THE POSSIBLE PERILS OF RECOGNIZING KOSOVO’S INDEPENDENCE
By Charles Tannock
The Daily Star, Lebanon
Sept 25 2007
Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it
is in life. Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to
leap into the unknown. Even though lack of foresight is universally
viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with
British backing probable) is now preparing to recognize Kosovo’s
independence unilaterally – irrespective of the consequences for
Europe and the world.
Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission
guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of
Serbia. But, with Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian majority demanding its
own state and with Russia refusing to recognize UN mediator Martti
Ahtisaari’s plan for conditional independence, the US is preparing
to go it alone. Instead of thinking through what Ahtisaari deemed
unthinkable – a partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north
going to Serbia and the rest linked to the Kosovars’ ethnic brethren
in Albania or a separate state – the US plans to act without the
UN’s blessing, arguing that only an independent Kosovo will bring
stability to the Western Balkans.
That argument is debatable – and the record of the Kosovar government
suggests that it is wrong. But the US position is unambiguously
misguided in not foreseeing that the "Kosovo precedent" will incite
instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.
Why the rush to give Kosovo independence? Many serious disputes
have gone unresolved for decades. The Kashmir question has lingered
since 1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974,
and Israel’s occupation of the West Bank from 1967. Yet no one is
suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential
flashpoints.
Nevertheless, the US – like most European Union members – argue that
Kosovo’s situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding
international precedent. But Russia sees things very differently.
Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to reestablish its authority
over the nations and territories that were once part of the Soviet
Union.
Spain and Cyprus, with their worries over secessionist-minded
regions, are worried by any possible precedent. Romania fears the
fallout on neighboring Moldova from Kosovo’s unilaterally gaining
independence. The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognize
the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian
troops and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years.
Ukraine – the great prize in Russia’s bid to recapture its former
sphere of influence – is also deeply anxious. It fears that Russia
will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic
Russian population forms a majority. (Crimea was ceded to Ukraine
by Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954). Russia may decide to abuse the
Kosovo precedent further to divide Ukraine’s population between
Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers.
But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo’s
independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the
tinderbox of today’s Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that
Russia may recognize breakaway regions in the South Caucasus – and
back them more strongly than it does now.
Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia’s president, the Kremlin was
making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens
of Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into
its economy. Russia’s supposed "peacekeeping troops" in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, Georgia’s other secession-minded region, have in fact
protected their rebel governments. Russia has also been enforcing
a complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the
resolve of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili.
Should Russia recognize Abkhazia’s independence, Saakashvili might be
tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from unraveling.
Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk of open
warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as there
are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the breakaway
government.
Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian
support) will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh’s self-proclaimed independence
from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian, endured
a bloody secessionist war between 1988 and 1994, with 30,000 killed
and 14 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory occupied by Russian-backed
Armenian forces.
Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup. So the
government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare
than it was in the 1990s. Moreover, it has neighboring Turkey on
its side. Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on
Armenia, including closure of its border.
Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that
Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased
equipment and Turkish military support. Armenian forces are well dug in
and have received a significant boost from Russia’s diversion of heavy
weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military bases.
Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a
strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border
in Armenia – partly as a security measure in case of a US attack
and partly to relieve its petrol shortages. Moreover, Iran remains
eager to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri
minority in northern Iran.
The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually
called "frozen conflicts," because not much has happened since they
began in the early 1990s. Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its
independence is likely to unfreeze them – fast and bloodily. And such
potential bloodshed on Russia’s border may give Vladimir Putin the
pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally
mandated end next March.
Charles Tannock is a member of the European Parliament, where he is
spokesman on foreign affairs for the British Conservative Party. THE
DAILY STAR publishes this commentary in collaboration with Project
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