THE ILLUSION OF TURKISH-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP
Suat Kiniklioglu

Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Sept 26 2007

After three days in Washington, one leaves with a distinct sense of
alienation from the capital of the United States.

Every contact we meet cautiously whispers that this time the infamous
Armenian resolution might pass. Interestingly, they also acknowledge
that they know that it is not in the interest of the US to do so.

Regardless of the gloom and doom, some analysts believe that there
is still some common sense among the democrats that recognizes the
potential risks of passing such a resolution at this time. "Why kill
the cash cow now when we are entering an election campaign?" noted
another. Of course it is clear that once the resolution passes there
would be no more need to financially support exorbitant election
campaigns. The present situation is actually ideal as it allows
representatives to garner the benefits of the current environment,
which on the one hand suggests inevitability and on the other leans
on the sober reality of impossibility. Let the Armenians pay for one
more year.

Needless to say, the security threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) and the unwillingness of the US to assert proper influence
over President Massoud Barzani was at the center of our meetings. We
humble Turks have difficulty grasping how the United States Central
Command (CENTCOM) can manage to get away with stalling action on
the PKK when President Bush and Secretary of State Rice repeatedly
ordered the military command to deal with the PKK issue.

Turkey’s friends in Washington were equally aghast when Undersecretary
Burns listed the areas in which the US was expecting Turkey’s help at
an Atlantic Council event. Unfortunately, no one among the audience
could hear what Washington was offering in exchange. Turkish ears
were particularly curious to hear what was going to be said about the
PKK menace in northern Iraq. Far from expecting any new items on the
agenda, Ankara would have been happy to hear what its NATO ally was
going to do about the PKK, which really is a responsibility rather
than a favor. In fact, the overall message of Burns’ speech was that
all was fine on the Turkish-American front. Luckily Burns avoided
reading his wish list to Prime Minister Erdoðan in Ankara.

We Turks need to come to terms with the fact that this administration
is not going to lift a finger on the PKK. The only hope is that the
violence remains at a sustainable level until a new administration
takes its place in the White House. Fixing the Turkish-American
relationship will take years, if it happens at all. The US appears
to have made a very calculated choice when it comes to Turks and
Kurds in Iraq. That choice is clearly in favor of Mr. Barzani and the
Kurds. That a strategic ally is alienated and is being lost in the
process appears to be a secondary concern. It is too early to tell
what this will mean in the mid to long term, but this relationship is
neither strategic nor visionary any more. We need to get used to it
and reorganize ourselves, instead of reminiscing about the old days
or deceiving ourselves about a nonexistent partnership.

A last word is appropriate on the Iraqi Kurds. Iraqi Kurds, especially
those who burn with Barzani’s nationalism, seem to believe in the
illusion that the US will provide them with an eternal security
umbrella. Similar to the Romanians, they are inexperienced in dealing
with our friends in Washington. Regardless of what they base their
calculations on, there is no doubt that Turks, Kurds, Iranians and
Syrians, not to mention the Shiites and Sunnis of Iraq, will be
facing each other when everyone else is gone. Wise leadership would
take this into account.

Ultimately an honest discussion on how to mend the Turkish-American
relationship would require the US to make significant policy changes.

This is not going to happen before 2009, if at all. We should
acknowledge that instead of pretending that all is fine.

–Boundary_(ID_uwD1w8jzsiNbHhHejz6+DA)–