Eurasia Daily Monitor

September 21, 2007 — Volume 4, Issue 175

MOSCOW HINTS AT ITS NUISANCE VALUE TO ALLIED OPERATIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

by Vladimir Socor

Russia abstained in the UN Security Council’s September 20 vote to
prolong the mandate of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in
Afghanistan, a NATO-led operation. This is the first time since 2001 that
Russia withheld its approval from an allied operation (U.S.-led Enduring
Freedom and NATO’s ISAF) in Afghanistan. Concurrently, Moscow indicated
again that it tolerates the U.S.-led air base in Kyrgyzstan — that supports
operations in Afghanistan — conditionally and temporarily.

Moscow’s abstention in the Security Council has no significant
consequences on the practical level. Symbolically, however, it hits at what
the United States and NATO define as a core interest and top operational
priority. Politically, it signifies yet another warning that Russia is
prepared to challenge U.S. and NATO interests and hinder their policies
almost anywhere in Eurasia to the maximum feasible extent.

Thus, obstructionism in Afghanistan is only the latest in the series
of recent Russian moves against anti-missile defense in Europe, the Treaty
on Conventional Forces, conflict resolution in Kosovo (where Russia now
opposes what it calls `a NATO state’), U.S. military installations in
Romania and Bulgaria, sovereignty and integrity of Georgia and Moldova, and
other geopolitical issues, all amid the challenge to Western energy
interests and energy security. By stepping up the obstructions or pressures
and multiplying the disputed points, Moscow seeks to extract concessions on
some issues in return for relenting on other disputes that it has itself
created.

Russia was the only country that did not support the Security Council’
s resolution to prolong ISAF’s mandate by another year. As a pretext for its
abstention, Moscow raised questions about the ongoing Japanese naval
operation in the Indian Ocean. The Russians objected to the draft resolution
that linked Japan’s naval operation with the ISAF and Enduring Freedom
ground operations in Afghanistan.

The Japanese operation is designed to supply allied forces in
Afghanistan, via the Indian Ocean and Pakistan, with fuel and other critical
materiel. It is also intended to intercept and board vessels suspected of
carrying arms or reinforcements destined for terror groups that operate in
Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas. Russia obliquely sought a voice in
defining the parameters of the Japanese naval operations. Furthermore,
Moscow objected to the resolution’s wording that commended Japan for its
role.

The naval operation is highly controversial in Japan. It became one of
the factors behind prime minister Shinzo Abe’s resignation earlier this
month, following the opposition’s victory in the Senate elections.
Opposition parties call for termination of this naval operation. The
governing Liberal-Democratic Party wants to continue it and has welcomed the
Security Council’s resolution for praising this Japanese contribution to
anti-terror efforts.

Russian Ambassador to the UN Vitaly Churkin objected to what he
described as improper interference in Japan’s internal affairs through this
resolution. Churkin argued almost explicitly that the resolution’s wording
would help the government and hinder the opposition in the Japanese
political debate over the naval operation. Thus, Moscow evidenced an
interest in curbing Japan’s emergent role in international security in Asia,
even on the anti-terror front in this case. With this move, Russia seems to
be positioning itself more broadly against NATO’s intentions to develop
closer links with countries like Australia and Japan for enhancing security
in the Indian and Pacific oceans.

Also on September 20, the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO) proposed assuming a political and security role in
Afghanistan. Citing an urgent need to stabilize the country and the region,
CSTO General Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha offered the organization’s
assistance to train Afghan military and security personnel, combat drug
trafficking, coordinate economic aid projects by Central Asian countries
through the CSTO in Afghanistan, and help `normalize’ the political
situation there through legislative assistance.

Moscow is airing this set of proposals through the CSTO, so as to make
it look `multilateral’ and regional, rather than Russian. It first unveiled
this agenda in March of this year during a Russian-led CSTO delegation’s
visit to Afghanistan (see EDM, March 16). The goal is to re-introduce
Russian political and security influence in Afghanistan through means short
of a military presence. Moscow could not fail to see opportunity in the
recent setbacks and dysfunctionalities of NATO and U.S. operations there. It
seeks to capitalize on this situation for re-entry in Afghanistan, primarily
through soft-power instruments, for a strategic payoff that eludes the
hard-power wielding Western forces.

Bordyuzha was addressing a two-day meeting in Bishkek of the Security
Council Secretaries of CSTO member countries (Russia, Belarus, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan). At that session, Bordyuzha
reaffirmed Russia’s position that U.S. access to the Manas air base is
time-limited to the duration of operations in Afghanistan. Moreover, while
Kyrgyzstan’s agreement with the United States on this issue is a matter for
Bishkek to decide, he said, nevertheless Kyrgyzstan is `actively consulting
with its allies on this issue.’ This is a clear hint that Moscow reserves
the options to allow, disallow, or set conditions to the continuation of
Kyrgyzstan’s basing arrangements with the United States.

(Interfax, Itar-Tass, September 19, 20)

–Vladimir Socor