RUSSIAN PUNDIT SEES SIGNS OF MOSCOW’S WARINESS ON CIS SEPARATIST REGIONS

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Moscow
15 Jun 07

[Commentary by Valeriy Vyzhutovich, Rossiyakaya Gazeta political
observer: "Without Looking Back at Kosovo" – taken from html version
of source provided by ISP.]

Without looking back at Kosovo

Moscow and Tbilisi are renewing their dialogue. At the Economic Forum
in St Petersburg, Vladimir Putin and Mikhail Saakashvili agreed to
assign the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries joint work
aimed at stabilizing bilateral relations. Then, as was stated, this
would be followed also by removal of limitations on development of
trade-economic relations.

The Georgian leader was pleased with the meeting and announced that
Georgia is always "not only ready, but is obligated to conduct fruitful
dialogue with Russia."

Perhaps, it would be premature to call all of this a warming
of relations, but an easing of tensions is certainly being
observed. And the main thing is that the condition for rapprochement
has appeared. This is a basic condition, unconditionally adopted
by both parties. It was outlined by Saakashvili when he said that,
aside from consideration of mutual interests, friendly relations
must also be built on adherence to the principle of territorial
integrity. Putin immediately agreed with his Georgian colleague:
"We have always proceeded from the need to adhere to the fundamental
principle of territorial integrity of the state. Unfortunately,
attempts are being made to erode these fundamental principles. And
this, of course, creates problems for us on the post-Soviet area."

The words spoken by the Russian president should be understood not only
as a sign of diplomatic solidarity with Georgia, which is burdened
by the separatist regimes of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. This was
practically the first time that Vladimir Putin announced the need for
adhering to territorial integrity of states on the entire territory
of the CIS.

Although, it would seem, what is new about that? Even before, Moscow
had not cast doubt upon the territorial integrity of Georgia and
Moldova in those boundaries, which they had prior to the disintegration
of the USSR. But for 15 years now, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and the
Dniester region, having proclaimed themselves sovereign states,
are flaunting their independence in every way. And all this time,
they have been asking Russia to recognize them.

South Ossetia has already sent more than 20 documents to Moscow, asking
for recognition. The leadership of that republic is being impatient,
not wanting to wait at least for a decision on Kosovo, which is capable
of setting an international precedent. "We do not believe that South
Ossetia depends on the resolution of the problem of that region (Kosovo
– editor)," says Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Ossetia Murat
Dzhioyev. "The situations here and there are different. South Ossetia
declared itself in the course of disintegration of the USSR. It did not
withdraw from the complement of the already independent Georgia… The
South Ossetians want to be independent.

Ninety-nine per cent of the region’s residents have spoken out in
favour of this."

The aspirations of Abkhazia extend even farther. It is asking to
be accepted into the complement of the Russian Federation as an
associated member. This means a customs and defence union, a single
currency, and single citizenship, but at the same time – independence
in domestic and foreign policy. We may recall that, at one time,
Aleksandr Lukashenka had tried to incline Moscow towards a community
reminiscent of this, and received the response: "Let us separate the
flies from the hamburger." But, through the words of its Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sergey Shamba, Abkhazia continues to insist: "We want
our state, which possesses all of the necessary state institutions,
to be recognized by the world community. First and foremost, we are
awaiting recognition on the part of Russia."

In this rhetoric, the authorities of the self-proclaimed states are
reminiscent of each other. Especially when they refer to the results
of the referenda held there. Well, and why not?! The number of votes
cast for independence is simply overwhelming. Although, the very
directionality of the questions, which contain a prompting in and
of themselves, ruled out a different expression of will. And the
Dniester, Abkhazian and South Ossetian authorities could pose such
questions without the slightest risk: The mass sentiments are well
known to them. Ultimately, this is the fundamental property of a direct
democracy, practiced by the post-Soviet regimes: A referendum may be
held only in one case – if it is initiated by the authorities. And
only with guaranteed provision of the answers necessary to it. This
was the case in 1993, with the fateful slogan, which has now become
an anecdote: "yes, yes, no, yes." That is what happened also on 17
March 1991, when the fate of the Union was put up for a popular vote
– which, we might add, very soon did not keep this fate from being
decided by the well-known means and without looking back at the will
of the fraternal peoples of the "single and inviolable." There is
also nothing to keep the world community from treating the results of
referenda in the unrecognized post-Soviet republics in exactly the
same way as the "Belovezhskiy" threesome treated the results of the
Gorbachev plebiscite. References to Montenegro, which ceded from Serbia
after an analogous referendum and received international recognition,
nods at Kosovo, whose course towards independence is being approved
by the European Union and the USA, accusation of the West as holding
double standards – all this is not unfounded, but does not change the
matter. Neither the Dniester region, nor Abkhazia, nor South Ossetia
will receive the status of an independent state in the nearest time.

But what about Moscow? Despite its obvious predisposition to these new
formations, it is exhibiting restraint in its official statements. For
example, the reaction to the Dniester referendum proved to be exactly
like its result. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Sergey Lavrov
called this result predictable – and that is all. We should not have
expected anything more definite from the head of the MFA [Ministry
of Foreign Affairs]. "We must treat the referendum in the Dniester
region without emotions," said Lavrov, "so that [these emotions]
do not overshadow the essence of what is going on. And the essence
consists of the need to return to the negotiating table." Yes, the
most that Russia can do for the Dniester region is to protect its
interests in the negotiation process with Moldova.

But will Moscow have to hold its pause for long? Or will the Kosovo
precedent (and it will happen anytime now) give it more decisiveness,
at least in the formulation of the question of international
recognition of the separatist regimes on the post-Soviet area? No,
I believe that, in that case too, Russia would have to refrain from
active moves. And not only because, in striving to achieve official
state status for its unrecognized neighbours, it will encounter
the European Union and the USA, the limit of clashes with which has
practically already been exhausted. The matter lies also – and this
is the most important thing – in what will begin near our borders if
Moscow were to recognize the independence of at least one of these
rebellious republics. After all, the Kosovo precedent for the CIS
countries is not the same thing that, say, the Dniester precedent
may prove to be. The chain reaction would be such, that no one would
think it little.

Abkhazia and South Ossetia would also immediately demand
recognition. That means that they too would have to be
recognized. Watching this parade, Armenia would then have the right
to strive for recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh republic. And then,
who knows, Crimea might also catch the separatist fever. Ultimately,
it may come to the situation where Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan,
and Ukraine, with whom our relations today are not unclouded, would
finally become our enemies and, in a rush of response, would demand
that Russia recognize the independence of Chechnya.

It was evidently the understanding of these consequences that dictated
the agreement of the presidents of Russia and Georgia to adhere to
the principle of territorial integrity of states. And if Abkhazia,
South Ossetia and the Dniester region are hoping to get official
recognition from Moscow in the nearest time, then they are most likely
in for a disappointment.