Balkanalysis.com, AZ
June 9 2007
Turkey’s Parliamentary Elections and the Long-Debated Cross Border
Operation into Iraq
6/9/2007 (Balkanalysis.com)
By Mehmet Kalyoncu
The timing of the Turkish army’s dramatic, though long expected,
military move against the PKK across the Iraqi border has some
suspecting that there is more than exigency behind the bold
offensive. Considering that the pivotal Turkish parliamentary
elections are due next month, is not the northern Iraq offensive
really all about channeling the surging `patriotism’ of the
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) to erode votes from the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) of candidate and prime minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan?
Ever since the Turkish military’s digital intervention with the
civilian administration on April 27th, there has been no shortage of
political crises, each one causing the democratic process in the
country to falter. The generals’ e-memorandum followed the halted
parliamentary voting for president out of which the Republican
People’s Party (CHP) managed to produce a regime threat. Then came
the military’s insistence for an immediate cross-border operation
against the Kurdish PKK camps in Northern Iraq, which is nowadays
pronounced to possibly deal with the Barzani government as well.
At the same time, Turkey has gone into pre-election mode, and those
parties who are bashing the AKP government for its alleged inability
to deal with the most severe national security threat, most notably
the MHP), now the main contender, have boosted their popular support.
The phenomenon of politically expedient MHP nationalism has much less
to do with the PKK or the so-called independent Kurdish state than it
does with the parliamentary elections of July 22.
Secular vs. Islamist – OUT / Islamist vs. Nationalist – IN
For a long time, Turkish society was easily split and polarized along
the lines of the secular-minded vs. the Islamists. However, the AK
Party’s record over the last four and a half years has changed the
whole equation, thereby making it less possible, if not impossible,
to identify an Islamist counterpart or threat against the secular
regime of the Republic.
This record has been noted by Western observers as well. `Mr.
Erdogan’s government has been Turkey’s most successful in half a
century,’ argued the Economist in May. `After years of macroeconomic
instability, growth has been steady and strong, inflation has been
controlled and foreign investment has shot up. Even more impressive
are the judicial and constitutional reforms that the AK government
has pushed through. Corruption remains a blemish, but there is no
sign of the government trying to overturn Turkey’s secular order. The
record amply justifies Mr. Erdogan’s biggest achievement: to persuade
the EU to open membership talks, over 40 years after a much less
impressive Turkey first expressed its wish to join.’1
Nevertheless, ethnic Turkish vs. Kurdish nationalism fomented by the
surge of PKK activities in the southeastern border of Turkey still
provides fertile ground to polarize the country and evenly split the
electoral vote. Given the hitherto conciliatory attitude of the
mildly Islamist AK Party towards the secular establishment, its
unprecedented economic and political successes, and finally its
deliberate effort to avoid hot button issues such as the wearing of
the head scarf depleted options for many in the ultra-secular circles
to attack the AK Party.
Nevertheless, the PKK question and the possibility, perceived as a
looming threat, of an independent Kurdish state have always been the
weak spot of the AK Party, whose very legitimacy both at home and
abroad is pretty much dependent on its continuous commitment to the
EU and the United States- both of which seem profoundly allergic to
any sort of cross-border military operation by the Turkish military.
Therefore, the matter of dealing (or not dealing) with those two
imminent threats is literally the only ground on which the AK Party
government’s popular prestige could be undermined.
A less effective, but not totally ignorable, issue to be exploited is
that of corruption. Yet given all the other parties’ records on
corruption, it would be futile to attack the AK government with such
allegations. It would in fact prove ineffective, especially so for
the Nationalist Action Party, whose former minister has recently been
sentenced with the highest corruption charges in the Republic’s
history.
When it comes to exploiting popular sentiment over the Kurdish
secessionist issue, however, the MHP has proven by far the most
suitable contender against the AK Party. In his public rallies, MHP
leader Devlet Bahceli frequently accuses the AKP government of being
sluggish and dependent on the United States and the European Union to
deal with the most severe national security threat, the PKK.2
Bahceli’s inflammatory and nationalistic speeches seem to be paying
off. Recent polls about the upcoming parliamentary elections and the
long debated cross-border military operation in Northern Iraq
indicate that the new fault lines of `Islamists vs. nationalists’
have already taken shape, rapidly closing the gap between the AKP and
MHP constituencies.
The Polls: Changing Numbers
Two recent online polls, conducted by Turkish polling groups
Turkiyesecimleri.com and Secimsonucu.com asked the participants to
identify which political party they would vote for in the upcoming
July 22 parliamentary elections, indicating a sharp increase in the
expected vote count for the MHP, a slight increase or decrease
respectively in the AK Party votes and an absolute decline in the
Republican People’s Party (CHP) votes.
According to the first poll, which surveyed some 159,897 people, the
top-three ranking is as follows: the AK Party (39.19%), the MHP (24.6
%), and then the CHP (12.72%). Compared to the November 3rd 2002
election results, which brought the AK Party into office with a
sweeping electoral majority (34.38%) while making the CHP have to be
content with 19.39% and leaving the MHP outside the parliament with
only 8.36% (below the 10 % threshold), the poll shows a plummeting in
the CHP votes whereas a sharp, almost incomprehensible, surge in the
MHP votes has been registered. The second poll, to which some 224,328
people responded, demonstrates the same pattern of change: the AK
Party in the lead at 32%, followed by the MHP with 21%, and finally
the CHP at 16%.
What can possibly explain this pattern? Why did not the decline in
the CHP votes, the main rival to the AKP, reflect as an increase in
votes for the latter? And what caused such a radical increase in the
popularity the MHP, which today offers essentially nothing more than
it ever has, and which could not even get into the parliament five
years ago?
The recent presidential election process, which was eventually
aborted and delayed until after the parliamentary elections, has in
fact been a political showdown between the AK Party and the CHP. The
latter’s extreme tactics, such as invoking military intervention to
halt the AKP majority parliament voting for the president, and making
it a matter of regime threat have alienated a substantial number of
its own constituency. These tactics have in fact also resulted in the
resignation of some of the party’s deputies. They have publicly
stated that the reason for their resignation was their party’s
anti-democratic attitude toward the presidential elections. The
public opinion polls were at the same time hinting that a growing
number of people from center left and center right parties were
gravitating toward the AK Party, thereby hinting that a second
reactionary vote explosion would almost double the AKP votes.
However, that old standard-bearer of nationalism, the MHP, has
instead emerged as a main contender to the incumbent AK Party, thanks
to leader Bahceli’s inflammatory speeches. They have played on
wounded pride among the Turkish people over the Iraq invasion and
resulting deterioration of the security situation in the border area,
and so fueled popular unrest against the AK Party government.
Essentially, the MHP leader is accusing the government of being a
mere puppet in the hands of the United States and the European Union,
unable or unwilling to assert itself to safeguard national security
against Kurdish insurrectionists.
An example of this rhetoric manifested in a recent rally speech in
the eastern Anatolian town of Erzurum, a place well known for the
strength of its nationalist sentiment. Bahceli urged PM Erdogan to
unleash the army in order to erect the Turkish flag at the top of
Mount Qandil, where the PKK terrorists are based in Northern Iraq.3
According to another poll carried out by the website
Turkiyesecimleri.com, to which some 10,211 people responded, 72.12%
of Turks support military intervention in Northern Iraq, while 13.42%
oppose it outright, A slightly higher figure (14.46%) prefer a
diplomatic solution. Simultaneous developments such as the
confrontation between Ankara and Iraqi Kurdish leader Barzani, the
AKP Government’s hopeless wait for action from the United States
against the PKK, and the surge in the MHP votes, show that fanning
the nationalistic sentiments against the AKP government who seem
sluggish to deal with the most imminent national security threat is
the best strategy to garner popular support nowadays.
It is hardly difficult to realize that neither can the Nationalist
Action Party win the elections simply by bashing the AK Party for its
failure to deal with the PKK, nor can the Republican People’s Party
(CHP) prevent the AK Party from retaining office by portraying it as
a major threat to the secular regime.
However, their concerted effort before the elections and in a future
parliamentary coalition after the election will dramatically curb the
AK Party’s ability to govern. The result will likely manifest itself
not only in a slowdown in the EU accession process, but also in a
more consistently aggressive attitude toward the Kurds of Northern
Iraq. In this equation the Turkmen minority of that region, whose
rights Turkey claims to be protecting, will also assume greater
importance.
What is at Stake for the AKP, the US and the EU?
Unless the United States and the European Union change their course
against the PKK and provide substantial assistance to the AKP
government to tackle the terrorist organization, Turkish democracy,
which has so far managed avoiding a repeat of the lively old
tradition of the military coup, will be exposed to a civilian one.
That is, the AK government will simply be punished by a sizeable
moderately nationalist vote at the ballot box, just because of its
compliance with the United States and the European Union, and its
seemingly sluggish approach to the national security threat.
No matter what will be considered as the reason for the AK Party
losing its mandate and Turkey returning back to the chronically
ineffective coalition governments that preceded this government, for
majority mainstream voters in Turkey and for the moderate majority in
the broader Muslim world, the reason for the democratic failure will
be simple: the United States and the European Union, whose support
for democratic change in the Muslim world is perceived simply as
shallow rhetoric. Jamal Khashoggi, editor of Saudi Arabia’s al-Watan
newspaper, says the Turkish experience has broader implications: `If
that experience fails,’ he writes, `it will be a setback for modern
Islamist movements and it will be a disaster for the western dream of
encouraging a secular form of Islam.’4
Certainly, there are and will be interest groups in both Washington
and Brussels whose primary objective is not to make sure a
sustainable democracy takes root in Turkey but to secure a government
in Ankara that would be more compliant with their narrow interests
than the AKP government has been. However, policy makers in both
capitals should act according to their respective country’s and
Union’s long-term interests. In his 1997 tome, The Grand Chessboard,
the veteran American diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski provided a
definitive account of how the United States’ and the European Union’s
long-term interests are tightly intertwined with sustainable
stability in Turkey: `Turkey’s evolution and orientation are likely
to be especially decisive for the Caucasian states. If Turkey
sustains its path to Europe – and if Europe does not close its doors
to Turkey – the states of the Caucasus are also likely to gravitate
into the European orbit, a prospect they fervently desire. But if
Turkey’s Europeanization grinds to a halt, for either internal or
external reasons, then Georgia and Armenia will have no choice but to
adapt to Russia’s inclinations.’5
Recent developments prove that Azerbaijan could also face a similar
fate. In complete disregard for what Baku has to say about it,
Russian President Vladimir Putin counter-proposed his American
counterpart George W. Bush’s proposal to install aEuropean missile
defense shield in a facility in Azerbaijan, which was built during
Soviet times, and is still available for Russia’s use under a
continuing agreement between Russia and Azerbaijan.6 Paralyzed with
its own chronic problems and likely to experience major blunders over
its EU accession with France’s Nicholas Sarkozy, Ankara is far from
recognizing the possible political and security implications of
Moscow’s growing influence in the region, let alone somehow being
able to counter it.
Finally, Ofra Bengio’s reminder about the background of the rising
National Action Party (MHP), whose supporters were active recently to
publish and distribute Metal Firtina, the fiction prophesizing a
major war between Turkey and the United States, hints at what we can
expect regarding the possible changes in the Turkish public opinion:
`[m]ost of the parties or groupings had in their background
anti-Semitic tendencies. This was especially true of the Republican
Peasants’ and National Party (Cumhuriyetci Koylu Millet Partisi,
CKMP), which later became the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), headed
by Alpaslan Turkes. In the 1930s the Turkish ultranationalists were
strongly influenced by Nazi propaganda, and anti-Semitism became one
of their trademarks… Hitler’s Mein Kampf was published and
extensively distributed by Turkish nationalists.’7
1 `Turkey: The Battle for Turkey’s Soul’, The Economist May 3rd 2007
available at
fm?story_id`16747
(accessed on June 6, 2007)
2 `Bahceli, AK Parti’ye yuklendi’, Zaman available at
rno=547628&keyfield=6465766C65742062616863656C 69
(accessed on June 5, 2007)
3 `Bahceli, AK Parti’ye yuklendi’, Zaman available at
rno=547628&keyfield=6465766C65742062616863656C 69
(accessed on June 5, 2007)
4 `Arab Islamists view Turkey crisis as test for democracy’,
Financial Times May 15 2007
5 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its
Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books 1997, p.149
6 `Russian President Putin proposes Azerbaijan for US missile defense
shield’, Today’s Zaman June 8 2007
7 Ofra Bengio, The Turkish-Israeli Relationship: Changing Ties of
Middle Eastern Outsiders, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, May 2004,
p.76
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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress