RUSSIAN WEBSITE SEES QABALA PROJECT PROMOTING "STRATEGIC RAPPROCHEMENT" WITH US

Politkom.ru website, Moscow
9 Jun 07

Text of article by Sergey Markedonov, head of Political and Military
Analysis Institute’s Department for Problems in Interethnic Relations:
"Azerbaijan is a Good Choice" by Russian Politkom.ru website on 9 June

In early June 2007 Azerbaijan became the focus of world media
attention.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s initiative at the G8 summit was a
sensation. The United States and Russia have been keeping at arm’s
length for a long time now. In fact, our bilateral relations have
been haunted by the specter of the Cold War throughout 2007.

In 1814 French Emperor Napoleon, commenting on his penultimate
military campaign, said that he had "donned his 1796 boots" again,
meaning that the French leader had recovered the spirit of the
victories he had gained in his debut Italian campaign. Following
Vladimir Putin’s statement it appeared for a while that the spirit
of 2001 (the spirit of unity in the fight against global terrorism)
had again returned to Russian-American relations.

Let us remind ourselves briefly of the Russian leader’s
proposals. Vladimir Putin put to George Bush a plan for the joint
use of the Qabala radar station, deployed on Azerbaijani territory,
to avert threats from "certain Asian countries." The joint use of the
radar station is seen as an alternative to the deployment of the US
ABM system in Europe.

The Russian military presence in Azerbaijan is minimal in comparison
with Georgia and Armenia. At the beginning of the nineties Azerbaijan
did not agree to joint border protection with Russia and deployment
of Russian military facilities. What we are talking about in effect
is a single facility – the Qabala radar station. The radar station on
the southern slopes of the Caucasus plays a big part in the defence
of Russia’s southern frontiers. In January 2002 the Russian and
Azerbaijani leaders signed an agreement whereby the Russian side would
lease the Daryal base alongside Qabala for $7 million per year. It
was a 10-year treaty.

So the Russian president had put the ball in the Americans’ court. In
the first place, he is prepared to invite them into an important
Russian strategic facility. Second, this invitation relates to the
South Caucasus which hitherto Russia has seen as its "geopolitical
property." Judging by initial reactions, the United States is currently
not prepared to run headlong after the Russian president. There was no
immediate reaction from the US President. And the secretary of state’s
reaction was not at all what Russia would have wanted. But official
Baku did respond quickly. Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz
Azimov said he was willing to hold talks both with the United States
and with Russia on this issue. All in all, Putin’s "Qabala initiative"
highlighted several important "systemic" aspects of Russian-American
relations.

Azerbaijan came in very handy. It is the post-Soviet state where
Russian and US interests coincide (unlike Georgia). Both Russia
and the United States want to see a secular and politically stable
Azerbaijan which would deter the "Islamic threat." This threat is more
real as far as Russia is concerned, particularly if you consider the
fact that in the North Caucasus the nationalist discourse is giving
way to religious radicalism. Azerbaijan borders on Russian Dagestan,
which has now become a kind of politico-ideological centre for Islamic
radicals in the North Caucasus.

Russian Dagestan and Azerbaijan are inhabited by so-called divided
peoples (above all, of course, Lezgins and Avars). Before the
institution of president was introduced in Dagestan the Azerbaijanis
had their own representative on the Dagestani collegial body, the
republic State Council.

Intensive cooperation is developing between Dagestan and
Azerbaijani border territories(although this cooperation
is not always of a positive nature, if we are talking about
criminals collaborating). Azerbaijan is a Caspian state, so the
Russian Federation is also interested in this sphere of bilateral
cooperation. As for the United States, the South Caucasus is part of
its ambitious "Greater Near East" project." It is the Near East rear,
which, unlike the "frontal strip," must be stable and quiet. Azerbaijan
is also a potential resource for rivalry with Iran (it does not
have to be direct military confrontation). Last year Azerbaijan
was described by US diplomats as a "US Muslim ally" (this "title"
had been previously bestowed on Turkey). Now that American-Turkish
bilateral relations are going through a tricky period (there is thee
Kurdish problem, the prospect of the formation of an independent state
in Iraqi Kurdistan, and Turkey’s attitude towards Iraq since 2003).

Azerbaijan is becoming an important factor in US relations with
"Islamic Civilization" states. Hence the similar US and Russian
approaches to internal processes in Azerbaijan. Neither the White
House nor the Kremlin is demanding democracy of Azerbaijan. Both the
United States and Russia recognize the victories of Ilham Aliyev and
the Azerbaijani "party of power" in 2003 (presidential elections)
and in 2005 (parliamentary elections).

There is no doubt that in 2008 Moscow and Washington will compete to
be first to congratulate Ilham Aliyev on his second presidential term.

Both the United States and Russia are zealously watching Baku’s efforts
to pursue a diversified foreign policy. In recent years Azerbaijan
has tried not only to "seesaw" beween the United States and Russia,
but also to seek friends in the Islamic world. In the past three years
bilateral relations with Iran have significantly improved. In 2007 it
was Azerbaijan that functioned as president of the Islamic Conference,
a very influential international organization, with 57 Islamic states
as members. Baku has been repeatedly visited by Islamic Conference
representatives throughout 2007. In April 2007, under Azerbaijani
Foreign Ministry and Islamic Conference auspices, Baku hosted a
high-level international conference on the role of the media in the
development of religious tolerance (where the principal subject was
the fight against Islamophobia). Basically, the Islamic Conference
has become an important platform for Azerbaijani diplomacy. The
Islamic Conference is also an important Baku foreign policy
resource. Since December 1991 the Islamic Conference has condemned
"Armenian aggression" against Azerbaijan on five occasions. This
organization has always confirmed the republic’s territorial integrity
and recognized Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of it. The Islamic
vector is becoming more and more pronounced in Baku’s foreign policy
course. Of course, it is not that Azerbaijan is altering the secular
nature of its statehood and becoming "Iranized." The Islamic Conference
has nothing to do with Islamic radicalism (although anti-Americanism
and anti-Westernism are actually very popular with it). But a definite
trend is discernible. Azerbaijan is experiencing some disillusionment
with the West and, above all, with the United States. How can that
have come about? There are several rational explanations, unrelated
to the Azerbaijanis’ "civilization type" or mentality. Only yesterday
many ordinary people in Baku used to joke, saying that not even Usamah
bin Ladin himself would be able to put a yashmak on an Azerbaijani
girl. Today there are several substantial prerequisites for the
activation of radical Islam in Azerbaijan. Let us give some of them:

– a weak, demoralized, and politically ineffective secular opposition
(there is disaffection with the regime, but there are no means of
voicing it through civilized opposition; ethnonational trauma (loss
of sovereignty over Karabakh and seven districts outside it that make
up 13 per cent of Azerbaijan’s territory) and a lack of faith in the
secular regime’s ability to resolve the problem in Azerbaijan’s favour;

– the implementation of an authoritarian modernization project
accompanied by radical social stratification, corruption, and
alteration of the traditional way of life;

– the proximity of Dagestan and Iran as neighbours: in the former case,
a region that has become a Salafist (renewed Islam) centre in the
Caucasus; in the latter case, a Shi’ite country geared to exporting
an Islamic model of authority and organization of public life. Add
to that the fact that the current Azerbaijani regime is backed by the
United States (with all its shortcomings). Even the United States is
unable to resolve the Karabakh issue in Baku’s favour. In the same
way that Russia, which since 1991 has had the reputation in Baku
of being a "pro-Armenian state," has been unable to resolve it. And
while the Azerbaijani political elite cease to be so categorically
in its description of Russia at the beginning of the new millennium,
this view is still strong among the masses. Both the United States
and Russia have their reasons to want a relationship with Azerbaijan,
but, at the same time, they are not prepared to take Baku’s part
exclusively in a Karabakh settlement.

So the United States and Russia have far more points of contact in
Azerbaijan than reasons for disputes or rivalry, In this connection the
idea of joint use of the Qabala radar station would also be extremely
useful in terms of ending the Cold War lite and in terms of placing
our relationship in the Caucasus and in the CIS on a constructive
footing. The Qabala project would enable the two countries to jointly
guard Azerbaijan against "Islamic temptations" and would also increase
the possibility of influencing a Karabakh settlement (although there is
no reason to expect it to happen quickly). So Russian-American tactical
rivalry (if we are talking about Azerbaijan) can only weaken our and
America’s positions in this part of post-Soviet space. Consequently,
the Qabala initiative demonstrates again with the utmost clarity
that we have the potential for "strategic rapprochement." And this
is much more important than the mild version of the Cold War. Even
in its PR format.