Eurasia Daily Monitor

Thursday, June 7, 2007 — Volume 4, Issue 111

KREMLIN, ABKHAZ, SOUTH OSSETIAN PROTEGES DELIBERATELY AMBIVALENT ABOUT
KOSOVO

by Vladimir Socor

Russia is redoubling its rhetorical support for Serbia over Kosovo,
ostensibly on the basis of the territorial-integrity principle. At the same
time, Moscow stands with its Abkhaz and South Ossetian protégés on the basis
of the self-determination principle (as Moscow construes it). Russian
President Vladimir Putin leads the charge on the first track, while his
presidential administration’s department under Modest Kolerov is
operationally in charge of the second track of this policy, working with the
secessionist leaderships.

Russian policy is to obstruct, though not necessarily or ultimately
defeat, the Western-approved plan for Kosovo’s supervised independence.
Those two tracks are designed to create two alternative options for Moscow:
Either abandon Serbia and write off Kosovo for a high price in a bargain
with the West; or, conversely, cement an alliance with Serbia and try to
freeze the Kosovo conflict as long as possible. The former scenario would
cheer Moscow’s clients in the post-Soviet conflicts while the latter
scenario would discomfit that same set of clients.

In his June 4 meeting with print media from the G-8 countries, Putin
weighed in heavily for the territorial-integrity principle and for Serbia
regarding Kosovo. His arguments ranged from the defunct Yugoslavia’s
constitution to Serbian national pride to UN resolutions that define Kosovo
as part of Serbia (again unilaterally interpreted, as UNSC resolution 1244
was adopted well before Yugoslavia’s final official dissolution). Putin also
used this media opportunity to frighten certain European countries into
abandoning the common Western position on Kosovo by raising the specter of
`separatism’ in those countries; he apparently feels completely secure about
Russia in this regard. He insisted that the Kosovo conflict in no way
differs from the four post-Soviet conflicts: simply `ethnic conflicts,’ all
requiring the same type of solution, with Kosovo first as a `model.’

Putin chooses to sound agnostic about the substance of a political
solution for Kosovo: `Some kind of compromise being reached. … If I knew it
I would have long since proposed it. We need to keep looking. This is
difficult and complex work. I don’t know [the solution] at the moment.’ On
the diplomatic process, his motto remains, `No hurry.’ Thus, on both
substance and process, Russia seeks to perpetuate the deadlock and turn
Kosovo into the fifth `frozen’ conflict, linking its ultimate resolution
with that of the four post-Soviet conflicts (Kremlin.ru, Interfax, June 4).

By calculated contrast, the presidential administration’s directorate
under Kolerov (`for cultural and inter-regional ties’) is hosting
post-Soviet secessionist leaders periodically in Moscow — most recently on
June 4, the same day when Putin was defending the territorial-integrity
principle in front of the world press. The Abkhaz and South Ossetian
leaders, Sergei Bagapsh and Eduard Kokoiti, issued from Moscow that day an
appeal to the United Nations, OSCE, Council of Europe, and the CIS Council
of Heads of State (Interfax, Apsnypress, Regnum, June 4, 5). The appeal
asserts Abkhazia’s and South Ossetia’s claims to international recognition
as states in accordance with the self-determination principle.

While stopping short of requesting immediate recognition, Bagapsh and
Kokoiti serve notice through this document that they would press for
recognition `with even greater resolve’ in the event that Kosovo is
recognized as independent from Serbia — `the Kosovo precedent.’ In the
knowledge, however, that Russia is set to drag out the Kosovo negotiations,
the two leaders and their Moscow handlers avoid linking their case too
closely with that of Kosovo. Thus the appeal cites `referendums for
independence’ held in Abkhazia and South Ossetia over the years. It does not
mention however the ethnic cleansing and disenfranchisement of half of
Abkhazia’s population (mostly Georgian) or the fact that both sets of
leaders openly regard `independence’ from Georgia as an intermediate stage
toward joining the Russian Federation. By the same token, the appeal fails
to mention the mass handover of Russian citizenship in the two enclaves.
This is an argument for Russia to play protector but is clearly discrediting
the case for the enclaves’ international recognition

Such omissions are meant to obscure the stark differences between the
Kosovo conflict and the conflicts on Georgia’s territory. In Kosovo, the
Western allies reversed the ethnic cleansing of the native majority; the
independence referendum possessed democratic legitimacy; the option of
Kosovo joining any state is precluded legally as well as de facto; Western
forces provide security, and the European Union is taking charge of economic
arrangements.

None of this applies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia because Russia has
blocked such processes there, deepening the contrast with the Kosovo
conflict. Nevertheless, Russia is now pretending that those situations are
identical with the Kosovo conflict. In fact, the conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia have long turned from `ethnic conflicts’ (as Putin mislabels
them) into territorial conflicts due to Russia’s de facto seizure of these
territories from Georgia. Thus, the territorial-integrity principle
provides the relevant legal basis for resolution while the claim to
ethnically based `self-determination’ is invalid in an Abkhazia ethnically
cleansed of its Georgian plurality or in an ethnically mixed South Ossetia.

Releasing their appeal at a news conference in Moscow (Interfax,
Regnum, June 4, 5; Vremya Novostey, June 5), Bagapsh and Kokoiti insisted at
the same time that their `self-determination’ claim is stronger than Kosovo’
s and does not rest on a possible `Kosovo precedent,’ although a `precedent’
could enhance their claim as they see it. This is also the position of
Transnistria’s and Karabakh’s authorities, which founded together with
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2006 a `Community for Democracy and the Rights
of Peoples.’ The group propagandizes for international recognition of these
`unrecognized republics’ and develops largely symbolic links between them
under the aegis of Kolerov’s directorate. Karabakh has partly distanced
itself from this four-sided group in recent months.

Moscow retains tactical flexibility on Kosovo, prepared to bargain
away either Belgrade’s interests or those of post-Soviet secessionists at
some juncture. Consequently, the authorities in Sukhumi, Tskhinvali,
Tiraspol, and Stepanakert claim that a solution in Kosovo in Serbia’s favor
would not prejudice their own claim to `independence,’ because their claim
is `much stronger’ anyway. This naïve attempt to both preserve and eat the
cake was also a feature of the Moscow news conference.

Bagapsh and Kokoiti warned that any Georgian attack on either
territory would result in the opening of a `second front’ against Georgia
from the other territory — `and not only.’ They also reaffirmed their
sides’ refusal to participate in political negotiations unless Tbilisi
removes the parallel authorities from parts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
They realize that the existence and increasingly successful operation of
those parallel authorities lay to rest any claim to international
recognition of the Russian-installed leaderships in Abkhazia and South
Ossetia.

–Vladimir Socor