Palestine-Israel Journal
June 10 2007
East Jerusalem: 40 Years of Occupation
In discussions of Jerusalem’s future, the people are usually
forgotten or marginalized.
by Nazmi Ju’beh
In the many heated discussions about East Jerusalem’s political
future within the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the
focus is invariably the city’s holiness, its symbolic character, its
importance to Palestinians and Israelis and to the international
community. Therefore, most of the policies are oriented towards
objects, buildings, walls, history, sanctity, etc. The people
inhabiting the city, however, are usually forgotten or marginalized.
They have no say in determining their future and status; they are
mostly invisible.
When Israel occupied East Jerusalem in 1967, the residents of the
city, as well as those of the rest of the West Bank, were Jordanian
citizens holding Jordanian passports. Israel imposed Israeli law on
the city and unilaterally annexed the territory of East Jerusalem,
but without extending Israeli citizenship to its inhabitants.
Palestinian Jerusalemites were issued Israeli identity cards1. These
enable them to have civil – not political – rights and duties, and
are given only to those who can prove their residency within the
municipal borders of the city, as defined by Israel.2
Since 1967 and to date, some 6,600 Jerusalemites have lost their
residency rights for a variety of reasons, such as traveling abroad
for more than three years, having their center of life outside the
municipal borders or marrying non-resident spouses. These statistics
do not include the dependent children of those who have lost their
identity cards. Israeli law treats East Jerusalem Palestinians as
though it is they who entered Israel in 19673 and not Israel that
occupied East Jerusalem that same year.
In spite of the fact that most Palestinians fulfill their duties by
paying taxes, the majority do not participate in the most important
element of the decision-making process – municipal elections. This
form of resistance or non-participation, attributable to political
and nationalistic reasons,4 is very important for the understanding
of Israeli demographic policies in East Jerusalem since 1967, and the
effects these policies have on the living standards in the city and
the deterioration in the quality of life there.
Demographic Realities
Immediately after it occupied East Jerusalem, the Israeli government
conducted a census and registered 66,000 Palestinians within the
expanded borders of the city. The census excluded all `absentees’ who
were, for one reason or another (work, study, vacation or escaping
the war), outside Jerusalem. According to Israeli estimates, the
percentage of Palestinians in the city was 25.8%. Officially, Israel
has been seeking through several means (see below) to keep the
Palestinian population in East Jerusalem below 30% (some say 27%) of
the total population of "united Jerusalem."5 This policy failed when
the Palestinians managed to exceed this percentage in 1999 (31.1%)
and again in 2002 (not less than 33%) according to Israeli
statistics. Palestinian statistics reflect even higher percentages.6
Despite Israel’s demographic policy in Jerusalem, the demographic
trend is clearly in favor of the Palestinian population. This has
become obvious since 1996 when the growth rate rose from 2.9% to 4%
in 1999, while Israeli growth declined from 1.2% in 1996 and to 1.1%
in 1999.
The Israeli policy of "demographic monopoly" was carried out through
the transfer of some of the Jewish population from West Jerusalem,
along with new immigrants from abroad and other parts of Israel, to
the newly built Jewish settlements in East Jerusalem. It is not clear
whether the Jewish population in East Jerusalem has exceeded the 50%
mark or not at this point, as the published figures lack accuracy and
are influenced by politics on both sides. At the same time, we must
recognize that, while East Jerusalem was very attractive to the
Jewish population for several reasons, it gradually lost its
attraction for the Palestinians due to a number of push factors.
The Birth of a Civil Society
With the collapse of the Jordanian administration in East Jerusalem
in the wake of the Arab defeat in the 1967 war, the Palestinians in
the city began to organize themselves in order to protect their
interests (and those of the West Bank and Gaza) on the political,
socioeconomic, administrative and service levels through the
formation of civil society institutions. The Israeli civil law
imposed on the city was very helpful in this respect; whereas it was
impossible to establish an institutionalized Palestinian leadership
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as they were subjected to Israeli
military rule, which prevented the development of civil society.
One of the earliest institutions established in Jerusalem soon after
1967 was the Islamic Higher Council, which saw itself as a
representative of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and a
guardian of the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem and the West Bank.
Others began to restore the educational system and establish schools
independent of those administered by the Israeli municipality.
Similar organizations were set up in the health, social and youth
sectors. Unions for professionals and workers were established, as
well as charitable societies and media organizations. The result was
that Jerusalem began to lead the occupied territories politically and
became the administrative, cultural and services center of Palestine.
Orient House7
Like so many Palestinian organs, Orient House rose gradually to
prominence. It began as a research center, the Arab Study Society,
established towards the end of the 1970s by the late Faisal
al-Husseini to front for his political activities as a Fateh
representative and PLO member. While the society continued to work on
documentation and research on Jerusalem and the Arab-Israeli
conflict, it also evolved into a major political voice for the
Palestinians in East Jerusalem and, on certain issues, for all
Palestinians in the occupied territories. Al-Husseini, capitalizing
in part on the reputation of his illustrious family history,8 managed
to gain high credibility among the population. The late 1980s saw him
rise from a local Palestinian leader to an international figure
through his preparation for the peace process negotiations at the
Madrid Conference for Peace in the Middle East. In fact, it is very
difficult to imagine the breakthrough in the peace process
(1990-1991) without taking into account the role Orient House played
on every level – among Palestinians in the occupied territories and
in the Diaspora (especially the Palestinian leadership in Tunisia),
as well as on the Israeli and U.S. fronts.
The rise of Orient House is to be seen as the result of a long
institution-building process of civil society, as well as filling the
vacuum created by the Israeli decision to dissolve the Arab
municipality and other Palestinian institutions in Jerusalem. Thus,
Orient House became a political and institutional umbrella for the
Palestinians in Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories.
It was also ample demonstration of the failed Israeli control in East
Jerusalem.
A State within a State
The Palestinians in East Jerusalem have managed to develop a
sociopolitical network with which to counter Israel’s negligence to
address their daily needs and, at the same time, to resist the
annexationist policies that sought to dilute their national rights.
This ran the gamut from political forums and conflict resolution
mechanisms, to a sort of shadow municipality, to social services and
institutional networking. All of these efforts led to some form of
independence of East Jerusalem from Israel. The process turned the
"united capital" into two separate cities, living together but
divided. As Michael Roman notes, "In Jerusalem, a Jewish or Arab
identity [has become] attributed not only to individuals and
neighborhoods but to practically every public institution and
economic entity. Indeed, this refers not only to national, religious
or other culturally related institutions, such as schools and
theaters, but also to each hospital, hotel, or taxi cab."9
To a certain extent, Palestinian Jerusalem was until the late 1980s
the major urban center of the West Bank. It was home to the major
social institutions, the most specialized hospitals, the most
developed markets, and to renowned educational and research centers.
In addition to being the spiritual heart for both Muslim and
Christian communities in Palestine, it is the center of the leading
religious institutions.10
The Peace Process
With the launch of the Madrid Conference in 1991, Israel embarked on
steps for the implementation of its own vision of peace, disregarding
the negotiating process. The first was the establishment of a
permanent checkpoint between the Gaza Strip and Israel. This was
followed in 1993 by isolating Jerusalem from the West Bank and
requiring all Palestinians to obtain permits to enter Jerusalem.
Since then East Jerusalem has been isolated from its kindred
territories, leading to a steady deterioration of the situation in
the holy city.
The Gradual Collapse of East Jerusalem
Clearly, East Jerusalem has paid a hefty price for the peace process.
>From the outset, the closure was imposed on it, divesting it of its
position as an Arab metropolis, isolating it from its hinterland,
driving it to increased dependency on Israeli markets and
institutions, and intensifying the pressure on its population.
Indeed, the situation in Jerusalem is so explosive that it is liable
to erupt any day. The main contributing factors are the sealing of
the city, the acceleration of Jewish settlement activity and
expansion, the deportation of its inhabitants, the closure of
Palestinian institutions in the city, the redefined city boundaries,
the decline of the rule of law, and 40 years of Israeli demographic
policy.
The features of Israel’s scheme for Jerusalem and its environs are
only now beginning to surface in the wake of a series of successive
plans that are blatantly interconnected. The Israeli government and
the Jerusalem Municipality have exploited the world’s preoccupation
with 9/11 and the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and has
tied together all of its earlier moves. We can identify the following
actions and plans, which will impact not only the political solution
of the Jerusalem issue, but also the socioeconomic development of
East Jerusalem, leading to its isolation from the West Bank and to
the fragmentation of most of its neighborhoods. These can be
summarized in the outer ring settlements, the inner ring road, the
ring road, and the separation wall.
Israel’s practices, its settlement policy and the closure are not the
only factors accountable for the collapse of the Palestinian
institutions in Jerusalem. The Palestinian Authority (PA) and the
international community are also to blame. The PA, bound by the
agreements with Israel, invested only indirectly and irregularly in
Jerusalem. Before the PA in 1995, several Arab funds were channeled
to supporting and maintaining the continuity of most of the
Palestinian social, educational, health and political institutions in
East Jerusalem. These funds, in addition to the Israeli investments,
had raised East Jerusalem’s living standards to a level surpassing
those of the rest of the occupied territories. After the
establishment of the PA, the priorities shifted and the financial
support was channeled mainly to the establishment of PA institutions
and the improvement of its infrastructure. It would be very difficult
to argue that the PA invested in Jerusalem to the same degree as it
did in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Furthermore, the rise of Ramallah as a de facto PA `capital’ has
attracted institutions and skilled labor away from East Jerusalem.
Businesses followed, drawn by Ramallah’s growth as a market promising
rapid development, offering attractive investment laws and an escape
from the high Israeli taxes in Jerusalem. The closure of Jerusalem
since 1993 has slowly led to a tangible development in the satellite
neighborhoods outside the municipal borders, such as Ezariyya, Abu
Dis, A-Ram and Bir Nabala.
The deterioration process reached its peak with the outbreak of the
al-Aqsa intifada and the collapse of the tourism sector, which was a
major source of income for East Jerusalem. The untimely death of
Faisal al-Husseini was a further setback for the city. Since his
death, the city has been grappling with a leadership problem. None of
the plethora of aspiring leaders has been able to fill his shoes and
to gain the trust of the people, or to assure the continuity of his
services to the city.
Israel took advantage of this situation and issued orders for the
closure of several institutions, among them Orient House, the Chamber
of Commerce, the Small Projects Office, the Department of Land and
Mapping, the Old City Rehabilitation Committee and other vital
institutions that served the citizens of Jerusalem. The closure of
Orient House and the collapse of other related and unrelated
institutions led to the dismantling of the invisible Palestinian
security forces that worked under the umbrella of Orient House
(tolerated by the Israeli security establishment, and sometimes in
cooperation with it). These forces had given the Jerusalemites a
sense of security and provided a mechanism for conflict resolution.
Indeed, most of the internal conflicts among Palestinians in
Jerusalem had been solved through the good offices of these forces.
With the eruption of the al-Aqsa intifada, the Israelis focused their
attention on security issues, leaving public order in East Jerusalem
virtually in the hands of nobody. The Israeli police in Jerusalem and
the municipality admit that crime is on the rise. They claim that the
lack of investment on all levels is at the root of such negative
developments. As usual, it is the lack of money and resources that
get blamed for the situation, and not the asymmetrical investment,
the negligence and the socioeconomic push factors to which East
Jerusalemites are subjected.
More Refugee Camps
The factors discussed above have led to a rise in poverty in East
Jerusalem. We do not have clear and reliable statistics about East
Jerusalem; I am, therefore, forced to rely on empirical observation.
The closure of Jerusalem, the settlement activity, the intifada, the
separation wall, the land confiscation, the lack of allocated land
for housing, the lack of public investment – all of these factors
have affected the city in a very dramatic way. In spite of all that,
many Palestinians have left their dwellings in the satellite
neighborhoods (mainly located in the West Bank), looking for housing
in East Jerusalem.
The building restrictions and absence of zoning and master planning
in East Jerusalem has caused a housing crisis, forcing people to live
in conditions much worse than what they have been used to. The acute
housing shortage has led to the construction of many unplanned and
`unlicensed’ buildings. This is more frequent in disadvantaged
neighborhoods, where more apartments have been added to already
poorly built houses (Silwan and A-Thuri). These neighborhoods are in
the process of becoming slums.
The most interesting example is the Shu’fat Refugee Camp. The number
of officially registered refugees, according to UNRWA, does not
exceed 6,000, but the actual number of those now living in the camp
(according to social workers, youth clubs and stakeholders in the
camp) exceeds 17,000. If this is accurate, it means that around
11,000 inhabitants have become de facto refugees, living in miserable
social conditions.11 The same phenomenon is unfolding in three
additional communities: A-Thuri, Silwan, Wadi Qaddum – and, less
obviously, in Wadi al-Joz.
The Old City
The Old City of Jerusalem is becoming the focal point in recent
attempts at finding solutions. The developments in the Old City in
recent years are the consequence of an accumulation of misguided
policies by British, Jordanian and Israeli governments. Today the
majority of the Old City’s population, mainly Muslims, is poor. This
involves all poverty-related problems: unemployment, drugs, family
violence, sexual abuse and petty crime.
The Old City is densely populated: almost half of the 0.871 square
kilometers that make up the Old City provides residence for its
estimated 36,000 inhabitants, while the other half consists of
religious places – the Haram al-Sharif being the largest – and public
buildings, such as schools, hospices and market places. This
situation is reflected in the Old City’s small-sized residential
units. Statistics show, for example, that around 60% of the units in
the Muslim Quarter average 40 square meters, while 25% are less than
20 square meters. Coupled with an average family size of 6.3 persons,
this conveys the gravity of the living standards. This high
population density is an indicator of the high poverty rate in the
Old City as a whole and the Muslim Quarter in particular.
Living standards as well as density, the physical condition of
buildings, public services, and social characteristics differ from
one quarter to the other. The Muslim Quarter has the highest
population density and lowest public services, while the Armenian
Quarter has the lowest density (close to the Jewish), and the Jewish
Quarter enjoys the highest level of public services and facilities.
The Old City also suffers from the on-going political conflict that
adversely affects the livelihood of its inhabitants. In recent years,
it has seen a rising emigration rate among both social and economic
elites, thus leaving behind less fortunate families. Equally
seriously, the situation is leading to the destruction of the
cultural heritage of the city, which also has enormous international
value.
The question that every politician should ponder is not only the form
of political solution for Jerusalem. The real question is: Can the
city that lives under the above-mentioned conditions – regardless of
whether it remains open, or whether it will be divided and how –
really provide good neighborliness or be conducive to any kind of
coexistence?