TURKEY: A MAJOR REGIONAL POWER TO ENGAGE OR CONFRONT IRAN (1)
By Mehmet OÐutcu*
Today’s Zaman, Turkey
July 19 2007
Turkey — Iran’s next-door neighbor, historic rival and the largest
military/economic power in the region — remains the only country
which can genuinely engage or confront Iran in the region (including
the Middle East, the Caspian Basin and Central Asia).
This holds particularly true at a time when speculation has intensified
about a possible US/Israeli air strike or more targeted sanctions
against Iran due to the nuclear standoff with the West.
Turkey fears that a nuclear Iran may upset the delicate balance of
power in a combustible region where no single country seems dominant.
At the same time, Turkey does not wish to undermine the recent
improvement in bilateral relations with Iran. Iran is unlikely to
make any progress on the nuclear issue given its track record of
tactical delays in complying with the demands of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for comprehensive inspections in Iran.
In this unfolding situation, Turkey is not only expected to play a
crucial role in support of, or against, such moves; it will also be
deeply affected by the consequences of an escalated tension between
Washington/Tel Aviv, Brussels and Tehran. For one thing, Turkey has
declared unequivocally that its territory or airspace will not be
used in any military operations against Iran.
In a departure from its traditional foreign policy and after decades
of passivity, Turkey is now emerging as an important diplomatic actor
in the Middle East in response to structural changes in its security
environment since the end of the Cold War. Iran is considered both a
partner (Iraq, energy exports) and competitor (Central Asia/Caucasus)
in Turkey’s new proactive regional diplomacy. An impending Iranian
crisis or accommodation could ignite a series of long-term economic,
domestic and external security, and foreign policy challenges for
Turkey.
Iran’s growing nuclear capability and the boosting of its current
stock of missiles creates a new security environment and the need for
appropriate responses from Turkey’s military establishment. A nuclear
Iran is likely to heighten Turkey’s interest in missile defense. Yet
current plans for deploying elements of a US missile defense system
in Poland and the Czech Republic are designed to provide protection
against only long-range missile threats from Iran and North Korea,
and they exclude southern Europe and Turkey, effectively dividing
Europe into two unequal zones of security.
This is bound to reinforce Turkey’s sense of insecurity and its
disenchantment with its Western allies since it already faces a
threat from Iran’s short and medium-range systems, some of which
can reach parts of eastern Turkey. In the face of a nuclear Iran,
Turkey may not seek out nuclear programs of its own. This is because,
at least for now, it is perceived and perceives that it is not the
reason Iran has sought to "nuclearize" in the first place.
Another area where Turkey and Iran do not see eye-to-eye is Central
Asia/the Caucasus. An aggressive posture by a nuclear-armed Iran could
lead to an intensification of the political and cultural/economic
competition throughout the Central Asian states — regardless of
their ethnic composition. The involvement of Russia and China in this
evolving situation as Iran’s strategic partners makes the picture
even more complicated.
The Iranian leadership recognizes the energy demand realities that
limit the consequences of US economic sanctions. Therefore Tehran’s
long-term solution is found within the calculus of supply and demand:
Regardless of US sanctions countries experiencing high growth rates
and/or rapid industrialization (China and India), or countries that
have large populations with no indigenous hydrocarbon resources
(Western Europe), will trade with Iran despite the ongoing tension.
In addition the current insurgency in Iraq, along with the consistent
insurgent tactic of targeting oil pipelines there, has an impact on
the markets and will continue to place countries such as Iran —
regardless of the regime’s nature or ideological affiliation —
on the VIP list of oil and gas dealers.
Despite all the rhetoric about coercive measures, for the time being,
the US seems to be walking a fine line with Tehran and warns that
all options are on the table. Yet Washington’s options are limited
by its current military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, by fear
of a shock to global oil prices, by a reluctant Congress and by the
less-than-united front from UN Security Council permanent members.
However the tension is likely to escalate in the later part of this
year as the Iranian intransigence could harden and the US asserts
that no level of Iranian uranium enrichment and expansion of influence
across the region is acceptable. US President George Bush has called
the row with Iran a "grave national security concern" and considers
Turkish support essential in containing it.
When the Iranian question inevitably flares up again, it will no
doubt generate further complexities and uncertainties for Ankara
strategists. Turkey’s leadership has already faced a serious dilemma
in responding to growing pressure from both Washington and Tehran.
Ankara will feel further heat to make a critical choice in what
promises to be a "permanent state of crises" in its region. This
is of particular importance because an indecisive stance as was the
case with Iraq, which has cost Turkey dearly in northern Iraq, is no
longer an easy option.
Turkish-Iranian ties have notably improved over the past several
years after an icy period marked by Turkish accusations that Iran was
sheltering anti-Turkish groups. Bilateral tension over charges that
Iran wants to undermine Turkey’s secular system is "a thing of the
past," in the words of the Turkish Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul. The
turmoil in Iraq, which neighbors both countries, has also brought them
closer and Ankara has lobbied Tehran for a peaceful resolution of its
row with the West over its nuclear program. Ankara has noted Tehran’s
enhanced cooperation in combating Kurdish rebels, who are also active
in Iran, at a time when Washington and Tel Aviv turn a blind eye.
Turkey is well aware of its relatively limited role in the resolution
of the situation but recognizes that this, when considered together
with the present Iraqi debacle, could transform into "a matter of
life and death" for its security and indeed future survival, let
alone the serious economic ramifications it has to live with. Taking
side in a future Iranian crisis either actively or passively will
likely determine the future direction of the efforts to push ahead
the "Kurdish independent state" designs. The incentives could thus
increase for Turkey to sympathize with Iran in alleviating the Kurdish
threat unless Washington provides solid assurance and takes actions
for Iraq’s territorial integrity in tandem with Ankara.
The role of the EU should also be kept in mind. Turkey’s goal of
entering the European Union will not merely rely on a series of
economic and humanitarian overtures of submission, but also on what
it chooses to do in response to a nuclear Iran and disintegrating
Iraq. However the disillusionment with progress in EU accession
negotiations, particularly the "Sarkozy/Merkel factor," could seriously
reduce Brussels’ leverage over the increasingly independent-minded
and assertive Ankara on critical regional issues.
In view of the US’ perception of Iran as a major threat to its
interests in the Middle East, Turkey as a third country will have
somewhat limited leverage or influence to change this perception.
Indeed US leaders have all along made it clear that such a role is
not expected of Turkey. The historic rivalry and lack of trust between
Turkey and Iran too make this very difficult practically.
The relations between Iran and Turkey have been generally peaceful,
but are certainly not free of serious strains at times, particularly
since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Iran’s interest in getting
its own Caspian and Central Asian oil/gas directly to the gulf
and to Europe via Turkey today dominates the top of the agenda of
Turkish-Iranian relations, alongside the security concerns involving
the Iranian anti-regime groups and separatist Kurds.
Iran’s manipulation of the Kurdish and Islamic groups as perceived
in Turkey, its cozy relations and tactical alliance with Armenia
and Greece, its marriage of convenience with Russia and China and
treatment of the Turkic Azeris, which number 25 to 30 million, are
among the most contentious issues. The competition for sphere of
influence in Central Asia and the Caspian, Turkey’s alliance with
the US and Israel, and Turkish influence in Azerbaijan also figure
prominently in shaping the course of the bilateral agenda.
Economic cooperation is set to expand further as both countries
are complementary to one another. Bilateral trade between the two
countries stood at $2.4 billion in 2003. The volume is expected to
reach $10 billion at the end of this year from $6.7 billion in 2006,
of which only $1.1 billion was Turkish exports. The bulk of Iranian
sales to Turkey are in the form of oil and natural gas, carried via
a pipeline linking the two neighbors.
Ankara has been pressing Tehran to reduce the high tariffs it imposes
on Turkish industrial goods in a bid to balance bilateral trade. Both
sides agreed to sign a preferential trade agreement after Turkish
and Iranian officials draw up a list of products the accord will cover.
Other areas of cooperation include oil, gas and the petrochemical
industry, joint industrial production projects like automobile
manufacturing, boosting cooperation on transportation, and investment
projects on mass housing. Both countries are part of the Economic
Cooperation Organization (ECO).
The Turkish government has hinted that the prospect of more UN
sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program would not deter Turkey
from seeking more trade with its eastern neighbor — at least until
such measures are adopted and enforced by the international community.
*Head of OECD Global Forum on International Investment and Non-Members
Liaison Group
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