"INTELLIGENCE BRIEF: KOSOVO’S OPPORTUNITY FOR INDEPENDENCE"

PINR: Power & Interest News report
June 13 2007

Serbia’s current political weakness, coupled by France’s more
pro-U.S. stance resulting from Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential and
legislative wins, offers Kosovo’s nationalists a chance to obtain
independence. On June 12, however, Belgrade declared that Serbia would
annul every unilateral decision on Kosovo and called for the strict
respect of international law. This means that Serbia will only accept
a U.N. Security Council decision — thus implicitly suggesting that
Russia will have its say on the issue.

Sarkozy and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while preserving good
relations with Moscow, have adopted a firmer stance toward the
Kremlin, and have sent signals to Washington that can be interpreted
as a green light for Kosovo’s emancipation from Serbia. While it is
true that during the Heiligendamm G8 meeting Nicolas Sarkozy proposed
(unsuccessfully) that the issue be re-discussed in six months, France
and Germany will not oppose Kosovo’s bid for independence; rather,
they will try to appease Serbia (proposing a fast-track admission to
the E.U.) and Russia (with a negotiation that appears to be tough at
the moment).

After the 1999 war against Slobodan Milosevic’s former Yugoslavia,
European decision-makers became disenchanted with the effects of
state proliferation in the Balkans and would probably not oppose a
federal solution to the Serbian-Kosovo dispute. However, they also
fear that a protracted stalemate on the issue may favor the outburst
of new conflicts between the Serbs and the Albanians.

U.S. President George W. Bush declared during his recent trip to Europe
(marked by a visit to Albania) that the "time for Kosovo’s independence
is now." Washington approves of Kosovo’s desire of national sovereignty
since it would be the logical end of a process that began in 1999
with N.A.T.O.’s military operations against Belgrade, in addition
to weakening Moscow’s grip on its last western Balkans rampart:
orthodox Serbia.

In the current geopolitical context of U.S.-Russia competition for
influence in Eastern Europe, the Trans-Caucasus and Central Asia,
giving the western Balkans access to a more pro-Atlantic European
Union is an important political objective for Washington. The United
States is working at shaping an Adriatic-Black Sea-Caspian Sea axis
that could have important economic and geostrategic consequences
by easing Western and Central European access to Caspian resources
while allowing N.A.T.O. to enhance its military-strategic control of
southeastern Europe.

As the Franco-German axis continues its rapprochement with London and
Washington, Kosovo’s ambitions are receiving more support from the
European Union. However, the road map to Pristina’s independence
remains to be defined, and three big issues will dominate the
U.S.-European agenda in the western Balkans.

First of all, Serbia’s rising social-nationalist bloc may become
stronger in Belgrade, thus further weakening the incumbent fragile
pro-Western government. As a consequence, the E.U. will need to rapidly
implement a comprehensive political strategy to accompany the process
of yet another Serbian territorial loss. Also, if Belgrade feels
betrayed by the West, it could re-ignite ethnic bickering in Bosnia
(where numerous Serbs live).

Second, Moscow’s assistance to centrifugal forces in Moldova (the
Russian-speaking Transdniester region) and Georgia (Abkhazia and
South Ossetia) will likely increase further. Moscow is unlikely
to support any U.N. resolution on Kosovo’s independence unless the
Euro-U.S. combine gives concessions on sensitive issues where Moscow
is involved (Ukraine, Georgia, and even the Iranian nuclear crisis).

The price to pay for Kosovo’s independence may end up being
considerable for the West.

Additionally, Kosovo’s current status as a de jure independent entity
and its graduation to a fully-recognized state can also destabilize
a careful diplomatic rapprochement between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnically Armenian enclave
in western Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh’s de facto status as an
independent state depends on Armenia’s support and at least tacit
Russian assistance. Nagorno-Karabakh’s leadership may look to Kosovo
as an inspiration and push once again for full recognition. This may
draw a very definitive and punishing response from Azerbaijan, which
is now much stronger militarily and politically thanks to significant
petroleum reserves and exports.

Third, Kosovo’s economic viability will also need to be assessed.

Montenegro, which detached from Serbia in 2006, has benefited from its
access to the Adriatic Sea as tourism and coastal resorts represent
a growth market for international consumers and investors.

However, Kosovo’s geography is not as promising as Montenegro’s.

Moreover, Kosovo’s attractiveness for European businesses will need
to be enhanced.

If the Western powers are unable to define a successful
political-economic framework for Pristina’s likely independence, the
ghosts of Greater Albania (the unification of all ethnic Albanians
in the Balkans) will probably appear, with possible destabilizing
consequences for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece
as well.

The bottom line is that Europe should take Kosovo and the western
Balkans seriously. Russia is now stronger than in 1999 and will try
to use the Kosovo issue as a bargaining chip on sensitive issues. In
addition, the uneasy construction of a fluid and effective regional
economic system that will help old and new states to find their way
in the global economy appears a crucial foundation for political and
geopolitical stability there.

Expect the E.U. powers to try to keep the United States engaged in
the region while seeking reconciliation with Moscow. Also, look for
separatism to remain strong in Moldova and Georgia in the coming years.

The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent
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analysis services in the context of international relations.

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