Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
July 4 2007
An Open Memorandum On Solutions Other Than a Military Operation Into
Northern Iraq
by Barýn Kayaoðlu
Wednesday , 04 July 2007
Tour d’horizon
In the past few weeks, consensus has emerged among sensible observers
that a military operation into Northern Iraq would not be useful for
Turkey. (USAK’s Northern Iraq Report, for one thing, has helped the
debates.) Even the Chief of General Staff Yaþar Büyükanýt conceded
two days ago that an operation would not `root out’ the PKK from
Northern Iraq but merely `strike a blow.'[1]
If a military operation is not the solution, then what are the
alternatives to military strike for Turkey? Let us engage in a `tour
d’horizon’ to answer that question.
Short-term solutions
For Turkey to triumph over terrorism with minimum loss and maximum
gain, a combination of short and long-term solutions is in order. The
first thing to do is to ask Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoðan and Gen.
Büyükanýt to make more responsible statements. Right now, these two
officials look like they are not engaged in a concerted effort to
protect Turkey from the PKK. In fact, they appear as if they are
fighting each other rather than the PKK. Effective decision-making
can only come about when decision-makers work together rather than
against each other.
Once high-ranking officials act more responsibility, it will be
easier for them to realize that Turkey has more to gain by talking to
Iraq’s Kurdish leaders. Extravagant statements directed against the
autonomy of Iraqi Kurds – which is Iraq’s internal affair to begin
with – are causing Ankara to lose a viable dialogue channel. Only
through such a channel could sincere Turkish concerns about the PKK
be communicated to Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani.
Once that line of contact is established, the following should be
impressed on Iraqi Kurds: Turkey is not using the PKK as a pretext to
destroy Iraqi Kurds. To substantiate that, Turkish leaders should
make it clear that they would respect the outcome of the coming
Kirkuk referendum so long as it is done in a fair, transparent, and
democratic way. Turkey should disentangle Iraqi Kurds’ autonomy from
the PKK for its own good.
Iraqi Kurds, for their part, should also do the same. By tying their
political fate to the PKK, Iraqi Kurds are jeopardizing their own
gains. They are reluctant to move against the PKK at the moment
because they do not want to lose one of their trump cards that could
fight back in the event of a Turkish military operation. That might
make sense. However, Iraqi Kurds’ fraternization with the PKK is
exacerbating a situation that is not necessarily improving for either
Turkey or Iraqi Kurds. Thus, Iraqi Kurds must understand that though
Turkey will not benefit from moving against the PKK’s camps in
Northern Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government has more to lose from
such an eventuality.
Long-term solutions
Despite the PKK’s claims that it is fighting for Kurdish rights, that
is not the case. Turkey was on a shining path of reform that began
alleviating the lot of Turkish Kurds from 2000 until 2005. That year,
the PKK recommenced its attacks and things began to worsen for the
people of southeast Turkey once again. Coupled with the European
Union’s excessive demands on Turkey at the onset of the accession
negotiations in 2005 (that Turkey should accept the tragedies during
World War I as a genocide of the Armenian people and that Turkey
recognize the Greek Cypriot administration as the Republic of Cyprus
– unrealistic expectations at the moment), the Turkish government’s
zeal for reform has melted away.
Rekindling that zeal is precisely the solution to Turkey’s
predicament. More positive results will come about by granting
greater rights and liberties to Turkish Kurds. Together with economic
measures, such as the completion of the GAP (Güneydoðu Anadolu
Projesi – Southeastern Anatolia Project) that aims to harness the
waters of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for the benefit of the
people in the southeast, greater social and political opportunities
will pull the rug under the PKK’s feet.
The last solution relates to combating the PKK. Turkey needs to set
up a multi-agency counter-terrorism task force comprising
professionals from the MÝT (Milli Ýstihbarat Teþkilatý – National
Intelligence Organization), the Police Department, and the military.
Through this new agency, Turkey will gain a more effective mechanism
which will directly fight the PKK.
This last point is not meant to disparage the immense endeavor and
sacrifice of the Turkish military in its struggle against the PKK.
However, the need for a specialized security force is more imminent
than ever. In fact, that point has been raised by several retired
military officers in the recent past.
Take retired general Osman Pamukoðlu. In concluding his memoirs a few
years ago, Gen. Pamukoðlu – who was the former commander of the
Hakkari Commando Brigade and is no stranger to the PKK’s terrorism –
states the following: `In fighting the PKK, a total of 20,000 troops,
including hand-picked officers and NCOs, would be more than enough.
We shall train them for four to six months. In the following 14
months, we shall clear the mountains, valleys, and forests by working
in four groups of 5,000 men. We do not need anything [i.e. additional
hardware] besides helicopters and mountain howitzers.'[2] Although
this memorandum’s specific recommendation with regards to enforcement
is slightly different than that of Gen. Pamukoðlu, the gist of the
arguments are the same – only a fully professional force can
effectively curb the PKK.
Many observers have been criticizing the United States for
mishandling its war on terror for the past six years. The Bush
administration is doing a poor job in fighting terrorism. However,
there is no point in criticizing the United States for its sole
reliance on coercion in fighting terrorism and sparing Turkey from
criticism for the same mistake. As this memorandum argues, there are
myriad options in front of Turkey that have to augment a military
solution. Taking advantage of them would deal the finishing blow to
the PKK.
Barýn Kayaoðlu is a Ph.D. student in history at the University of
Virginia in Charlottesville, Virginia and a regular contributor to
the Journal of Turkish Weekly.
E-mail: [email protected]
[1] Büyükanýt’tan `iki boksör benzetmesi’ [Büyükanýt’s `two boxers’
analogy], ntvmsnbc.com, June 28, 2007; available from
[2] Osman Pamukoðlu, Güneydoðu’da Unutulanlar Dýþýnda Yeni Birþey
Yok: Hakkari ve Kuzey Irak Daðlarýndaki Askerler [Nothing New Except
for What Has Been Forgotten: The Soldiers in the Mountains of Hakkari
and Northern Iraq] (Ýstanbul: Harmoni), 331-2.