IRAN TO LEAD CENTRAL ASIA
Journal of Turkish Weekly, Turkey
Aug 15 2007
This week, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad kicks off a tour of
neighboring states in South and Central Asia with a trip that begins
in Kabul and ends in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in time to attend the next
summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asia Times
Online reported.
With the security deterioration in Afghanistan, openly admitted to by
that country’s President Hamid Karzai on his recent trip to Washington,
and rising Islamic militancy in the region and in China’s western
autonomous region of Xinjiang, the Islamic Republic of Iran is a
key regional player that can be counted on by the SCO member states,
irrespective of China’s recent misgivings about Iran’s inclusion as
a full member.
In Afghanistan, Ahmadinejad will reiterate Iran’s good-neighborly
policy, perhaps much to the chagrin of US President George W Bush,
who openly disagreed with Karzai’s pro-Iran comments at their recent
joint press conference. With their porous 936-kilometer border, Iran
and Afghanistan are grappling with a growing menace of drug traffic
that exacts the lives of hundreds of Iranian law-enforcement agents
annually, in addition to the deadly resurgence of the Taliban who,
having regrouped in Pakistan, have stepped up their attacks on the
Afghan government and US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces
stationed in the war-ravaged country.
In Turkmenistan, the country’s new leader, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov,
is playing a balancing act between Iran and Russia, in contrast to his
predecessor, Sapamurat Niyazov, who was closely aligned with Iran and
signed a (hitherto undisclosed) military pact. Considered a welcome
departure from Niyazov’s cultic brand of politics, Berdimuhamedov
is keen on not antagonizing Moscow, tantalizing it with offers of
marketing his country’s abundant gas resources through a pipeline to
Russia. Already, Turkmenistan has entered an agreement with Iran for
the transit of its gas to Turkey and Europe.
Iran and Turkmenistan have similar perspectives on the hitherto
inconclusive marathon discussions on the division of the Caspian Sea.
Iran is weary of any undue shift in Turkmenistan’s foreign policy in
Russia’s favor at a delicate time when Iran-Russia relations have hit
a new low as a result of the nuclear row and Russia’s appeasement
of Washington’s demand to link the fate of the Russian-made power
plant in Bushehr to the nuclear crisis. With President Vladimir Putin
beginning to flex Russian military muscle on Georgia, and through
a joint military exercise with China, Iran’s concerns about a new
Russian militarism are unmistakable.
In Uzbekistan, home to a US military base, Iran seeks to enhance
economic cooperation in part by improving the transportation
corridor between the two countries. According to Iran’s ambassador
to Uzbekistan, trade between Iran and Uzbekistan in the first nine
months of 2006 reached US$450 million. About 70 joint ventures and
representative offices of big Iranian companies are operating in the
various sectors of the Uzbek economy. Iran is soliciting Tashkent’s
support on Iran’s nuclear program, and that is only one of several
reasons Tehran, always considering Uzbekistan a regional middleweight,
is keen on cultivating relations.
In the "near neighbor" Tajikistan, considered close to Iran’s heart
because of various cultural and historical connections, Tehran’s aim is
to build on the progress made as a result of the January visit by the
Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov, which paved the way for an expansion
of bilateral ties, eg agreements providing for Iranian assistance for
several Tajik infrastructure projects, including construction of the
Sangtuda-2 hydroelectric power station and the Shahristan Tunnel.
In light of the continuing tensions between and among the Central
Asian states of Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan over scarce
water and arable land, Iran is a suitable mediator with a rather
shining record, seeing how it successfully brokered peace among the
Tajik warring factions during the mid-1990s. Unfortunately, to this
date, Iran’s conflict-management role, both in Tajikistan and in the
Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, have remained
largely unnoticed in the Western media’s coverage of Iran.
In Kazakhstan, Iran seeks to boost its oil and trade relations and to
do so partly by arranging sub-national, ie, region-to-region relations
through its Caspian provinces. Kazakhstan has an oil-swap agreement
with Iran, whereby every year some 1.2 million barrels of oil are
exported from Aktau, Kazakhstan, to Iran, which then transports this
oil to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf region.
Iran’s oil companies are active in Kazakh oil activities in the
Caspian Sea and, barring unforeseen developments, the two countries
can expand their trade even beyond the US$2 billion reported for 2006.
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev has expressed support for Iran’s
peaceful nuclear program and may even push aggressively for Iran’s
inclusion in the SCO, given Kazakhstan’s close yet not too close
relations with both China and Russia. Kazakhstan is averse toward
SCO’s evolution as a Warsaw Treaty-like organization, which is why
it has "sent a signal to Washington" by not allowing the Chinese
soldiers participating in the joint exercise to travel to Russia
through its territory.
In Kyrgyzstan, after a recent trip by Iran’s finance minister promising
the allocation of Iran’s 50 million euros ($66.67 million) credit for
joint development and industrial projects in Bishkek, Iran is looking
to expand ties in all domains, as part and parcel of it broader Central
Asian policy that includes the ambitious plans for a "new Silk Road"
connecting Iran and China through the region.
All five Central Asian states and Afghanistan are members of the
regional Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), which has been a
forum for discussion among these states for trade and transportation
linkages among them. By more organically connecting Afghanistan to
Central Asia within the scope of its regionalist approach, Iran hopes
to see a certain geopolitical dividend emerge that may, in fact,
influence the SCO’s approach toward it.
A timely boost to the hitherto neglected aspect of Ahmadinejad’s
foreign policy, which has been understandably more preoccupied with
the volatile Persian Gulf and Iraq, his tour of the region will not
only reinforce Iran’s image as a pillar of cooperation and stability,
it will also indirectly help Iran’s Persian Gulf strategy, which has
met the resistance of Saudi Arabia (boycotting last week’s security
meeting on Iraq held in Damascus).
After all, Iran can also play transit route for the Arab states of
Persian Gulf seeking trade and investment in the landlocked Central
Asian states. That aside, geostrategically speaking, Iran eases
pressure on itself by getting more breathing space in this newly
independent region still grappling with the problems of state-making.