CONFLICTS, FORECASTS, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS
Written by Shota Malashkhia

Abkhazia, CA

Ju ly 23 2007

Introduction

The idea of putting together a book similar to this monograph has
long been around in the scholarly and political community of Georgia.

In fact, this is due to several reasons, including Russia’s aggressive
policies toward Georgia it pursued ever since dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the instigated internal conflicts in the territory of Georgia,
violation of human rights in the two occupied – factually annexed –
territories, and the lack of effective international involvement in
regulating the mentioned conflicts. The present Monograph describes
how similar developments have evolved in other parts of the world
over the recent decade. It analyses significant facts and processes
bearing a relevance to Georgia and demonstrates what steps the relevant
international organizations have taken so far to assist in resolving
the conflicts and protecting human rights.

The Monograph contains an overview of the UN peacekeeping missions,
their legal mandates and implementation examples, conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, as well as the structure of
organizations called to protect human rights, particularly, the UN
and European Courts, together with their main areas of competence and
specifics. This is the first Georgian-language publication comprising
an account of the international case law relating to the Cyprus-Greece,
Moldova-Russia, Russia-Chechnya relationships and developments in
Rwanda; The Kosovo developments have been addressed only to a length
relevant to Georgia; A special chapter deals with the economic aspects
of conflict settlement.

The authors believe that a due account to the above issues in making
conclusions, as well as drawing parallels and identifying similarities
with the developments in Georgia, is crucial to the resolution of this
country’s main problem – restoration of its territorial integrity. The
Monograph considers the issue of restoration of territorial integrity
both from the standpoint of reinstating Georgia’s jurisdiction in
the uncontrolled territories and safeguarding the universally shared
system of democratic and humanitarian values.

First and foremost, conflict situations are known to affect human
rights and freedoms, together with bringing about economic plight.

Hence, the book’s focus is not only on how international courts and
other international organizations deal with the violations of human
rights and freedoms, but also on a novel approach to the economic
aspects of conflicts that are of no less importance. The authors’
position regarding resolution of conflicts can in a nutshell be
expressed as a tenet "the product from the conflict zone". The approach
accentuates the need for implementation of integrated projects,
as opposed to a general economic rehabilitation. The program called
"The Product from the Conflict Zone" aims to restore trust between
the opposing groups of population through economic cooperation,
which will, in turn, expedite the integration of conflict zones’
population into the Georgian state. The approach is versatile and,
hence, applicable to conflict settlement in other countries.

We believe that the present book will be of interest to a wide circle
of readers and scholars, far beyond the scope of those solely working
on problems specific to Georgia.

Summary Chapter 1, "UN and Peacekeeping Operations", features the main
substance, goals and objectives of peacekeeping. This is a notion
defined as a method for the provision of assistance to countries
that have suffered from a conflict, with a view to reaching peace and
setting conditions for its maintenance. UN peacekeepers – soldiers,
officers, civilian police and civilian personnel from many countries
of the world – control and monitor peace processes in post-conflict
areas, and help ex-combatants fulfil obligations taken under the
signed peace agreements. Such an assistance may come in various forms,
including the support of confidence-building measures, joint discharge
of governance functions, helping with holding elections, strengthening
the law and order, facilitating social and economic development, etc.

Peacekeeping forces have first come to the scene in 1948 as a
reconciliation mission in the first UN- supervised operation.

According to the UN Charter, the UN Security Council is authorized and
responsible for undertaking collective measures aimed at supporting
international peace and security. Therefore, the actions of the
international community are normally based on the principle that
the conduct of peacekeeping operations should be sanctioned by the
UN Security Council. The majority of such operations are designed
and effected by the UN itself, with troops acting under its direct
operational leadership. In other cases, however, where the UN deems
its direct involvement unjustified or inexpedient, the Council tasks
the regional organizations – such as the North-Atlantic Alliance,
Economic Community of West African States, or other coalitions of
countries willing to shoulder some peacekeeping or peace-building
functions – to conduct such operations.

The experiences gained by the UN observer forces in the course of
operations aimed at separating hostile forces in Cyprus in 1964,
coupled with the operational effectiveness of the United Nations
special peacekeeping forces’ Emergency Force II in 1973, have laid
foundation for the elaboration of a number of fundamental principles
underlying the UN peace support operations. In particular: – Support
by the Security Council; 1. as sanctioned by the UN Security Council,
led and controlled by the UN General Secretary on behalf of the UN; 2.
troops shall be manned by servicemen from small- and medium-size
countries, which practically allowed to rule out involvement of
permanent members of the Security Council in the peacekeeping
operations during the cold war period.

The use of weapons solely for self-defence while fulfilling the
mandate, in the event of armed resistance – Impartiality

The peacekeeping forces have saved a lot of lives. On numerous
occasions, these forces provided a valuable help in securing peaceful
settlement of disputes through negotiations and setting necessary
conditions for the fulfilment of agreements reached by confronting
parties under the supervision of peacekeepers.

The Monograph tracks the dynamics of UN peacekeeping operations and
demonstrates their changeable character. In particular, it features the
radical change in the mode of peacekeeping operations which occurred
in 1987, following the expansion of the scale of operations beyond the
traditional model of observing seize-fires and force separations. This
period was marked with the introduction of a peace-building element
into the operations (e.g., neutralizing mines in Cambodia), together
with the humanitarian relief (Somali and Bosnia). Civilians played a
vitally important part in the UN operations in Namibia, Salvador and
Cambodia, performing a variety of tasks, from public administration
and observing elections to investigation into human rights violations.

The Book states that peacekeeping functions have not been clearly
spelled out in the UN Charter, for the simple reason that back in 1945,
when the UN was established, nobody could possibly foresee there would
be any need for such operations in future. One commonly shared belief
of that time was that the world’s five great powers – China, USSR,
UK, USA and France – together could deter or restrain any conflict
nearly anywhere. However, the ensuing period proved otherwise. Hence,
it became necessary to take other methods on board.

As such, peace support operations were ‘born’ with the setting up of
the United Nations Emergency Force during the Suez Canal crisis in
1956. From that time on, there have been the total of thirty peace
support operations conducted in various parts of the world.

The end of cold war triggered a radical change in the mode of
peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN on multilateral basis.

Making use of the newly emerged environment for collaboration, the
Security Council endorsed wider and more complex peace missions,
often aimed at helping the main opposing sides in internal conflicts
to reach an all-embracing peace accord. In 1992, with a view to
meeting the growing demand for comprehensive peace operations,
the UN established the Peace Support Department. The book includes
description of the functions and structure of this department.

The Monograph contains an account of accomplished (Mozambique,
Salvador, Somali, Cambodia) and successful peace missions (Salvador,
Mozambique, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Timor L’Este (former East Timor),
Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia). It is noted
that some of the UN missions have failed due to an over-enthusiastic
assessment of the potential of peacekeeping operations: for instance,
in Somali a seize-fire could not be achieved, nor was it possible to
secure consent of all involved parties for the conduct of peacekeeping
operations. The manning of the operation was insufficient. Moreover,
no political will was demonstrated to resolve the conflict, which
made it impossible to perform the mandate properly and duly. A series
of disfunctionalities – the most painful of which were the 1996 mass
killings in Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the 1994 genocide
in Rwanda – urged the UN to embark on a serious reorganization work
and undertake a self-analysis.

In 1999, based on the comprehensive analysis of the tragedies in
Srebrenica and Rwanda, Kofi Annan arrived at the conclusion that the
UN peacekeeping activities were to be thoroughly reformed. He ordered
an independent investigation to study the activities of the UN in the
course of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The obtained findings clearly
demonstrated the need for enhancing the UN peacekeeping capacity. The
report of the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations, commonly known
as Brahimi report, provides clear-cut recommendations, setting minimum
requirements for a successful conduct of the UN peace missions. The
reports underscored the importance of clear and credible mandates,
together with need to secure the consent of conflicting parties for the
conduct of the UN peace operations and provision of adequate resources.

Based on this report, the UN and its member-countries effected a
number of measures aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the UN
peace operations. The UN Department for Peace Keeping Operations
was tasked to increase its headquarters staffing in support of field
missions. The Department enlarged its Military and Civilian Police
Advisers’ Division. Apart from this, it launched the Peacekeeping Best
Practices Unit, charged with analyzing the accumulated experiences
and providing recommendations to the UN missions on such matters
as: general issues, peacekeepers’ code of conduct, disarmament,
planning demobilization and reintegration programs, keeping the law
and order, etc.

On 20 December 2005, the parallel sessions of the UN General Assembly
and the Security Council endorsed the resolution on the establishment
of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. This new intergovernmental advisory
body is called to provide a post-conflict recovery assistance and
mobilize resources to this end.

In our view, of particular interest to the reader will be the
deliberations regarding the UN peace mission in Kosovo. The more
so that Georgia’s opponents are now attempting to apply Kosovo’s
precedent to the current conflicts in this country.

In Kosovo, regardless the large scale and complex structure of the
conflict, the UN opted for an unprecedented and daring experiment.

Not a single UN mission in the preceding period has ever engaged
other multilateral organizations as full-fledged partners in the
peace operations held under the UN auspices.

The peace mission in Kosovo was endorsed on 10 June 1999, when
the UN Security Council passed resolution #1244 and authorized
the UN Secretary General to establish the UN-led Interim Civil
Administration in the war-torn Kosovo. Under its leadership,
the Kosovo population could gradually start exercising the rights
of a virtual autonomy. Specifically, through resolution #1244, the
Security Council charged the mission with the following tasks: 
perform basic civilian administrative functions;  promote the
establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo;
 facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s future
status;  coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all
international agencies;  support the reconstruction of key
infrastructure;  maintain civil law and order; 
promote human rights; and  assure the safe and unimpeded
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.

Having enlisted the help of Kosovo’s leadership and population, the
mission shouldered the task of implementing essential administrative
functions and services, encompassing such areas as healthcare,
education, banking system and finances, postal services and
communication, and maintenance of civil law and order.

~U In January 2000, various departments of the joint administrative
structure were formed. In October 2000, 30 municipalities of
Kosovo held local elections; May 2001 saw adoption of Kosovo’s new
constitutional frameworks.

With a view to fulfilling its mandate, the UN mission in Kosovo took
control of four areas, in other words "pillars", of administration.

Pillar 1 (humanitarian relief) – led by the Office Higher Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) was launched upon completion of the emergency
stage and phased out by June 2000. In May 2001, a new Pillar 1 was
introduced. Presently, there are the following pillars: 
Police and justice, under the United Nations,  Civil
administration, under the United Nations,  Democratisation
and institution-building, led by the Organization for Security,
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and  Reconstruction and
Economic Development, led by the European Union.

The Head of UNMK is a special representative of the UN Secretary
General. He controls and oversees the progress of work undertaken
by the above four pillars and facilitates the political processes
leading to determination of Kosovo’s political status.

On 10 December 2003, a Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General, Mr. Holkery, officially voiced his plan known as "Standards
for Kosovo". This document is an important landmark towards securing
compliance with the eight standards for Kosovo that should be met
infallibly prior to consideration of the issue of Kosovo’s status.

The Reader will also find the citing of ten guiding principles of the
Contact Group for a settlement of the status of Kosovo. This latter,
de jure being a part of Serbia has been under UN administration since
1999. So far, the negotiations aimed at determining Kosovo’s status
in accordance with universally recognized principles of international
law, remain largely unsuccessful. This year alone, there were four
summit meetings held with the mediation of the UN Special Envoy for
Future Status Process in Kosovo, Martti Antisaari, former President
of Finland. Sadly, all of these meetings were in vain.

The Albanian side sets forth a categorical ultimatum for independence,
while the Serb leadership rules out such a possibility totally and
completely. At negotiations, the Serb side expressed its readiness
to grant Kosovo a broad autonomy within Serbia’s borders that would
be guaranteed by a special constitutional agreement.

According to the suggested agreement, Serbia is prepared to delegate
the local legislative, executive and judiciary authority to Kosovo,
with Belgrade retaining foreign policy and border protection functions.

In addition, in the course of negotiations, the heads of
Serbian delegation, President Boris Tadic and Prime Minister
Vojislav Kostunica, circulated among the foreign ministers of the
member-countries of the Kosovo Contact Group (USA, Germany, Russia,
Italy, France and UK) and to Marti Antisaari, a document containing
proposals for further negotiations.

The circulated document suggests that the dialogue between Belgrade and
Pristina should concentrate on four major issues: 1. Elaboration of the
new constitution of Kosovo 2. Security of Kosovo’s Serbian population
3. Economic and financial relations 4. Decentralization of the province

The Security Council and the UN General Assembly have considered the
issue of Kosovo’s status at their sessions but have failed to come
at any concerted decision.

On February 14 this year, Serbia’s Skupcina, by the absolute
majority of votes (225 against 15, with 3 abstained), endorsed a
government-submitted draft resolution fully rejecting the basic
provisions of the plan set forth by M. Antisaari, Special Envoy of
the UN Secretary General, on February 2.

The Serbian MPs dismissed M. Antisaari’s major principles as totally
illegitimate, as they speak about according all essential attributes
of an independent statehood to Kosovo, also leaving certain elements
of international protectorate.

The Resolution points out that ‘Antisaari’s plan’ violates the basic
principles of international law, disregards the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Serbia as regards Kosovo and Metohija, and
paves the way for an illegitimate establishment of a new independent
state inside the territory of Serbia. This ‘imposed independence’
of the province, the MPs’ contend, will be fraught with unforeseeable
consequences. They caution that the virtual independence of Kosovo will
create "an exceptionally dangerous precedent for resolving minority
issues and territorial disputes throughout Europe and the world
". "Such an outcome would destabilize the situation in the region
for the long term, and cloud the European prospects of the entire
Western Balkans". Serbia’s National Assembly called on all countries
and international organizations to stand up to the threat to Serbia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity and reject any imposed solution
regarding Kosovo.

Russia’s position in respect to Kosovo’s status was made
crystal-clear both by President Putin and Minster of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Lavrov. This position is fully reflected in a document, called
"On Russia’s Position at the 61st Session of the UN General Assembly"
placed on the official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation. The document states that the decision
regarding Kosovo’s status should be universal and precedental by
nature; Earlier on, (September 2006), V. Putin elaborated on the
expediency of applying the international standards, similar to
those used with respect to Serbia-Kosovo, to the South Ossetian
and Abkhazian conflicts in the territory of Georgia. In his view,
the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by international community,
will knock off any grounds from under non-recognition of Abkhazia’s
and South Ossetia’s independence. At the same time, V. Putin noted
he would not rule out that Russia would use its veto right during
the voting on Kosovo’s status at the UN Security Council.

The US and Western countries have a different position about this
issue. They talk about the unique nature of the Kosovo issue and note
the specificities of the conflict, pointing out in how different it
is from other conflicts.

In response to Russian politicians’ attempts to artificially inflate
the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts in parallel with Kosovo and
insisting upon applying the same common and universal approaches to
these conflicts, the authors point out the distinctions between the
Georgian and Yugoslavian (Kosovo) conflicts which make them totally
different in nature.

In the view of the Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues
of the Parliament of Georgia, drawing parallels between the actions
of the governments of Georgia and Yugoslavia is an out-of-place and
nonsensical exercise. Neither would it be appropriate to speak about
similarities between these conflicts due to the following reason:
the majority of Kosovo’s population is Albanian (77% of Albans,
and 13% – Serbs), and this majority has expressly manifested its
support of independence. By comparison, holding any opinion polls in
connection with determination of Abkhazia’s status would totally be
devoid of any sense, as the majority of population have been ousted
from this territory (This opinion is unequivocally supported by the
European Union).

Yet another important circumstance should be mentioned here. As is well
known, the majority of the present population in Abkhazia and Ossetia
have been granted the Russian citizenship. Under such conditions,
participation of the persons that are citizens of one country in
a referendum on the independence of territories in another country
is a juridical nonsense. No such examples can be found in the world
practice.

It is commonly known that there was a genocide of the Albanian
population in Kosovo, while in Abkhazia, it was the Georgian population
that fell victim to the genocide and ethnic cleansing.

Until now, Russia undertakes permanent attempts to annex the
territory, a fact corroborated by a number of reputable international
organizations.

At OSCE meetings, the member countries have more than once raised
concerns about the ethnic cleansing of Georgians, their mass expulsion
from the places of their residence, and the killings of a large number
of the civilian population (Resolution of 6 December 1994 of the OSCE
Budapest Meeting ; OSCE Lisbon Summit Declaration of 2-3 December 1996;
OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration of 19 November 1999).

And still, the major difference lies in the fact that in case of
Yugoslavia the Serbian-Albanian confrontation was only too evident,
while the conflicts in this country hardly bear the nature of a direct
Georgian-Ossetian or Georgian-Abkhazian confrontation. Rather, what we
see in the latter case is Russia’s outright aggression against Georgia.

A separate chapter is devoted to a brief review of Yugoslavia’s
history, in particular: creation of the Yugoslav statehood and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, confrontation between the USSR and
Yugoslavia, protestations in the country over the status of the
Yugoslav Republic, as well as referendums on the independence held
in the constituent republics and the Dayton Agreement.

On 28 September 1995, at the Wright-Patterson air force base, near
Dayton (State of Ohio), USA, The General Framework Agreement for Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Agreement), with its 11 annexes, was
initialled with the participation of representatives of the Bosnian,
Croatian and Serbian conflicting parties.

Upon its signing in Paris on 14 December 1995, the enforced agreement
envisioned establishment of a joint state consisting of Bosnia and
Herzegovina within the confines of the 1990 borders. The Republic
was to consist of two parts – the Serb Republic and Muslim Croat
Federation.

Conditionally, the Agreement could be split into two parts: a set of
military questions and problems related to the civilian settlement.

It provided for stationing a large, 60-thousand-strong NATO contingent
in the Bosnian territory with a view to observing the seize-fire,
with American servicemen amounting to almost half the number of
troops. Apart from this, the post of High Representative of the
International Community was introduced, whose wide competencies are
indicative of nothing short of the establishment of an international
protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Book points out that the Dayton Agreement was most instrumental
in stopping the bloodshed brought about by ethnic confrontation. The
NATO troops managed to separate the conflicting forces, enabling
a part of displaced persons to return to their homes. Over recent
years, the country has made a certain headway in the political
and social sphere. Bosnia and Herzegovina are now going through a
constitutional reform, parallel to the ongoing integration process
into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Although, in the
opinion of international experts, this latter process falls behind
the respective rate of development of interrelationships between
Brussels and other Balkan countries.

Similar to the other Eastern European nations, Serbian people failed
to build a true democratic society over the period of 1945-1990,
as they were clutched in the grips of one-party dictatorship and
one overarching ideology. All of these countries were ruled by a
hypertrophic central power.

In truth, despite the formally declared ‘people’s power’, Yugoslavia
was fully subject to the dictatorship of the ruling party, having
zero tolerance for any discording of opinion. The ethnic issue was
pronounced as finally resolved, although, in fairness, there were
numerous gross violations from the interethnic relations viewpoint.

Hence, the authors conclude that the outbreak of nationalism in that
country was the price it paid for the many years of dictatorship.

After the death of Joseph Broz Tito who ruled with a firm feast
and managed to maintain social order and relative integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia over four decades, the strive for
independence amongst the republics that constituted the Federation
and the weakening of the centre became particularly prominent.

According to the author, one of the primary reasons for the collapse
of Yugoslavia was an extremely uneven level of economic development
of the constituent republics.

The Monograph also comprises deliberations on the topic of the Hague
International Court and the Hague International Tribunal.

As is well known, 27 February 2006 saw the commencement of
unprecedented hearings at Hague: for the first time in history,
individual countries – rather than citizens – acted both as the
plaintiff and the respondent.

Bosnia and Herzegovina accused Serbia and Montenegro of the breach
of the Convention for the Prevention War Crimes in 1992-1995 and of
the genocide and ethnic cleansing committed against the non-Serbian
population, which claimed the heavy toll of 100,000 lives.

Despite the fact that the complaints were lodged as early as 1993,
the judges were able to commence the hearing of this complex case
only in 2006. This has been the first litigation initiated by one
former Yugoslav republic against the other.

As to the Hague Tribunal, established in connection with former
Yugoslavia, in total, from its inception until now, it delivered
judgements on 16 individuals. In January 2004, the Hague International
Tribunal issued an arrest warrant for another 12 persons charged with
war crimes.

According to the most recent information, the Tribunal has issued
indictments on 125 persons, out of which 16 are still absconding
justice. The best known figures among these are President Slobodan
Milosevic and sixteen other influential political and military leaders
of former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Serbs leader, former president
Radovan Karacic and the Serbian army commander Ratko Mladić.

On 10 July 2006, the Hague Tribunal began one of the most resonating
litigations over its history, with six former leaders of Serbia and
the Federative Republic of Yugoslavia behind the bar, including the
former president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic.

Chapter 3 of the Book deals with the topic of armed conflicts in
the post-Soviet space.

The end of cold war, together with the demise of totalitarian communist
regimes and collapse of the socialist system in the 80’s and 90’s
of the 20th century, resulted in a major redesign of the world’s
political spectrum.

Former soviet republics expressly demonstrated their aspiration toward
building their respective independent statehoods.

This period was also marked by the emergence of separatists
sentiments, inspired by the former centre, which in a number of
locations manifested the tendency towards growing into regional
conflicts (Transdniestria, Abkhazia, former South Ossetian Oblast,
the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast).

Notably, all four leaders of the rebellious regions were members of
the ‘Sojuz’ faction of the Council of People’s Deputies of the Soviet
Union. Unsurprisingly, they were string-manipulated from the centre.

The authors hold that, despite the varying forms, these conflicts are
identical in substance. They analyse the root-causes of the conflicts
and draw distinctions between their three types: a) conflicts inspired
by self-determination demands of ethnic minorities; 2) conflicts
related to the re-distribution of the former USSR property; and,
finally, c) conflicts that have acquired the character of a civil war.

As a rule, conflicts driven by demands for self-determination and
the re-tailoring of administrative borders, have been found to
evolve three major stages. First, there comes a relatively peaceful
stage, characterized by a growing ‘war of laws’ between the central
authorities and the political elite of the ethnic minorities,
demanding wider political and economic freedoms. Typically, neither
of the sides is flexible enough to reach an accord or come to a
compromise. For instance, in the mid-perestroika period, Nagorny
Karabakh’s Armenian population, set forth a petition to the Azerbaijan
government claiming a broad national and territorial autonomy, also
implying the possibility of acceding to Armenia.

Seeing these claims as a real threat of separatism, including a
possible break-away of the Armenian part of the Nagorno-Karabakh
oblast, the Azerbaijani leadership, categorically refused to consider
the demand and attempted to settle the problem forcefully.

The Supreme Council of the Armenian Republic and the National
Council of the Nagorny Karabakh adopted a joint decision declaring
the accession of Nagorny Karabakh to Armenia. The decision came in
response to the adoption by Azerbaijan of the Law on Sovereignty,
according to which Nagorny Karabakh, together with the rest of
Azerbaijan, could pull out from the USSR any moment in time.

The above decision turned out to serve as a prologue to an open
armed confrontation.

Developments in Moldova evolved by a similar scenario. The
Supreme Council of the self-proclaimed republic of Transdniestria
presented numerous proposals to the Parliament of Moldova to sign a
federative constitutional agreement. As the proposals were rejected,
the representatives of Transdniestria refused to participate in the
work of the parliament to demonstrate their protest. In the following
period, Transdniestria issued a number of laws directly conflicting
with Moldova’s acting constitution. This entailed reciprocal steps
on the part of the country’s leadership, expressed in a consistent
dismissal of these laws as illegitimate.

A similar ‘war of laws’ scenario was played with respect to the
so-called South Ossetia. Perestroika sparked off a growing movement
for independence statehood in the majority of Soviet republics,
including Georgia. As a counter measure, the Kremlin resorted to
fanning the flames of separatist sentiments. Such sentiments aspiring
to achieve a maximal autonomy from Georgia were basically prevalent
among Ossetia’s political elite.

As a rule, in each case the ‘war of laws’ was waged in parallel with
the introduction of economic sanctions, the orchestrated subversive
activities and terrorist acts, all of these contributing to the
spilling of the existent confrontation into an armed conflict.

As a chain reaction, a fight unleashed by one national minority was
added to by unrests stirred among other minorities. In Moldova,
Transdniestria’a movement for autonomy was bolstered by the
protestations of gagauzs residing to the south of Moldova. Similar to
this, in Georgia, the Abkhazs started setting forth their own demands
for broader rights, thus backing up the protestations of the South
Ossetian Oblast.

The second stage of this type of conflict involves an armed
confrontation. Normally, at this stage, the conflicting parties
undertake attempts to internationalize the conflict and call on their
potential allies for help or mediation. At the same time they do all
they can to denigrate one another in the eyes of the international
community. In every instance, each side harboured an illusory hope that
it would soon gain a major military victory, which pushed the situation
further into a deadlock, leaving little room for peaceful negotiations.

Another feature typical of all conflicts in the CIS space was that
prior to major talks each conflicting party tried to grab control over
as much territory as possible, so that it could sit at the negotiation
table comfortably cushioned by the head-start gained in such a way.

Hence, the development of conflicts into an armed confrontation stage
did nothing to expedite the settlement of these conflicts. On the
contrary, it added on the gruesome "burden" of more mutual claims,
hurt feelings, grave confrontations, and new scores to settle.

Stage 3 – de-escalation of conflicts on the basis of seize-fire
agreements.

For a number of reasons, the end of hostilities has brought about no
final and comprehensive settlement of the conflicts until now.

Unfortunately, the attained peace is very fragile, while the root
causes and political discordances that had led to the conflicts remain
largely unresolved.

So far, no solution has been found to the problem of safe return of
refugees and IDPs to their home places. This fact accounts for the
existence of a large category of people which, sooner or later, may
turn into a serious political force that could trigger a new wave of
tensions in the region.

Such a course of events indicates to the fact that despite the
many efforts of the international and regional conflict-resolution
organizations, their effectiveness remains disappointingly low. This
is particularly evident in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazian
conflicts.

Property-redistribution related conflicts are potentially linked to
the disagreements over quotas for the redistribution of the former
USSR property. The most illustrative example of such is the conflict
between Russia and Ukraine over the Black Sea fleet.

The first stage of the conflict emerged in July 1990, straight
after Ukraine’s declaration of independence. Ukraine’s political
argumentation in the dispute was based on the premise that the
republic’s share in the former USSR national income equalled about 25%,
while the Black Sea fleet accounted only for 9.2% of the entire USSR
fleet. Besides, 44% of all the Black Sea fleet ships had been built
in Ukraine. Russia, on its part, maintained that it was entitled
to 78% of all the Black Sea fleet ships, while Ukraine could only
claim 22%. As the tensions escalated, Ukraine resorted to a number
of attempts that were, in effect, aimed at gaining control over the
entire Black See fleet. From January 1992, without any prior agreement
with the Russian Defence Ministry, Ukraine started financing the entire
fleet unilaterally. It was only after rounds of arduous negotiations,
that a solution was reached by which both the countries would allocate
equal sums from their budgets to finance the fleet.

This decision provided a headway for the transfer of the conflict
into the second stage, where disputes over the Black Sea fleet were
put into the frameworks of agreements. The peace accord achieved
in Dagomyss on 22 July 1992, provided for a transition period for
the division of the fleet to cover the period until 1995, however
the agreement contained no indication of the major issue, as to
what mechanism would be used in the division process. What’s more,
certain decision dragged the situation further into a stalemate.

Without resolving the issue of the fleet’s status, it was decided that
its Commander would be appointed by the mutual agreement by the two
Presidents and would take orders both form the Russian and Ukrainian
President. Besides, the parties made a decision on the establishment
of a joint commission with a view to overseeing the implementation of
the Yalta Agreement, comprising members of Russia’s, Ukraine’s and
Crimea’s Supreme Councils and the Sevastopol Municipality Council,
which largely remained unaffected.

Another subject of contention between Russia and Ukraine was a dispute
over Crimea, which back in January-February 1954, was pulled out from
the Russian Federation and adjoined to Ukraine.

Stage 3 of the conflicts – civil war.

A telling example of this conflict stage has been the civil war in
Tajikistan. Its root cause of was an increasingly high confrontation
between the many political forces in the country, representing various
social layers (tribes, local clans, etc.).

A political compromise turned out practically impossible, which led
to an armed confrontation. The first telling sign of a starting civil
war was the beginning of armed clashes between the armed formations
legally subordinated to different political forces, followed by a
gradual escalation of fights over time.

The traditional antagonism was further exacerbated by a
region-to-region confrontment and the class dissent between the old
forces (the so-called ‘party nomenclature’) and the representatives
of a new political movement waging the war under the Islamic Revival
flag. Apparently, it will take decades of politicians’ and diplomats’
self-devoted efforts to undo this intricately woven bundle of problems.

Understandably, the Monograph gives a great deal of attention to the
conflicts that emerged in Georgia in the early 90’s. It views the root
causes of the conflicts through the prism of the highly complicated
history of Russian-Georgia relations, also devoting ample attention
to the consideration of the evolution of conflicts, progress of peace
processes and the mistakes made in their course. In this connection,
the authors suggest a tool to activate the above processes.

The Monograph speculates on the major impact Georgia’s geographic
location spanning over its entire history and development, and
determining the country’s major cultural and historical mission in
the Caucasus.

Historically, no country with any strength and imperial ambitions was
ever able by-pass the Caucasus if, indeed, it aspired to become an
empire. It aspired to consolidate its borders in the Caucasus or,
better even, across the Caucasus. Naturally, in either instance,
it came head-to-head with Georgia, the central country in the region.

Last aggressor that subjugated the Caucasus insistently and
step-by-step, was the Russian Empire. Its tireless attempts to conquer
the Caucasus span over the period of more than two centuries.

This plan was implemented methodically and consistently.

The main strategies employed by Russia to gain control over Georgia
were based upon the following factors: 1. Internal factor – the region
being a melting pot of a great number of ethnicities and religions,
which offered considerable chances to stir internal contradictions.

2. External factor – a frantic confrontment between Iran and the
Ottoman Empire over the Caucasus and their century-long fight,
which finally – along with the domestic reasons – significantly
weakened the two countries, leaving them outside the playfield of big
geopolitical games for a lengthy time; 3. A plan to turn Georgia into
the gendarme of the Caucasus – a total and complete contradiction with
the historical role/mission of this country; 4. Demographic expansion

The Monograph describes how the Russian Empire proceeded along these
strategic lines and what techniques it had used starting from the
18th century until now.

To a certain degree, Russia succeeded in reversing the positive energy
expended into the building of the Common Caucasus Home to a negative
charge, by purposefully embroiling North Caucasians in the conflict it
instigated in Abkhazia. Prior to that, it orchestrated the toppling
down of the Georgian government that came to power democratically
in 1991-1992.

Importantly, apart from geopolitical interests, the engagement of North
Caucasians into the Abkhazian conflict by Russia pursued yet another,
insidious goal. More specifically, this exercise was meant to divert
the North Caucasians’ attention from their own problems onto Georgia.

It is well known that in the early 90’s, against the backdrop of
growing religious and national identity sentiments in North Caucasus,
the level of unemployment among the youth was particularly high.

Social problems served a feeding ground for the ripening of ethnic
confrontation between representatives of various ethnic groups. The
increasing dissatisfaction with the existing situation inevitably
lead to an escalation of tensions and eventual confrontation with the
centre. Under these circumstances, with a view to camouflaging the
existing problems and avoiding the need to address them, the Russian
authorities did all in their power to ensure that the accumulated
negative energy vented onto Georgia.

The authors note that during the Soviet period separatism movement in
Abkhazia was acquiring an organized form. An extremely sharp episode
of exacerbation of the Georgian-Abkhaz relations coincides with the
adoption of the 1977 Constitution. The confrontation occurred around
the issue of Abkhazia’s status.

The onset of ‘perestroika’ processes back in 1985, enabled Georgia
to openly launch the national liberation movement for the its
independence.

A new, decisive stage of this movement in the country began in
1988. Unsurprisingly, the same period was marked by intensification
of separatists movements inspired by the Centre. Their first serious
manifestation was the "Abkhaz letter’ addressed to the 1st All-Union
Conference of the Communist Party.

This show of separatist sentiments reached its peak with the gathering
of the Abkhaz population in v. Lykhni, Gudauta district, on 18 March
1989, which adopted an address to the leadership of the Soviet Union
fully permeated with anti-Georgian rhetoric. This, in truth, was a
petition to decede from Georgia. Soon, there followed provocations of
blood-shedding attacks on Georgians (1-2 April 1989, 15-16 July 1989).

In order to keep the heat of the exacerbated confrontation with the
Georgian population, Moscow’s special services aided and financed
the setting up of a number of anti-Georgian organizations, such as
"Aidgilara", "Slavjanski do", "Krounk" and "Alan".

*** The situation in the South Ossetian Oblast became tense when its
local authorities passed a decision on the assignment of a higher
status to the autonomous oblast on 10 November 1989, proclaiming the
transformation of the oblast into the Soviet democratic republic and
declaring its sovereignty.

Similar processes were also underway in Abkhazia. In the early 90’s,
through a gross violation of the law, the Abkhaz separatists adopted
a resolution "On Legal Guarantees for the Protection of Akhazia’s
Statehood", coupled with "The declaration on the state sovereignty
of the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Republic".

Apparently, all these steps by separatists and their accomplices,
were targeted at provoking larger clashes against the Georgian
people. In the end, Georgia was dragged into a most severe, lengthy
and blood-shedding war raging in its two provinces – all of this was
aimed at stifling Georgia’s aspirations towards independence. The
conflicts took a heavy toll of casualties, including thousands of
dead, tens of thousands of wounded, over 300,000 displaced persons,
tens of thousands of destroyed houses, accompanied by destruction
of material and cultural artefacts. In effect, by using the Abkhaz
and Ossetian separatists as a cat’s paw and engaging its own regular
forces in decisive moments of battles, Russia committed an act of
actual occupation and annexation of Georgia.

The ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Georgian population is
still continuing. However, the Georgian government has not abandoned
its efforts to settle the conflicts peacefully. On 24 July 1992,
in Dagomyss (Russia) an agreement was signed "On the Principles of
Settlement of the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict", which resulted in the
setting up and stationing of tripartite peace-keeping forces (Russia,
Georgia, and Northern Ossetia) on the ground.

On 4 April 1994, a quadripartite agreement on "Voluntary Return
of Refugees and IDPs from Abkhazia" was signed in Moscow, together
with a release of a statement "On the Political Settlement of the
Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict".

On 14 May 1994, with the mediation of the Russian Federation,
the Georgian and Abkhaz sides signed an agreement on ceasefire and
separation of forces. On 24 July 1994, CIS collective peace-keeping
forces (1600 servicemen and ammunition) entered the conflict zone.

Disrespecting the peace negotiations conducted so far, on 24 November
1994, the Abkhaz side adopted the so-called constitution of the Abkhaz
Republic, declaring Abkhazia a sovereign state.

On 19 January 1996, the Moscow CIS Summit adopted a decision "On the
Measures for Settlement of the Conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia".

The document denounces the destructive stance of the Abkhaz side,
holding it responsible for dragging-out the political settlement
process, along with the safe return of IDPs to their homes.

Georgia enjoys an unequivocal support of the international community.

Attesting to this are the many documents adopted by the UN, OSCE,
EU which reconfirm Georgia’s territorial integrity and condemn the
ethnic cleansing.

Although donned in the cloak of a peacekeeper, the Russian government,
holding a dominance position in the post-Soviet space, has never taken
a single realistic step toward a true resolution of conflicts. On the
contrary, it has offered and is still offering a fierce resistance
to the Government of Georgia, by taking a clear-cut anti-Georgian
stance at international organizations. This is manifested in the
non-observance of the documents that truly aim at settlement of the
conflicts. For instance, according to paragraph 27.3 of Chapter 5 of
the UN Charter, the Security Council adopts decisions on all matters by
affirmative vote of its nine members, including all permanent members
of the Council. At the same time, pursuant to Chapter 4, paragraph
52. 3, the member that is party to the dispute in question should
abstain from participating in the voting. In order to enable this
provision, the Russian Federation must be officially recognized as a
party to the conflict. To achieve this, Georgia needs the support of
international organizations and certain states. In view of the above,
the Georgian government deems it crucially important to boost the role
of these latter, together with changing the format of peacekeeping
operations and conducting negotiations directly with the Abkhaz side,
as an essential prerequisite for the commencement of the settlement
process.

The provided examples of conflicts allow to single out the basic
preconditions for conflict resolution: 1. Stop combat activities and
restrain conflicting parties 2. Achieve a peace agreement; determine
the subject of the conflict; determine the status.

The authors set forth the basic goals corresponding to each
stage. In particular: – unconditional non-resumption of fire and
stopping hostilities, disarming and disbanding confronting parties’
paramilitary formations; – withdrawing all military units from the
conflict zone and from all neighbouring countries participating in
the combat activities, including volunteer formations.

– unconditional release of all hostages; bringing to justice all
instigators of the armed conflict and perpetrators of criminal acts.

– unblocking all transport and rail road routes; – delivering
humanitarian relief to the population in the conflict zone; –
maintain and strengthen the law and order through cooperation of the
police services of the parties – safe return of refugees and IDPs
to their homes under guarantees and supervision of the respective
international organizations – holding elections – rehabilitation of
the main infrastructure facilities, residential buildings and economy
on the whole;

The main goal of Stage 2 is determination of the status through
application of universally recognized principles of the international
law.

Chapter 4 of the publication deals with the international structures
working in the field of human rights protection, including their
respective scopes of competence and specificities.

By joining the Council of Europe in April 1999 and ratifying the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in May of the same year, Georgia has officially recognized
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights, which acts
as the guarantor of the observance of rights and freedoms spelled
out in the Convention.

The fact that the breakaway regions remain outside the factual
jurisdiction of the Georgian state renders the country incapable
of ensuring protection of human rights through domestic remedies in
respect to the citizens that reside in those territories. Hence, the
most efficient instrument for reinstatement of their abused rights is
the application to the European Court of Human Rights. Its judgments
on a number of cases serve as guiding benchmarks for Georgia. It is
for this reason exactly that the Temporary Commission on Territorial
Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia prepared two draft
resolutions, unanimously approved at the plenary session of Georgia’s
parliament on 17 March 2006.

Ratification of the European Convention for Human Rights affords
every individual under its jurisdiction an opportunity to apply
to the Strasbourg Court to ensure restoration of his/her violated
rights. The analysis and generalization of the international court
practice suggests that Georgia should take necessary steps in order to
lodge a complaint against Russia with the United Nations International
Court of Justice for the violations it committed in the conflict
regions of Georgia.

The conflicts that emerged in Georgia in early 90’s, resulted in the
ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population, which was reflected in
the respective documents of a number of international organizations.

At the OSCE meeting, the participating countries expressed their deep
concern over the ethnic cleansing and mass expulsion of citizens –
predominantly Georgians – from places of their residence, as well
as the killing of a large number of civilians. On 21 February 2006,
the country presiding over European Union made a statement on EU’s
behalf in connection to Georgia. The statement was joined practically
by all European countries, except Russia and Belarus.

The Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the
Parliament of Georgia, deems it necessary to establish an ad hoc
working group in order to intensify work with the Baltic countries,
Turkey – as a neighbouring country, Ukraine, Poland and others,
to ensure the recognition of the fact of annexation of Abkhazia
and Tskhinvali by Russia. All of these countries have one feature
in common. They are all embroiled in disputes with Russia as Soviet
Union’s legal successor, whereas Georgia’s claim to Russia relates
to the developments that occurred after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union.

Bringing all crime perpetrators to justice is an essential
precondition for conflict resolution and restoration of trust.

Therefore, Georgia deems it necessary to pose the issue of
establishment of an international tribunal for prosecution of violators
of the international law in the territory of Abkhazia, both with the
UN and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

Presently, as universally known, there are international tribunals,
established by the Security Council, for Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Not
so long ago, the idea of establishing an international tribunal for
crimes committed in Chechnya was debated most actively. In 2003,
The Council of Europe applied to the United Nations with a request to
look into the issue of creating an international tribunal for Chechnya.

Apparently, bringing violators of the international criminal law
before international criminal courts is a much simpler undertaking
compared to the establishment of international tribunals, requiring
a special decision of the Security Council. An international court
is a permanent body whose jurisdiction allows prosecution of physical
persons for serious crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes, and aggression crimes.

On 17 July 1998, the Statute of the International Criminal Court
was signed in Rome. The Georgian parliament ratified the Statute on
July 2003.

Given the above, a considerable attention is given to the overview
of the case law precedents, presented in the form of court judgments.

Each case has a relevance to the steps that Georgia is about to take,
in as much as they can serve as guiding benchmarks of principle
importance.

The book draws an example of the 18 December 1996 judgement of European
Court of Human Rights’ on the Loizidou against Turkey case.

This many-year long litigation set one of the most illustrative and
positive precedents in the international law. A citizen of the Republic
of Cyprus, Titina Loizidou, who claimed that she had lost the right
of access and enjoyment of her property following occupation of the
northern part of the country by Turkey, won the case. As a result,
the respondent party, Turkey, had to pay Mrs.

Loizidou a substantial monetary compensation for the incurred damage.

Another example bearing a crucial significance for Georgia is the
case of Ilaşcu and others against Moldova and the Russian
Federation. The European Court of Human Rights judged in respect to
a citizen of Moldova, Ilaşcu and his group members on 8 July 2004.

The armed conflict in Moldova violated practically all aspects of the
universally recognized principles for the protection of fundamental
human rights. An illegitimate court of the Transdniestrian separatist
regime issued Ilaşcu a death penalty, while the others were
sentenced to many years of imprisonment. The detainees were kept in the
territory of a Russian military base. They were subject to an inhuman
treatment – tortured, denied food, disallowed to receive visits from
relatives or representatives of international organizations. They were
also deprived of a possibility to send or receive mail and contact
a lawyer or other courts. Owing to the efforts of the international
community and the European Court of Human Rights Ilaşcu and his
group were freed and were afforded a substantial compensation.

The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered
three judgements on 24 February 2005 with regard to a complaint of
violated rights filed by six citizens of Russia (Khashiev and Akaev
vs Russia, Isaeva, Yousopouva and Bazaeva vs Russia, Zara Isaeva
vs. Russia). The Court deliberated on the violation of rights of the
Chechen citizens, contending that the responsibility for the violations
fully rested with the Russian Federation, and obliged this latter to
pay respective compensations to the plaintiffs.

In addition to the above, the book brings up the facts related to the
Rwandan developments in the 80’s and 90’s of the last century. On
8 November 1994, the Security Council adopted a resolution on the
establishment of the Tribunal for Rwanda to deliberate on the acts of
genocide committed in the territory of Rwanda. In total, the tribunal
delivered 18 judgements.

The European system of justice for the protection of human rights
contains one foremost feature, as it can receive, admit and judge on
the claims lodged by one state against another. According to Chapter
33 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, any member of the Convention is entitled to
bring a complaint to the Court regarding a suspected violation of the
Convention and its Protocols by another state. The CoE member-states
have resorted to this measure in numerous instances.

These instances relate to six cases: Greece vs United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (two complaints form Greece against the
United Kingdom concerning the situation in Cyprus in 1956-67), Austria
vs Italy (six juveniles claiming that they were deprived of the right
to fair judgment in connection with the killing of a customs officer),
Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden against Greece (four plaintiffs
claiming being tortured by Greek colonels), Cyprus vs Turkey (1978,
two claimants from Cyprus claiming the violation of the rights of
Greek-Cypriots by Turkey following the occupation of Cyprus by Turkey),
Ireland vs the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
(twelve suspected members of the Irish Republican Army being subject
to five forms of inhuman or degrading treatment during interrogation),
Cyprus against Turkey (regarding the outcomes of operations in the
northern part of Cyprus), Denamrk, France, Netherlands, Norway and
Sweden against Turkey (1985, five applications which, pursuant to
Chapter 25, involved Turkey’s consent on the admission of individual
petitions), Denmark vs. Turkey (the actions of the Turkish authorities
against a Danish citizen), and Cyprus vs Turkey ( 1997, mass violation
of human rights in northern Cyprus).

Among the above, special attention is given to consideration of the
Cyprus vs Turkey case. The court’s judgement on this case provided
a new significant precedent suitable for the resolution of disputes
between states.

The Book places a special focus on the economic aspects of conflicts.

Alongside with the protection of human rights, economic development
features as an essential factor which determines the ranking of
states in the world democratic community. The reason why so many
countries fail to gain a firm footing in the world community is that
they are unable to break away from the ‘vicious circle’ of conflicts –
poverty and a weak civil society contributes to the emergence of armed
conflicts, while conflicts, in turn, hamper the economic progress
and the building of democratic institutions.

According to the World Bank’s report, over the recent fifteen years,
80% of the poorest countries of the world have been embroiled in large
civil conflicts; in those countries where the war has already ended,
the threat of renewal of armed confrontation five years after the
hostilities remains as high as 40%. And, even if such countries make
a rapid advancement under peaceful conditions, they will still take
years and years before they can attain the pre-war economic level. It
is beyond any doubt that without economic progress it would hardly
be possible to attain a sustainable peace in any region.

Chapter "Economic Aspects of Conflicts’ looks into the magnitude of
losses entailed by conflicts. In truth, one can hardly find an adequate
measure to assess the human sufferings and the havoc inflicted by
conflicts upon vast territories and entire countries.

Large numbers of casualties, tens and hundreds of thousands of
civilians expelled from their homes, shattered economies – all this
is a logical outcome of conflicts, not to mention material damages
that mount up to hundreds of millions, often billions of US dollars.

According to expert evaluations, the aggregate material damage
resulting from conflicts in the hot spots of the former Soviet Union
totals 15 billion US dollars. Although, official representatives of
the affected countries often speak about amounts in losses far beyond
the above figure.

The prolonged conflicts in the post-Soviet countries have mostly
gone through their acute stage of hostilities onto the stage of
economic confrontation. In their rounds of settling the conflicts,
parties increasingly bring up the issue of compensation of the losses
incurred by them due to the actions of the other party.

Thus, Azerbaijan and Armenia rolled out their respective arguments
in connection with Nagorny Karabakh, holding each other responsible
for the material and moral damage and claiming compensations.

On 17 March 2006, the Parliament of Georgia adopted a resolution on
the Establishment of State Commission for evaluation of the damage
caused to the country by the conflicts in Abkhazia and the former
South Ossetian oblast. The resolution tasks the President of Georgia
to set up a state commission, in order to evaluate the losses incurred
by the country in relation with these conflicts.

A second Parliament resolution, adopted on the same day, requests the
President "to instruct the Georgian Government to call an international
tender with a view to identifing a law firm that would prepare and
bring claims to the European Court of Human Rights for the compensation
of losses incurred by the country due to the conflicts." The initiative
for adopting these resolutions came from the Temporary Commission on
Territorial Integrity Issues of the Parliament of Georgia.

In our view, the responsibility for the damage caused should rest
with the country which, in effect, controls both of the conflict
territories. Thus, Georgia must lodge a complaint in an international
court against Russia to claim at least 15 billion US dollars in
compensation of damages afflicted to the country in Abkhazia and the
former South Ossetian autonomous oblast (which is six times the 2006
state budget of Georgia).

Chapter "Economic Aspects of Conflicts" provides an overview of the
economic component of peace operations conducted under the aegis of
the United Nations. It also looks into the efficiency of the related
expenditures. Sadly, these peace operations, despite the large budgets,
have been valued as little effective against the expended funds.

It is commonly known that the World Bank attaches particular
significance to projects oriented toward rehabilitation and economic
development of post-conflict zones. In this respect, the Monograph
provides an extensive account of the activities carried out by the
World Bank.

The importance of transition from a conflict economy to that of a
peaceful time is hard to overestimate. In substance, this premise
should become the cornerstone of any conflict resolution process.

Another requirement of major significance is ensuring the maximum
legitimization of implemented economic programs. This would serve as
a gate-keeping mechanism to block any possibility for such programs
to become a feeding source for unlawful regimes.

There are a few examples of regions where after many years of abortive
attempts, they embark on robust policies orientated towards the
satisfaction of economic needs. Finally, they manage to break away
from poverty and build a sustainable economic system. Such "economic
wonders" include Northern Ireland (UK) and the South Tyrol Autonomous
Province (Italy). The chapter dealing with the economic aspects
of conflicts provides substantial detail regarding these regions,
including their economic growth rates and potential.

The Temporary Commission on Territorial Integrity Issues of the
Parliament of Georgia suggests an idea of a concrete project
aimed at the economic rehabilitation of conflict zones. The
project called "Product form the conflict zone’, focuses on active
involvement of broad groups of population within conflict zones in the
income-generating activities, coupled with setting up a special market
segment to allow the sale of locally produced goods and products.

Chapter "Economic Aspects of Conflicts" devotes special place
to a detailed description of the goals and objectives of this
project, including its implementation strategies. In the view of the
Parliamentary Commission, its realization should initially start with
a pilot project in the Georgian-Ossetian conflict zone. Favouring this
conclusion is the fact that a large-scale rehabilitation supported by
international donors is about to get underway in this territory. Hence,
conditions here would be better suited for the development of intensive
economic activities. What’s more, Georgian and Ossetian villages in
this zone are located literally side by side, which obviously provides
another prerequisite for a fuller integration of these communities
through economic activities.

The aim of the "Product form the Conflict Zone" project is to create a
favourable economic climate in the Tskinvali conflict region in order
to contribute to the re-building of traditional relations between
the conflict-torn communities and establishing a lasting peace.

The book aims to demonstrate that both the onset and further evolution
of the conflict are, indeed, predictable. It provides an account of
the material and human toll already taken by the current conflicts,
together with the threats they pose to regional stability.

In the authors’ opinion, activation of the international judicial
mechanism holds an important potential for conflict-resolution. The
authors’ prevailing motive in presenting substantial information
regarding the structure of international courts, as well as stressing
the need to expand their scope of competence and analyzing selected
precedents of the case law, was to emphasize the ultimate usefulness
of such structures and outline the efficient ways of drawing on these
benefits, given Georgia’s reality.

Human rights and freedoms, and the economic development are the two
factors most readily prone to the devastating effect of any conflict.

Destructive by nature, these processes are most intricately intertwined
and invariably spread beyond the confines of local significance. With
this in mind, the monograph concentrates just on these two major
directions: the economy and human rights protection.

The analysis of conflicts presented in the book allowed to single out
the individual and specific features of each conflict. An objective
approach to the interpretation of the developments underway in Georgia
must demonstrate to the international community that restoration
of this country’s territorial integrity and returning the conflict
zones to the fold of Georgia’s authority will be tantamount to the
restoration of an essential system of values in the eyes of the
civilized world.