TURKEY: NO ONE KNOWS WHAT WILL HAPPEN
Prof. Barry Rubin – 7/26/2007
Global Politician, NY
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July 24 2007
In political terms, the Justice and Development (AK) party which
won 47 percent of the votes in Turkey’s July 22 elections and
will have almost two-thirds of the parliament seats is a pragmatic,
conservative, business-oriented moderate party despite its roots as an
Islamic-oriented one. In societal terms, the Justice and Development
(AK) party is probably transforming Turkey from a secular into a
more Islamic society, with a big effect on the status of women,
the situation of minorities, and Turkey’s foreign policy.
Both statements are true. And this is the point many observers are
missing in the great change signaled by the election results.
The outcome was a surprise. Sure, everyone knew AK would win but
hardly anyone thought it would get almost half the votes. Even the
party’s leaders didn’t expect this to happen.
Part of the reason was the brilliance of the AK party’s leadership.
They usually knew exactly how far to go so as not to alienate people.
After all, only 7 to 12 percent of Turks want an Islamist state. The
AK party convinced many others that it is not seeking such an outcome,
successfully positioning itself as safely centrist.
I am not saying that this is all a con game. The party got rid of some
of its hardliners and brought in a lot of non-Islamic conservatives and
technocrats. It has gone slowly and carefully on making any changes
regarding secularism while the economy has improved under its rule
(though this probably would have happened any way). Among a lot of
intellectuals, it has now become fashionable to embrace the party,
ridiculing fears about its intentions.
A number of other factors played a role in the AK landslide:
The incompetence of the opposition. The other parties did not
unite, except for the two on the left, and carried out old-fashioned
rather than mobilizing, grass roots’-oriented campaigns. The "left"
nationalist CHP focused on western Turkey and did little in much of
the country. The party was led by the much-reviled Denis Baykal who
now insists he will not resign his post after the election defeat.
The collapse of the traditional conservative or center-right parties.
For many years the Motherland and True Path parties were big
vote-getters. They have vanished leaving the AK party as their heir.
It was their tradition-oriented but hardly Islamist voters who gave
the AK its big support.
The lack of any popular liberal, Western-style party. In parliament
there are now three parties: the Islam-rooted AK, the "left"
nationalist CHP, and the right-wing nationalist MHP. Given this
line-up, AK voters are less anti-American and more pro-European Union
membership than the so-called anti-Islamic parties.
Why, then, did this article open with an apparent contradiction. Is
the AK party trying to make Turkey Islamist or not? Let’s be
clear, first and foremost, Turks simply don’t know the answer to
that question. There is lots of evidence that the AK is moderate
and democratic, both in terms of its behavior and composition. The
party’s leader, Tacip Erdogan, made a very conciliatory speech after
the election, hitting all the right notes to calm any concerns Turks
might have about his intentions.
Yet the fact remains that while Turks hope this is true they don’t
know what the party will do if it stays in power for many years. In
conversations with intellectuals who start out stressing their comfort
with the AK victory, after a while some misgivings creep into their
sentiments. About one-third of Turks say today that they wouldn’t
mind seeing a military coup to throw out AK. That partly arises from
anger at losing but it also results from real fear.
There will be two fairly quick tests of the party’s short-term
intentions. First, will AK pick a presidential candidate from its own
ranks–someone identified with an Islamic orientation at least in the
past-or someone widely acceptable? If the former it will be a danger
sign. Second, when the armed forces make their annual promotions, will
the party object to the purging of pro-Islamic officers, something
the army does every year?
Even ruling out any conspiratorial intent on the AK party’s part,
there are three very important points to keep in mind:
The party’s moderation has been ensured by its feeling outside pressure
from voters, rival parties, the army, the economy, and the EU. Being
cautious brings it votes, investment, progress on EU membership,
more votes, and non-intervention by the army. Yet what if at some
point the party gets more confident, even arrogant? Erdogan seems
too smart for that but it could happen.
The EU’s negotiators, at least, find AK easy to deal with. After
all, being less nationalist, it is more willing to make concessions
over the Cyprus and other issues than its rivals. It is happy to go
along with EU demands to weaken the political power of the army,
which makes it harder for the military to intervene to protect
Turkey’s secularism. And it is eager to meet the standards required
for membership since success would solidify its popularity at home
and give it a certificate of moderation.
Yet are countries like France and Germany going to be more eager
to have in the EU a country where half the voters support a party
that is so Islamic-oriented? No. Remember that the goal is not to
advance the membership process but to attain membership. I have made
up a joke that makes Turks laugh, in the form of a new blessing:
"May you live long enough to see Turkey as an EU member," in other
words may you live a very long time.
The social factor. This is extremely important and almost all foreign
observers miss it. Suppose the AK party is a model democratic
government. Nevertheless, what is the long-term effect of its
success? Employees in government offices know that if your wife wears
a headscarf you are more likely to get promoted. Businesspeople know
that if you want a government contract it is better to be seen as a
pious Muslim and party supporter.
And what about women? Polling shows that more women support AK than
men. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the increasing numbers of
women wearing headscarves are all enthusiastically pious Muslims. If
you live in a neighborhood or city where more women are dressing
"modestly" not to do so is to stand out, perhaps to be accused of
being a prostitute. There are also a small but increasing number of
women wearing chadors or even Afghan-style burqas. So the situation
of women is likely to change steadily in eastern and central Turkey
especially, even if AK passes no laws and launches no repression.
Or take education. It is arguably unfair that graduates of
state-sanctioned Islamic high schools cannot take college entrance
tests. These schools are supposedly meant to train prayer leaders
but they have really emerged as a whole alternative system. Some say
that these schools can be as good as secular schools; secularists
charge they are inferior and train people to follow authority rather
than to function as democratic individuals. If there is a change to
raise their status, hundreds of thousands of students could enter
this system, indoctrinating them into an Islamist-style approach.
Foreign policy. In the context of advancing radical Islamist forces
in the Middle East and even Europe, the AK victory is seen as another
step forward toward inevitable victory. This is not good.
Feeling alone and surrounded by unfriendly countries is a common
feature of Turkish nationalist thinking, especially in the army as
well as in the two opposition parties. In this world view, The Arabs
are uncivilized, the Iranians are crazy, the Israelis are aggressive,
the Greeks are untrustworthy, the Russians are expansionists, the
French support the Armenians, and the Americans support the Kurds.
This attitude meshes in many ways with an Islamist one, though the
latter of course are more positive about fellow Muslims.
An AK-led government may not form an alliance with Iran but it
is also not going to join the United States in combating Iran’s
ambitions. Even though the two countries enjoy normal, even good,
relations, it is simply not realistic to consider Turkey under the
present government as a U.S. ally.
As for Turkey-Israel relations, these should stay the same. The
government wants to keep happy the army, which favors them. But there
can be no doubt that the AK party government would prefer to have no
relations with Israel at all.
Turkish Jews are obsessed with keeping a low profile. Some of
the communities’ wealthiest members are trying or succeeding to
do business with the government, though reportedly the regime
discriminates against smaller Jewish-owned companies. Many in the
community feel they have no future in Turkey. One Jewish woman
broke down in tears over the election results. Another sighed, in
a hyperbolic but heartfelt statement, that the vote’s result made
her feel walking down the street that two-thirds of those she passed
(the AK plus the MHP voters) hated her.
Of course, there are lots of possibilities. The AK party could split,
there might be a scandal, the economy could decline and in a few
years 47 percent of the voters could be backing an opposition party.
Or AK could be in power for 20 years and transform Turkey.
Prof. Barry Rubin is director of the Global Research in International
Affairs (GLORIA) Center, Interdisciplinary university. His new book
is The Truth About Syria (Palgrave-Macmillan).