the bureaucratic pyramid regarding the proposed
settlement of the conflict, and they themselves take on the baton of
propagating the concessions, thus reinforcing the defeatist moods even
further.

Second, the prolonged imitation of negotiations by Yerevan about the
readiness to make concessions on the one hand, and Baku’s
uncompromising stance on the other, involuntarily condition and
persuade the Azeri public opinion as well as the international
community that the only possible option for resolution is the
withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces from the liberated territory –
i.e., the capitulation of the Armenian side.

Third, suchlike imitation sends out incorrect signals to the big
international actors engaged in the conflict (in the capacity of third
parties or mediators) about the true positions and demands of the
Armenian side. Armenia cannot constantly bluff in the regional
geopolitical game with such big players as the U.S., Russia and the
EU. Such diplomatic gambles are rather transparent and doomed to be
revealed, which could bring extremely unpleasant consequences for the
gambler himself.

Fourth, such a game weakens the negotiating positions of the Armenian
side, debilitating one’s own position while, conversely, elevating the
expectations and demands of the opponent. We faced an identical
situation in 1996-1997. A passage I wrote about that period fully
corresponds to today’s unfavorable situation: "The latest studies on
the theory and practice of negotiations have demonstrated that if one
of the negotiating parties (in our case – Armenia) adopts a soft and
compromising stance, conducting a so-called "friendly bargaining",
while the other party (in this case – Azerbaijan) takes an extremely
hard stance or "hard bargaining", then initiative and advantage always
lies with the latter. At the end, some agreements may be reached but
these will undoubtedly be in favor of the hard bargainer. But the most
important consequence is that such agreements do not solve the
problem, often leading to the resumption of the conflict.

REGNUM: And what can be said about the implementation of the document
about the principles of settlement?

Even if such a document is signed, it cannot be implemented as long as
a "Big Treaty", which should elaborate all the details, is not
concluded. But the latter cannot be concluded and ratified for a long
period to come, because the settlement of the Karabakh conflict
depends on specific details, rather than on clarification of the
general principles. In conflicts of this type, each and every single
seemingly miniscule detail is of the utmost importance.

For example, where the Armenian or the Azeri post will be stationed –
on this or that side of the hill – can play the same role in the
conflict as, say, the proclamation of the most important legal fact –
the future political status of Artsakh. Moreover, it is my strong
belief that in the Karabakh conflict the real power factors are far
more important than the pure legal elements. No legal document can
provide the Armenian side with the security guarantees equivalent to
land and territory. Even if, in the best case scenario, Azerbaijan
does recognize the independence of Artsakh (though Baku doesn’t want
to even hear about it), such recognition will be merely a "paper"
element. The moment after conceding the liberated territory to the
enemy, Artsakh, as well as Syunik (the southernmost region of the
Republic of Armenia – REGNUM) will, in military sense, find themselves
in an undefendable situation () and
could be destroyed by a short-term Azerbaijani military offensive
(here it is apt to recall the fall of Serbian Craina). The conceding
of territory will not exclude the probability of war but, enticing
Baku’s appetite, will rather create conditions for Azerbaijan to
resume the war from the most favorable positions. Let us also remember
that Azerbaijan, with the disguised encouragement and support of its
ally Turkey, is yearning for and planning the destruction of Armenia
in its entirety.

In any case, both the signing and implementation of the "Big Treaty"
will be hindered not only by the difficulties in finding compromises
in the details, but also by the internal political problems in Armenia
and Azerbaijan, the interference by great and regional powers, various
possible provocations, as well as the resistance by the people and
leadership of Artsakh and the patriotic constituency within the
Armenian public.

Thus, the question of the "Big Treaty" will remain unresolved, but a
document on the principles of the settlement, if signed, will
legitimize Baku’s demands in the international arena and will hang
upon Armenia’s security as a "sword of Damocles". Consequently, the
signing of a document on the principles of the settlement requiring
the withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the liberated territory in
itself immediately jeopardizes Armenia’s national security in a
short-term context.

In the long run, the Karabakh conflict will be resolved in favour of
Armenia or Azerbaijan not at the negotiating table but as a result of
relative successes of these rival states in their respective
state-building processes. It is precisely this paramount challenge –
building a militarily and economically viable Armenian state – that
predetermines the fate of the liberated territory as an absolute and
inalienable strategic asset for Armenia and all Armenians.