THE ETHNIC RIOTS IN STAVROPOL
By Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh, special to Prague Watchdog

Prague Watchdog, Czech Republic
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June 26 2007

Russia has recently witnessed several major outbreaks of ethnic
violence, mostly between ethnic Russians and Chechens. Of most
importance here are two events, in Kondopoga (September 2006) and
recently in Stavropol (May-early June 2007), which indicate a serious
ethnic and, implicitly, social tension in Russia, recent improvements
notwithstanding.

The presence of tension is also indirectly indicated by Putin’s extreme
reluctance to discuss revolutions, even those in the past, such as the
February and October (Bolshevik) Revolutions of 1917, which took place
exactly 90 years ago. While there are some structural similarities
between the revolutions of the past and the present tension, they
are separated by one clear difference. Today, much more so than in
the past, the social conflicts are sublimated in ethnic conflicts.

Ethnic animosity

It was this fear and dislike of people from the Caucasus, especially
Chechens, that contributed mightily to the general xenophobic thrust
of Russia society. One of my old friends from Moscow stated that
hatred of people of Caucasian nationality and of Jews has spread.

And, indeed, this ethnic animosity has replaced the sense of social
hatred that was so strong at the time of the Russian revolutions of
1905-1921; to be precise, the social animosity has been sublimated
in ethnic animosity.

My conversation with a young Russian woman on one of my recent trips
to Russia could illustrate this point. While travelling, we observed
through the train window the nearby villages; and she commented on
the houses we passed, saying that some are good and some are bad. In
order to check her sense of social animosity, I replied, "Capitalist
landlord and poor peasants." She snapped angrily, "I don’t like to
divide people along social lines."

The statement of my casual interlocutor should , of course, should be
taken with a grain of salt. It simply means that social divisions have
been transformed in the minds of many Russians into ethnic divisions
while minorities – including Chechens but not only Chechens – are
affiliated with the elite, whereas Russians are implicitly seen as
the representatives of the lower class.

The involvement in crime of Chechens and other people from the Caucasus
is seen in a sort of twisted way as an additional manifestation of
oppression/harassment of ethnic Russians by those minorities and
the government/elite on their side. It is not surprising that this
feeling of animosity is spreading not just against the "people of
Caucasian nationality" but also against the government.

A government of the minorities

The sense that the regime is not on the side of the masses was
certainly the feeling of the Russian populace during the momentous
events of 1917 that toppled the tsarist regime and, later, the
provisional government. In the view of the masses, the regime had
represented the "lords" (gospod), which included not just the rich
capitalists and landlords but the broad segment of the Russian middle
class, which, in the minds of the populace, actually included anyone
who was neatly dressed and literate.

The situation is different in present-day Russia, where average
Russians see the government as being foreign to them because – in
their view – it represents the minorities. It is asserted in this
context that the current regime is not Russian; and this sort of view
has even been able to reach a national audience, despite the heavy
censorship of the mass media.

In a radio discussion during the summer of 2006, Markov, the well-known
nationalist-minded commentator, praised the achievements of Putin’s
regime for doing a lot for the Russian state, and implicitly for
ethnic Russians. Elaborating on Putin’s achievements, Markov said that
Putin ended the "Time of Trouble" and strengthened the Russian state,
limiting the power of oligarchs, even though they still exist.

While strengthening the Russian state, Putin also prevented the
West from taking command of the Russian economy. Europeans wanted
to take over Gazprom, but Putin stopped this dangerous encroachment,
and Gazprom is fully in the hands of the Russian state.

Putin also increased Russia’s prestige among the people outside the
borders of the Russian Federation. Under Putin, Russia once again
became a reliable ally. Putin would not betray Ossetia, Abkhazia and
the Transdnestrian Republic. Putin’s achievement in pacification of the
Caucasus was also praised. Markov asserted that Dagestan and Chechnya
are a part of Russia; and he implied that Chechnya and Dagestan were
actually pacified.

In short, Putin is a leader who has thought about the state
and, implicitly, about ethnic Russians. Still, some of his
nationalist-minded listeners were not convinced and called in, stating
on the air that the present-day Russian regime is not Russian. Rather,
it caters to the interests of minorities, including Chechens, but not
to ethnic Russians; and it was this feeling, the spread of which as
the author of this piece became aware in the summer of 2006, was a
catalyst for the pogroms of September 2006 in Kondopoga and recently
in Stavropol.

The Stavropol riots

One of the essential aspects of the post-Soviet period is the sharp
and increasing polarization along regional lines, and especially
between the big cities and the capital and the rest of the country.

It is true that this difference had been present in the Soviet era.

Still, the end of the Soviet regime has led to a sharp increase in
polarization and is apparently increasing at present. While the big
cities, especially Moscow, are booming, the provinces, especially the
smaller cities, are in much worse shape. The difference here is so
great that for some provincials, Moscow actually has become a "foreign
country," while the imperial capital gorges on the rest of the country.

The employment opportunities in the many provincial cities are
quite limited; enterprises that provided employment in the Soviet
era were closed and did not reopen even after the beginning of the
recent improvement of the Russian economy. In addition, the collapse
of professional educators, e.g. PTU, the professional schools that
trained skilled laborers, has created additional problems.

All of this goes along with the decline, or in some cases, complete
collapse, of the Soviet-type social protection net, which was
interwoven with the strongly repressive and controlling aspect of
the regime. The new generation that matured in post-Soviet Russia
not only does not have the secure and controlling environment of the
Soviet era but also has no illusions about the market economy as it
was in the late 1980s­­-early 1990s.

And unlike the older generation, it has no personal memory, and thus
no fear, of the terrible power of the state. They are also different
from the nationalists of the Yeltsin era who, while extremely critical
of the regime, were quite sheepish in their concrete actions; these
new radical youngsters have little respect for authorities and are
ready for violence. All of this explains that while nationalistic
and quasi-social animus has spread all over the country, it is the
provincial Kondopoga and recently Stavropol that have become the
hotbed of violence.

In late May and early June, Stavropol, a city in the south of European
Russia near the border of Chechnya, was marked by large-scale ethnic
rioting. It was the worst – or at any rate one of the worst – riots
of this kind since Kondopoga. The event indicated the continued high
level of ethnic, social, and, in a way, regional tension.

As in the case of Kondopoga, the riot erupted with a brawl between
a group of Russians and what Russians usually call "people of
Caucasian nationality," mostly Chechens. Both groups had called for
reinforcements; and soon enough the brawl was transformed into a
virtual battle with up to 300-400 people involved. The police seemed
to be watching with a sort of indifference. Still, when the rioters
attacked the police, the riot police arrived and engaged with the
crowd. As a result, dozens of people were seriously injured, and one
Chechen was killed.

A few days later, two Russian boys were killed; allegedly their
throats were slit. The crime was attributed to Chechens, and several
hundred people rallied on one of the squares and put forward a
variety of demands, from protection from ethnic violence to an end
to corruption. They also demanded – as in the case of Kondopoga – the
creation of grassroots detachments, the "druzhina", to maintain order.

According to some reports, some of those who participated in the
rally later engaged in acts of vandalism. Still, the authorities were
able to stop the violence from the development into a wide scale
pogrom. While this aspect of the event was reflected in the press,
one of the essential aspects was ignored. This was the ideology of the
participants in the event, particularly their vision of their enemies.

Interestingly enough, those Russians who participated in the events
did not regard all minorities as enemies, at least judging by their
Internet conversations. They had rather positive views of Armenians and
Greeks; even negative views of Jews were mentioned only in passing. The
focus was the Chechens, who are seen as the embodiment of all evil
and should be deported or simply eliminated.

Next to Chechens, state authorities, especially those in Moscow, are
especially hated. In the view of the participants, Putin has become
a powerless tool in the hands of Kadyrov, and Moscow has ceased to
be a Russian city. Not only Moscow elite, but all Moscow as a city
live at the expense of other Russians. Their images have blended
with the images of Chechens as alien to Russians. The participants
of the Internet discussion proclaimed that Russians should respond
to this situation.

They should create a purely Russian party, like the National Unity
party led by Barkashov in the1990s and, in some way, wage war against
Chechens and the Moscow/government alliance. One of the participants
of the discussion proposed measures such as the blowing up of train
tracks or pipelines. Other participants suggested that firearms should
be acquired for future struggle.

Conclusion

Despite what seems to be a booming Russian economy, a considerable part
of the Russian population, especially those in the provinces, is not
affected by the improvement. At the same time, the new generation of
youth supports the push for violence. The social animus has translated
into ethnic animosity and the feeling that the Russian government
does not care about ethnic Russians. All of this recently led to
ethnic riots, Stavropol being one of the most recent examples.

The implications of these events are hard to assess, and it is of
course also difficult to make accurate predictions about the future.

Still, they indicate the continuous instability in post-Soviet society
and may possibly be the harbinger of things to come, especially in
the case of a rapid decline in oil prices and oil revenues for Russia.

And there are other immediate repercussions. This general hostility
of ethnic Russians to "people of Caucasian nationality," especially
Chechens, has stimulated the continuous violence and terrorist
activities in the Caucasus, including Chechnya. These acts of violence
have created a strong fear of terrorism in Russian society, amplified
by the fact that the fear of real or imaginary terror has often in
reality been a kind of sublimation of many other fears. And in this
the Russians, of course, are not alone.

Dr. Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History at Indiana
University South Bend, USA, and a regular contributor to Prague
Watchdog.

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From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress